Shropshire v. Oakwood Acceptance Corp. (In Re Shropshire)

284 B.R. 145, 49 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1113, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1316, 2002 WL 31299595
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedAugust 12, 2002
Docket17-83414
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 284 B.R. 145 (Shropshire v. Oakwood Acceptance Corp. (In Re Shropshire)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shropshire v. Oakwood Acceptance Corp. (In Re Shropshire), 284 B.R. 145, 49 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1113, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1316, 2002 WL 31299595 (Ala. 2002).

Opinion

ORDER

JAMES S. SLEDGE, Bankruptcy Judge.

This adversary came before the Court on July 17, 2002, for trial. In the complaint, the plaintiff sought a determination as to the validity, priority, or extent of the liens held by the defendants. Counsel for the plaintiff, counsel for the defendants, and the trustee appeared and presented evidence at the hearing. With the close of all the evidence, this Court took the matter under advisement and now renders its findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in this Judgment in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7052, applying Fed. R.Civ.P. 52.

JURISDICTION

This Adversary Proceeding seeks a determination of the validity, priority, or extent of a lien. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), 1334(e), 157(a), 157(b)(1), and the General Order of Reference entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, this Court is possessed with the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all proceedings arising in or under title 11.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), and 157(b)(2)(K), these matters constitute core proceedings. The order of reference has not been removed from this Court in this title 11 case; and neither personal jurisdiction nor venue have been contested in the title 11 case or these specific matters. Therefore, this Court concludes that subject matter, in personam, and in rem jurisdiction exists in this Court and venue is proper.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The debtor initiated this bankruptcy case on October 5, 2001.
2. On November 1, 2001, a proof of claim was filed by Oakwood Acceptance Corp. (hereinafter “Oak-wood”). This claim listed Oakwood as Servicer for Deutsher Financial as the name of the creditor and was filed as a secured claim for $30,991.50. (Claim No. 5) This proof of claim was unsigned.
3. On November 13, 2001, Oakwood filed an amended claim identical to Claim No. 5, except this proof of claim was signed. (Claim No. 9)
4. On March 13, 2002, Oakwood filed yet another claim. Unlike the previous claims, this claim identified the creditor as JP Morgan Chase Bank, a New York banking association formerly The Chase Manhattan Bank, and formerly Chase Manhattan Trust Company, National Association (hereinafter “JP Morgan”). Like the previous claims, it was filed as a secured claim and listed the debt amount as $30,991.50. (Claim No. 20)
5. According to the documentation attached to Claim No. 20, the debtor executed a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract on October 15, 1997. The party identified as the seller on the contract was B.R. Holding Corp. This contract includes a security agreement which conveyed a security interest to the seller. (Defendant’s Exh. 2)
*147 6. The Retail Installment Contract contained a provision assigning the contract to Deutsche Financial Capital. (Defendant’s Exh. 2)
7. Deutsche Financial Capital LLC is the entity listed as the lienholder on the certificate of title executed by the State of Alabama Department of Revenue on March 10, 1998. (Plaintiffs Exh. 1)
8. No other certificate of title was executed on this property. (Testimony of Wallace Tycer)
9. By contract dated January 1, 1998, Deutsche Financial Capital LLC assigned its interest in the contract to Deutsche Financial Capital Securitization LLC. (Attachment 3 to Defendant's Exh. 1)
10. Deutsche Financial Capital Securitization LLC transferred ownership of the account to PNC Bank National Association, as Trustee via a Pooling and Servicing Agreement also executed on January 1, 1998. (Attachment 4 to Defendant's Exh. 1)
11. Per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, June 1997 Edition, PNC granted Oakwood the right and duty to service the contract. (Attachment 5 to Defendant’s Exh. 1)
12. Chase Manhattan Trust Company, National Association became the owner of the contract pursuant to a corporate trust business acquisition agreement dated July 31,1998.
13. By Amendment to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated September 28, 2001,. Chase Manhattan Bank, a New York Banking Corp. was designated as the Trustee. (Testimony of Wallace Tycer)
14. Chase Manhattan Bank changed its name to JP Morgan Chase Bank and is the current name of the Trustee of the Trust which owns this contract. (Testimony of Wallace Tycer)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 6) makes two specific requests for relief from the Court. Paragraph 4 of the complaint contains the following statement: “Plaintiffs [sic] aver that the claim filed by the defendants should be allowed by the court under 11 U.S.C. § 506 as a secured claim for the amount of $0.00 only, and as an unsecured claim for the amount of $30,991.50.” This allegation is consistent with complaints of this type wherein a debtor challenges the secured status of a creditor or the valuation of collateral securing the secured claim. By this allegation, debtor does not seem to be contesting the ownership of the claim.

Although the debtor seems to be challenging the secured status of the claim or the valuation of the collateral, the prayer for relief contains a request which is inconsistent with the sentence quoted above. “Plaintiff also prays that the court will determine which of the defendants, if either of them, is the current holder of the secured and/or unsecured claims which are the subject of this adversary.” With this request, debtor now seems to be challenging the ownership of the claims. Even though the debtor seems to be confused on this point, the Court will try to make the determinations requested of it in the prayer.

From the evidence presented, it seems clear to the Court that JP Morgan is the current holder of this claim. Testimony and documentary evidence was presented tracing this claim from its inception to its current resting place with JP Morgan. Debtor presented no evidence to challenge *148 this conclusion. As for Oakwood, evidence was presented it is the authorized servicing agent for JP Morgan on this claim. This conclusion is supported in the debt- or’s brief (Doc. No. 11), wherein the debtor concedes that JP Morgan is the current holder of the claim.

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Bluebook (online)
284 B.R. 145, 49 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1113, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1316, 2002 WL 31299595, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shropshire-v-oakwood-acceptance-corp-in-re-shropshire-alnb-2002.