Shuchen Yue v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 SHUCHEN YUE, Case No. 5:25-cv-11115-EJD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND TO 10 v. REMAND

11 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, Re: ECF No. 12 Defendant. 12

13 Plaintiff Shuchen Yue brings this action against Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA 14 (“MBUSA”) for violations of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of express warranty, and breach of the 15 implied warranty of merchantability. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion 16 under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) to amend the complaint to join a non-diverse defendant and remand the 17 action to state court. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and Motion to Remand (“Mot.”), 18 ECF No. 12. Defendant did not file an opposition. The parties appeared before the Court for a 19 motion hearing on March 12, 2026. ECF No. 21. For the reasons explained below, the Court 20 GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and to remand the action to state court. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Yue alleges that on June 23, 2024, he purchased a 2021 Mercedes-Benz GLE 23 from Defendant MBUSA in Walnut Creek, California. Mot. at 3. The car came with an express 24 written warranty which provided that, should a defect arise, MBUSA or one of its authorized 25 representatives would fix the defect or provide compensation. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the car 26 developed defects during the warranty period and that MBUSA and its representatives, including 27 Fletcher Jones Motor Cars, Inc. (“FJMC”) did not repair it. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that 1 MBUSA has neither replaced the car nor compensated Plaintiff. Id. 2 On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff sued in Santa Clara County Superior Court for violations 3 of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of express warranty, and breach of the implied warranty of 4 merchantability. Compl. On December 31, 2025, Defendant MBUSA removed to federal court 5 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. 6 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 7 Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add FJMC, an authorized 8 dealership that Plaintiff alleges failed to repair his car. Plaintiff’s proposed First Amended 9 Complaint (“FAC”) adds a cause of action alleging negligent repair and/or diagnosis against 10 FJMC. Proposed FAC, ECF No. 12-8 at 9. FJMC is in Fremont, California, so adding FJMC as a 11 defendant would destroy diversity and deprive the Court of jurisdiction over this case. 12 A. Legal Standard 13 Generally, motions to amend a complaint to add new parties are governed by Rule 15 of 14 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15 mandates that leave to amend be freely granted 15 whenever justice requires. However, Rule 15 does not apply in situations where—as here—“a 16 plaintiff amends her complaint after removal to add a diversity destroying defendant.” Greer v. 17 Lockheed Martin, No. 10-cv-1704-JF (HRL), 2010 WL 3168408, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2010). 18 When a plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to add a diversity-destroying defendant, 28 19 U.S.C. § 1447(e) governs the analysis. That statute reads, “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to 20 join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may 21 deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). 22 B. Discussion 23 When deciding whether to permit joinder under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), courts consider five 24 factors: (1) whether the new defendant(s) should be joined under Rule 19(a) as “needed for just 25 adjudication”; (2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude an original action against the 26 new defendants in state court; (3) whether there has been unexplained delay in requesting joinder; 27 (4) whether joinder is intended solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the claims against 1 the new defendant appear valid; and (6) whether denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. 2 Palestini v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 193 F.R.D. 654, 658 (S.D. Cal. 2000). The Court considers 3 each factor in turn. 4 1. Whether Joinder is Necessary for Just Adjudication 5 This factor is met when “failure to join will lead to separate and redundant actions,” but it 6 is not met when “defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not 7 prevent complete relief.” Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 2:16-CV- 8 00949-CAS-KSX, 2016 WL 3396925, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016). This is a less restrictive 9 standard than the required joinder of parties under Rule 19. IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania 10 Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 11 Plaintiff argues that the proposed joinder of FJMC meets this lenient standard. The Court 12 agrees. In Forward-Rossi, the plaintiff sued her vehicle’s manufacturer for violations of the 13 express and implied warranties and the Song-Beverly Act. Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925. 14 She later sought to add the dealership that attempted to repair her car. The court found that since 15 “[a]ll of the claims asserted against [the manufacturer] and [the dealership] involve the same 16 vehicle, the same alleged defects in that vehicle, and the same lengthy and, ultimately, 17 unsuccessful attempt to repair that vehicle,” their resolution would require the same documents 18 and witnesses and turn on the same factual and legal questions. Id. at *3. Joinder was thus 19 necessary for just adjudication of the claims. 20 Here, the facts are nearly identical to those in Forward-Rossi. The claims asserted against 21 MBUSA and FJMC involve the same car, the same alleged defects, and the same attempts to 22 repair the car. FJMC is not merely “tangentially related” to the existing claims against MBUSA— 23 it participated in the conduct that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims against MBUSA. This factor 24 weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff leave to amend. 25 2. Statute of Limitations 26 The second factor courts consider is whether the statute of limitations would preclude an 27 original action against the new party in state court. 1 “The Song-Beverly Act does not include its own statute of limitations.” Mexia v. Rinker 2 Boat Co., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 1305–06 (2009). Instead, “the statute of limitations for an 3 action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by . . . the Uniform 4 Commercial Code: section 2725.” Id.; see also Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 35 Cal. 5 App. 4th 112, 132 (1995). Under Section 2725, “[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale 6 must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued,” and “a cause of 7 action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of 8 the breach.” Cal. Com. Code. § 2725. 9 Here, Plaintiff purchased the vehicle on June 23, 2024, and brought suit on November 21, 10 2025. This puts Plaintiff’s claims well within the statute of limitations. This factor weighs in 11 favor of granting leave to amend. 12 3. Unexplained Delay 13 “When determining whether to allow amendment to add a nondiverse party, courts 14 consider whether the amendment was attempted in a timely fashion.” Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. 15 Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 16 Here, Plaintiff filed his motion to amend only one month after the case was removed to 17 federal court. This delay is “not unreasonable under this circuit’s precedents.” Forward-Rossi, 18 2016 WL 3396925, at *3 (collecting cases). This factor weighs in favor of granting leave to 19 amend. 20 4. Whether Joinder is Intended Solely to Defeat Federal Jurisdiction 21 “There is a general presumption against fraudulent joinder.” Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. 22 Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff has described a facially 23 valid claim against FJMC (see infra Part II.B.5). And since Defendant has not filed a response to 24 Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant has not rebutted the presumption against fraudulent joinder. This 25 factor favors granting leave to amend. 26 5. Apparent Validity of Plaintiff’s Claims 27 “The existence of a facially legitimate claim against the putative defendant weighs in favor 1 of permitting joinder under § 1447(e).” Taylor v. Honeywell Corp., No. C-09-4947-SBA, 2010 2 WL 1881459, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010). At this stage, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment need 3 not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Rather, Plaintiff must only state a facially legitimate claim. 4 In Forward-Rossi, the Central District found that the plaintiff had stated a facially valid claim 5 against the authorized dealership that conducted the repairs. See Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 6 3396925, at *4. The facts here are almost identical, so this factor favors granting leave to amend. 7 6. Whether the Denial of Joinder Would Prejudice the Plaintiff 8 This factor takes into consideration: (1) whether denying the amendment would force the 9 plaintiff to choose between the costs of redundant litigation arising out of the same facts or 10 foregoing potential claims against the parties sought to be joined; and (2) if the statute of 11 limitations would bar the filing of an original complaint in the state court. Verrell v. ROC AZ 12 Villa Antiqua LLC, No. CIV-14-1730-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 3556359, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 18, 13 2014). 14 Here, denying the amendment would force Plaintiff to choose between litigating two cases 15 arising out of the same set of facts, which would be costly, or foregoing potential claims against 16 FJMC. But the claim would not be time barred as an original action in state court. See supra Part 17 II.B.2. Generally, federal courts are less inclined to permit diversity-destroying joinder if the 18 plaintiff could still seek relief in state court. See Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. But since the 19 claims against MBUSA and FJMC arise from the same factual circumstances, it is more efficient 20 to adjudicate this matter only once. This factor favors granting leave to amend. 21 *** 22 All six of the factors thus weigh in favor of granting leave to amend. Consequently, the 23 Court finds that it is appropriate to permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint to add FJMC as a 24 defendant. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended 25 complaint. 26 III. MOTION TO REMAND 27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal courts have original jurisdiction over state law actions 1 where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are of diverse citizenship. 2 In its notice of removal, MBUSA argued that diversity jurisdiction existed because the 3 amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 and the parties were diverse. Notice of Removal at 2. 4 Specifically, Plaintiff is a citizen of California, and MBUSA is a citizen of Delaware and Georgia. 5 Id. However, with FJMC added as a defendant, this action is no longer between parties of diverse 6 citizenship: both Plaintiff and FJMC are citizens of California. 7 As jurisdiction no longer exists on the basis of diversity, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 8 motion to remand. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an 11 amended complaint and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand this action to state court. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: June 3, 2026 14 15 EDWARD J. DAVILA 16 United States District Judge

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