Shreveport Rys. Co. v. City of Shreveport

37 F.2d 910, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1823
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 6, 1930
DocketNo. 350
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 37 F.2d 910 (Shreveport Rys. Co. v. City of Shreveport) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shreveport Rys. Co. v. City of Shreveport, 37 F.2d 910, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1823 (W.D. La. 1930).

Opinion

DAWKINS, District Judge.

This suit was brought to enjoin the city of Shreveport, its officers and agents, from enforcing certain ordinances prohibiting the operation of street cars on all but two of plaintiff’s lines without using both a conductor and motorman, or what is commonly termed two-men ears. The first ordinance was enacted in May, 1907, requiring a conductor and motorman on all cars under penalty of a fine of from $25 to $100; the second was passed in December, 1917, compelling the company to provide an entrance at the rear end and exits at both ends of each ear, with similar penalties against the officers and employees of the railroad company. In 1922 these ordinances were amended so as to permit the operation of one-man ears on what are called Fairfield and Union Depot lines.

In substance, plaintiff charged that these -requirements were arbitrary, unreasonable, .and unnecessary for the safety and convenience of the public, but compelled it to make useless expenditures for an extra man on -each car, thereby depriving it of its property without due process of law, and taking it for public use without just compensation, contrary to the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The financial status of the company was set forth in much detail, and discloses a condition bordering on bankruptcy; but plaintiff alleged that by using one-man cars, it could -earn ■enough to pay interest on its bonded indebtedness and for a dividend on its stock; that, ■even if said ordinances of 1997 and 1917 were a proper exercise of police power by the city at the time of their adoption, they have become obsolete and oppressive because of the change of conditions in the city of Shreveport, and the “improvements made in the arts and sciences, particularly the arts and sciences of building and operating street cars. * * * ” Other allegations were made as to the increased cost of operation, including labor and materials since 1917, without a corresponding increase in gross revenues and the loss of patronage due to the use by the publie of automobiles.

The defendants moved to dismiss the petition, largely upon the ground that the same question had been decided adversely to plaintiff by the courts of the state and the United States Supreme Court, in a case arising through criminal prosecution of one of its' agents in 1917. Sullivan v. City of Shreveport, 251 U. S. 169, 40 S. Ct. 102, 64 L. Ed. 205. This motion was overruled because of the alleged change in conditions since that time, and the material allegations of the bill were put at issue by what amounts to a general denial.

The matter was referred to a master upon the issues of fact only, who spent' several weeks taking testimony and receiving depositions of witnesses taken in other states. In his report he finds for the plaintiff substantially on all important questions as follows:

That the city ordinances existed and would be enforced as alleged, unless the court intervenes. That the present value of plaintiff’s property used and useful in the public service, less depreciation, is $2,382,396.54. That its indebtedness consists of $605,000 of outstanding mortgage bonds, and $220,000 due to banks upon notes bearing the individual indorsement of its stockholders, or a total of $825,000. That the gross receipts during 1928 were $669,418.81, while operating expenses and a reasonable allowance for depreciation amounted to $612,181.25, thus giving a net revenue for the payment of interest on its indebtedness and for dividends of $57,-237.56. That the interest paid for that year was $46,701.59, leaving only $10,535.97 for dividends. That the net return upon the present value of plaintiff’s property in the public service was approximately .0243 per cent. That the property was economically managed, the annual salaries paid to its officers and other executives being as follows: Chairman of the Board of Directors, $3,000; president, $7,500; auditor, $4,500; -superintendent of power and equipment, $3,600; supervisor of substations, $2,700; superin[912]*912tendent of transportation, $2,400; claim agent, $2,400; roadmaster, $2,400.

That the operating expenses of plaintiff company, exclusive of depreciation and taxes, was .2323 per car mile as compared to an average of .271 for twenty-four representative, companies in the same class. That no dividends have been paid since 1923, when $30,000 was distributed, or three per cent, upon the stock then outstanding of $1,000,-000. That only three dividends have been paid within the past 14 years, amounting in the aggregate to 9' per cent, of the capital stock. That the plaintiff has from time to time made application to the Louisiana Public Service Commission for authority to increase its fares, but each increase has resulted in a loss of business with no appreciable benefit. That, if the company is permitted to operate its cars with one man, the same will result ultimately in a saving at. the present rate of wages, of $93,921.92 per year; that the company at present has no credit; and, but for the personal indorsement of its stockholders, could not raise funds to continue operation; that the change from two to one employee upon the cars will be gradual, owing to the necessity for replacing the old with new equipment, and it will not be necessary to discharge any of its employees, for the annual turnover of labor will be approximately sufficient to take care of the numbers which are dispensed with. ■

On the question of the relative safety of operation between one-man and two-men cars, I quote the master’s finding as follows:

“As to the relative safety between one man operation and two men operation, the Master finds the following facts:
“That the evidence of the numerous witnesses testifying on this point, many of whom are ex-motormen and conductors, shows conclusively that it has been the experience of those companies which have operated both systems that the total number of accidents were reduced by one man operation of cars equipped with modem safety devices. (Koonce, Ev. 227; W. L. Smith, Plffs. Ex. No. 12, pg. 12; Shaner, Plffs. Ex. No. 15, pf. 14; Hanson, Plff’s. Ex. No. 7, (4), p. 7; Owen, Plff’s. Ex. No. 11, pp. 4 — 6; Fennell, Plff’s. Ex. No. 8, p. 62; Ackerman, Plff’s. Ex. No. 13, p. 13.) The experience of companies operating in Dayton, Ohio (William Owen, Ex. No. 11, pp. 3-4); Brooklyn, Morgan, Plff’s. Ex. No. 17, (1), pp. 10-14; Atlanta, Butler, Plff’s. Ex. No. 20, pp. 6-8-16, and Knoxville, Kelly, Plff’s. Ex. No. 19, pp. 8-10), are particularly referred to as disclosing marked decrease in accidents.
“The Master finds that the type of accidents known as ‘step accidents,’ occurring while passengers are getting on and off the cars, have been greatly reduced and that this is true even where, on account of the increased automobile traffic, the number of accidents from all causes may not have been reduced, or may even have been increased, (W. L. Smith, Plff’s. No. 12, p. 8; Hanson, Plff’s. No. 7, (4), p. 5; Ackerman, Plff’s. Ex. No. 13, p. 11; Owen, Plff’s. No. 11, pp. 3-4; Holtzclaw, Ev. 123-138; Carroll, Ev. 177), and that in many cities ‘step accidents’ have been practically eliminated by one man opr eration of safety cars. (Shaner, Plff’s. No. 15, p. 17; West, Plff’s. No. 7, (7), p. 20; Holtzclaw, Ev. 122-123-138; Carroll, Ev. 177.)

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Related

Weinberg v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
150 F.2d 645 (Eighth Circuit, 1945)
City of Shreveport v. Shreveport Ry. Co.
38 F.2d 945 (Fifth Circuit, 1930)

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Bluebook (online)
37 F.2d 910, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1823, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shreveport-rys-co-v-city-of-shreveport-lawd-1930.