Shueon Mallory v. Checkr, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 8, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-00232
StatusUnknown

This text of Shueon Mallory v. Checkr, Inc. (Shueon Mallory v. Checkr, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shueon Mallory v. Checkr, Inc., (N.D. Ohio 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION SHUEON MALLORY, ) CASE NO. 1:26 CV 232 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER ) vs. ) ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION CHECKR, INC. ) AND ORDER ) Defendant. ) This action was removed from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas by Defendant Checkr, Inc. (“Checkr”) on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Pro se Plaintiff Shueon Mallory brings this action against Checkr under th Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, alleging Checkr reported false information to both a prospective landlord and a prospective employer, and failed to correct the inaccuracy when Plaintiff reported it. He seeks monetary damages. Checkr filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate liability under the FCRA. They further allege that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that he was denied an apartment on October 21, 2013 due to criminal history. He also alleges he was denied employment with Door Dash based on information provided to them by Checkr. In November 2019, Door Dash ordered a background report on Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff’s application to conduct deliveries on the Door Dash platform. The report prepared by Checkr included criminal history from Medina County, Ohio.

Plaintiff contends that Checkr reported his conviction as a fourth degree felony when it fact it was a minor misdemeanor.1 Plaintiff indicates he immediately went on the Checkr website and filed an appeal. He states, “nothing worked.” (Doc. No. 1-1). It is unclear if Plaintiff is stating that Checkr failed to investigate and change the information or if he is suggesting that Checkr did not provide the corrected information to Door Dash. He states Checkr blamed Medina County for keeping inaccurate records. Plaintiff indicates Medina County’s records are accurate and Checkr refused to take responsibility for the misinformation it provided. It is unclear if

Checkr has corrected the misinformation. Plaintiff does not provide much information regarding the legal basis for his claims. He simply states, “15 U.S.C. § 1651 Code 195 Code 190 Code 380 + 370.” The Court recognizes 16 U.S.C. § 1651 as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). There are too many variables for the Court to construct a cause of action with only the notation “Code 195 Code 190 Code 380 + 370.” Checkr filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). They claim that Plaintiff has not pled facts suggesting that their procedures in preparing and

reinvestigating the information in the report were unreasonable. They also assert that the

1 A search of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas docket and the Medina Municipal Court docket showed only one criminal case against Shueon Mallory from 2007 in which he was convicted on one count of drug abuse, a minor misdemeanor. See State of Ohio v. Mallory, No. 07CRB01642 (Medina Muni. Ct. Jan. 4, 2008). The Common Pleas Court has no record of a felony criminal case against Mr. Mallory. -2- Plaintiff’s claims are barred the two-year and a five-year statute of limitations set forth in the FCRA. They indicate that the statute of limitations begins to run when the Plaintiff discovered

the inaccuracy, or with respect to an appeal to correct inaccurate information, thirty days after filing the appeal. They contend Plaintiff discovered the inaccuracy provided to Door Dash in or around November 2019. He claims to have immediately reported the inaccuracy upon discovery which would place the date of the appeal in or around November 2019. The Defendants assert that even if the longer of the statute of limitations periods is used, his Complaint would have to have been filed in November or December 2024. They contend that Plaintiff’s filing of this case in January 2026 is beyond the applicable statute of limitations period for filing a claim under the

FCRA. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When deciding a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the function of the Court is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. See Mayer v. Mulod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and recently in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009) clarified the law regarding what the Plaintiff must plead in order to survive a Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6). When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

-3- Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78, further explains the “plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has held that a court may consider allegations contained in the Complaint, as well as exhibits attached to or otherwise incorporated in the Complaint, all without converting a Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c); Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997).

III. ANALYSIS The purpose of FCRA is to require that “consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the

-4- confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information....” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). A “consumer reporting agency” (“CRA”) is defined under the Act as “any person

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Related

Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Alan Weiner, D.P.M. v. Klais and Company, Inc.
108 F.3d 86 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
Smith v. Encore Credit Corp.
623 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ohio, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
Shueon Mallory v. Checkr, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shueon-mallory-v-checkr-inc-ohnd-2026.