Filed 12/1/23 Shontz v. Reid & Hellyer CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LEXIS BRANDON SHONTZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E079893
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2201150)
REID & HELLYER, APC, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kira L. Klatchko, Judge.
Affirmed.
Lexis Brandon Shontz, in pro per., and for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reid & Hellyer and Daniel E. Katz, for Defendant and Respondent.
1 Occupants of a residential property brought a civil malicious prosecution claim
against the law firm who sued them for eviction on behalf of the property owner. The law
firm filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. The trial
court granted the motion, finding the residents had not demonstrated they were likely to
prevail on the merits of their claim because there was a lack of evidence the law firm had
acted with malice. We agree with the trial court and affirm.
I
FACTS
On May 8, 2020, Lexis Brandon Shontz and Shireford Holdings LLC (Shireford)
entered a residential lease on the property located at 74125 Setting Sun Trail in Palm
Desert. The lease was set to end on May 8, 2021. Shireford is not a party to this appeal.
Michelle DuPont was a party to this litigation at the trial level and purported to sign onto
Shontz’s opening appellate brief, but she never filed a notice of appeal, so she is not party
to this appeal.
On February 3, 2021, attorney Barry Lee O’Connor prepared a 60-day notice to
quit the property, and, on February 8, served it on Shontz and all other occupants of the
property. The notice informed them they should vacate the property by May 8, 2021,
because the owners were removing it from the rental market so that they or their close
family members could occupy it.
On May 18, 2021, Maria Alemany, Skyline Holdings Trust, and David
Abramowitz, as trustee of the Skyline Holdings Trust (collectively “Skyline”) filed an
2 unlawful detainer action in Riverside County Superior Court against Shontz, DuPont, and
Shireford (Case No. UDPS 2100247). Skyline alleged they had purchased the property,
which Shontz and DuPont still occupied under an expired fixed-term lease, and sought
their eviction. The complaint alleged the tenancy was not subject to the Tenant Protection
Act of 2019, Civil Code section 1946.2. Attorney Barry O’Connor represented Skyline in
bringing the complaint.
The trial court set a trial date of February 4, 2022. On January 8, 2022, Shontz and
DuPont filed an amended answer to the complaint. Shontz and DuPont alleged DuPont
was not a party to the lease and did not claim a right to possess the property as a tenant.
Among other defenses, they also alleged—contrary to the complaint—that the property
was governed by the Tenant Protection Act because the lease did not include the notice of
exemption required by Civil Code section 1946.2, subdivision (e)(8)(B). They alleged for
that reason and others that the lease was not subject to a 60-day notice to quit. They also
alleged the notice was deficient for omitting a plan to mitigate disruption of eviction for
the tenants, required by the Tenant Protection Act. They caused a copy of their amended
answer to be served by email on attorney O’Connor.
Two days earlier, Skyline had retained Reid & Hellyer APC as new counsel to
represent them in the lawsuit. Barry Swan was the attorney in charge of the case for Reid
& Hellyer. Swan said he confirmed Skyline had purchased the property and that it was
subject to an expired lease before accepting the representation on behalf of his law firm.
3 He said he knew attorney O’Connor to be an unlawful detainer attorney of good
reputation and long experience.
According to a declaration submitted by Swan, he contacted Shontz by email on
January 14, 2022, and asked for confirmation that he could use the email for pretrial
communications. Between January 17 and January 20, 2022, Swan exchanged pretrial
documents by email and had a telephone conference with Shontz. They reviewed the
exhibit lists, witness lists, jury instructions and discussed a proposed joint statement of
the case. Swan also had a meeting with Shontz by telephone to go over pre-trial
documents. DuPont did not participate in any of these communications. On January 21,
2022, Swan and Shontz attended a trial readiness conference, where they learned the trial
would not proceed as scheduled or in the foreseeable future due to court policies arising
from the Covid pandemic.
After the trial readiness conference, Swan reviewed the notice to quit which
O’Connor had prepared and concluded it was not in compliance with the Tenant
Protection Act. Swan informed Abramowitz and Alemany of the deficiencies and
received permission to file a request for dismissal without prejudice in the unlawful
detainer action and to restart the unlawful detainer process with a revised notice to quit
compliant with the Tennant Protection Act.
On January 25, 2022, Swan filed a request for dismissal without prejudice. The
next day, he prepared a new notice to quit that offered the benefits and protections of the
Tenant Protection Act and filed a second unlawful detainer action (Case No. UDPS
4 2200300) against Shireford and Shontz as its trustee, which alleged the tenancy is subject
to the Tenant Protection Act.
On March 28, Shontz and DuPont sued Skyline Holdings Trust, Abramowitz,
Alemany, and their law firm, Reid & Hellyer. Against the law firm, they asserted a single
cause of action for malicious prosecution of the first eviction action. Only the claim
against the law firm is at issue in this appeal. Shontz and DuPont alleged the original
unlawful detainer action was meritless as a matter of law because DuPont was named as a
defendant, the tenancy was protected by the Tenant Protection Act and Skyline had not
complied with it, and the delinquency in payment of rent was excused under Civil Code
section 1511. They alleged damages proximately caused by the malicious prosecution in
the amount of $100,000 and sought punitive damages based on Skyline’s malicious
conduct. Shontz and DuPont acted as their own attorneys.
On July 15, Reid & Hellyer filed a motion to strike the malicious prosecution
claim against them under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16
(section 425.16). They argued representing litigants in a lawsuit is protected activity
under section 425.16, and Shontz and DuPont could not sustain their burden of showing
Reid & Hellyer, or Swan acting for the law firm, acted unreasonably or with malice in
pursuing the first unlawful detainer action from when they were retained on January 6,
2022, until they dismissed the action on January 25, 2022. They also argued Shontz and
DuPont could not show they were harmed by the conduct.
5 On July 28, Shontz and DuPont filed an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion.
They conceded Reid & Hellyer’s representation of their client in litigation is protected
activity under the anti-SLAPP statute, but argued the motion should be dismissed because
they were likely to prevail on their malicious prosecution claim. They asked the court to
take judicial notice of the pleadings from the two eviction actions and relied on those
filings to support their opposition. They argued the 20-day period between when Reid &
Hellyer were hired and when they dismissed the first unlawful detainer case was “the
most expensive part of the litigation for Plaintiffs” because it was during this period they
were engaged in “preparing jury instructions, exhibits, witness preparation, and
compiling the various related documents required for a jury trial.” They argued the law
firm “recklessly let Plaintiffs run up a large attorney fee bill, spending their time and
resources preparing for trial, and suffering the anxiety of the upcoming trial . . . all in the
strategy of the Landlords to wear down Plaintiffs as part of their ongoing bullying style
of landlording.”
Shontz filed a declaration with the opposition papers. He asserted “[m]alice was
shown by Counsel’s continuing to prosecute [the first unlawful detainer action] despite
the lack of probable cause, and by failing to investigate the claims made in our First
Amended Answer, which would have clarified that [the lawsuit] lacked merit.” Shontz
claimed damages in the form of time getting ready for trial, anxiety over the threat of
eviction during the pandemic, and attorney fees of $2,000 paid to an attorney to review
the anti-SLAPP motion and research and draft the opposition.
6 On August 9, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the anti-SLAPP
motion, which became the final ruling of the court. The court held “Plaintiff has failed to
offer admissible evidence, or evidence that could be admissible at the time of trial, to
establish a probability that it will prevail on its malicious prosecution claim against Reid
& Hellyer.” It explained, “The Plaintiffs have offered only judicially noticeable
documents that do not, in any fashion, demonstrate malice on the part of Reid & Hellyer
or any counsel at that firm. Further, the documents at issue in the request for judicial
notice reflect that Reid & Hellyer dismissed [the first complaint] shortly after assuming
the representation. The declaration from counsel confirms that Reid & Hellyer dismissed
the litigation after discovering a deficiency in the notice given, and then moved to correct
that deficiency and refile the litigation. Plaintiffs have not addressed that evidence,
which, if anything, militates against a finding of malice.”
II
ANALYSIS
Shontz and DuPont argue the trial court erred in determining they had not shown a
probability of prevailing on the merits of their malicious prosecution claim.
“Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets out a procedure for striking
complaints in harassing lawsuits that are commonly known as SLAPP suits . . . which are
brought to challenge the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech rights. A cause
of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech
under the [federal or state] Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject
7 to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established
that there is a probability that the claim will prevail. The anti-SLAPP statute does not
insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of
petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v.
Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater Union) [cleaned up].)
“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. Initially, the moving
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims
‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. If the defendant
carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal
merit.’ If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, the court will strike the claim.” (Wilson v.
Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 [cleaned up].)
The California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a summary-
judgment-like procedure. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting
factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.
It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [C]laims with the requisite
minimal merit may proceed. We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion. As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the
claim may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be
8 made upon competent admissible evidence.” (Sweetwater Union, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 940 [cleaned up].)
The parties agree the malicious prosecution action arises from acts in furtherance
of petition or free speech. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728,
734, 746 [civil claim “based on allegations that [defendants] maliciously and without
probable cause brought and maintained a cross-complaint against [plaintiff] in the course
of a civil lawsuit, is subject to anti-SLAPP scrutiny”].) Thus, the only question on appeal
is whether the plaintiffs carried their burden of producing admissible evidence in
opposing the anti-SLAPP motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to
support a judgment in favor of Shontz and DuPont. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert &
Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
“To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show that the prior
action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a
legal termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and
(3) was initiated with malice. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th
260, 292.) In addition, an attorney may be held liable for malicious prosecution if they
continue to prosecute a lawsuit after discovering it lacks probable cause. (Zamos v.
Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 970 (Zamos).) The trial court determined Shontz and
DuPont did not meet their burden of submitting admissible evidence that anyone at Reid 1 & Hellyer acted maliciously, and it is that conclusion that is the focus of this appeal.
1 Reid & Hellyer argue the voluntary dismissal was not a favorable determination for Shontz, but we need not resolve that issue.
9 “The ‘malice’ element . . . relates to the subjective intent or purpose with which
the defendant acted in initiating the prior action. The motive of the defendant must have
been something other than that of bringing a perceived guilty person to justice or the
satisfaction in a civil action of some personal or financial purpose. The plaintiff must
plead and prove actual ill will or some improper ulterior motive. Malice may range
anywhere from open hostility to indifference. Malice may also be inferred from the facts
establishing lack of probable cause.” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 [cleaned up].)
Shontz relies on the litigation history of the case as evidence to support an
inference of malice. He points out DuPont is not a signatory to the lease. He also points
out the agreement did not contain language necessary to take it outside the Tenant
Protection Act, meaning the 60-day notice to quit was legally insufficient, the complaint
wrongly omitted a plan to mitigate the costs of relocation, and eviction based solely on
the expiration of the lease was not permitted. He also argues the complaint was deficient
because the 60-day notice to quit could not be effective until the lease had ended and
converted to a month-to-month lease. Finally, he argues the lease itself improperly
charged more than two times the amount of the monthly rent as a security deposit.
Shontz alleges Reid & Hellyer acted out of malice in the approximately 20 days
from the date they were hired as new counsel and when they dismissed the first
complaint. Reid & Hellyer were not the lawyers who filed the first unlawful detainer
action. They were hired as replacement attorneys less than a month before trial was set to
begin. Attorney Swan first contacted Shontz on January 14, and 11 days later Reid &
10 Hellyer voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit, having determined the complaint was
technically deficient. The next day they filed a new unlawful detainer action, which
continued seeking Shontz’s eviction from the property, but corrected the deficiencies
Shontz points to as depriving the first lawsuit of probable cause. Nevertheless, Shontz
argues this brief period was the most costly and stressful of the litigation due to the
impending trial date, and he argues the facts of how Reid & Hellyer litigated during these
days allow an inference that they acted with malice.
However, the inferences Shontz proposes a factfinder could draw are wildly
unsupported. He argues the trier of fact might look at the date he filed the answer,
January 8, and reasonably conclude the filing made Reid & Hellyer aware the complaint
lacked merit and that they pursued trial preparations in the face of that knowledge. He
also argues the trier of fact might conclude the attorney Reid & Hellyer were hired to
replace had discovered the deficiencies and was fired because he wanted to dismiss the
action, and further that he would have informed Reid & Hellyer of the deficiencies due to
his ethical obligations. Regardless how the law firm realized the deficiencies, Shontz
argues, it was reasonable to infer they knew of them (or were reckless in failing to
discover them) and that their decision to proceed through several days of preparations up
to the trial readiness conference was made solely for the purpose of “financially
exhaust[ing]” him rather than prevailing on the merits.
This is pure speculation, not reasonable inference from evidence. We agree with
the trial court that the documents Shontz relies on “do not, in any fashion, demonstrate
11 malice on the part of Reid & Hellyer or any counsel at that firm.” There is simply no
evidence to suggest Reid & Hellyer or Swan knew of the deficiencies in the complaint
prepared by prior counsel until shortly before they voluntarily dismissed the action. The
dismissal of the first complaint within 11 days of initiating contact with Shontz, followed
by the refiling of the litigation the next day with the deficiencies corrected, supports an
inference that the law firm was focused on obtaining the eviction effectively, rather than
an inference that they intended to prosecute the action for improper purpose under a
legally and factually unsupported theory.
Shontz argues he should prevail even if Reid & Hellyer did not affirmatively know
of the deficiencies with the original complaint because it was reckless not to know
sooner, when he raised the issues in his answer two days after the law firm had been
hired. Shontz argues, “Even by Respondent’s own account, malice was shown by its
arrogant indifference to the truth, its smug confidence that it would win regardless of the
law or facts, and its unbridled ego that no unrepresented tenant could have a chance
against Respondent before this particular judge.” Again, this wildly overstates the
situation and, moreover, would hold the attorneys handling the case to a near-perfect duty
to have immediately discovered the problems with their case.
Attorney Swan explained his actions in the case in detail. He was hired on January
8, 2022, a Saturday. He knew attorney O’Connor to be an experienced eviction lawyer
with a good reputation. He contacted Shontz the next week to confirm they had open
channels of communication as the trial date approached. The following week, between
12 Monday and Thursday, Swan and Shontz exchanged pretrial documents by email and had
a telephone conference, where they reviewed the exhibit lists, witness lists, jury
instructions, and discussed a proposed joint statement of the case. That Friday, they
attended a trial readiness conference. It was after that conference that Swan says he
reviewed the notice to quit O’Connor had prepared and concluded it was not in
compliance with the Tenant Protection Act. He contacted his clients, and the following
Tuesday he filed a motion to dismiss the case. Nothing about this schedule on its own
suggests reckless disregard for the truth. We therefore conclude, like the trial court, that
Shontz failed to carry his burden of establishing Reid & Hellyer acted with malice.
Shontz argues Reid & Hellyer’s dismissal of the first complaint should not weigh
against finding malice, relying on Zamos for the proposition that malicious prosecution
includes “continuing to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause.” (Zamos,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 970) However, Zamos did not involve a voluntary dismissal but
did involve significant evidence that attorney Stroud obtained very specific evidence
showing he knew the litigation was baseless shortly after initiating the lawsuit. Attorney
Zamos had represented the client in a foreclosure action and obtained a settlement of
$250,000 against a subset of the defendants. The settlement required the client to
relinquish her claims to the property. However, the client later sued attorney Zamos
alleging, among other things, that he promised he would represent her against the
nonsettling defendants until judgment and would seek to have her house returned to her.
(Id. at p. 961.) Stroud brought a fraud case including these allegations against Zamos, but
13 Zamos demonstrated their falsity almost immediately by submitting transcripts from the
foreclosure litigation, showing the client agreeing on the record to release all claims to
her house and agreeing to release Zamos from representing her further in the litigation.
Zamos asked Stroud and his client to dismiss the lawsuit in the face of this evidence, but
they refused, and the case continued to trial. Ultimately, the trial court granted Zamos a
nonsuit based on the same transcripts. (Id. at pp. 961-963.) There is no such inculpating
evidence in this case.
Moreover, one of the reasons the Supreme Court adopted the rule that a malicious
prosecution claim could target a decision to continue litigation after it was revealed a lack
of probable cause was to encourage attorneys to voluntarily dismiss lawsuits they
discover to be meritless after filing. (Zamos, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 969.) Holding
attorneys liable after they promptly and voluntarily dismiss a lawsuit discovered to be
meritless would create the opposite incentive. We do not conclude dismissing a lawsuit
necessarily relieves an attorney of liability for having continued litigation without
probable cause. However, we do reject the suggestion that a voluntary dismissal itself
warrants an inference that the attorney had concluded the claim was without merit even
earlier but continued to litigate for an improper purpose. More evidence that the attorney
acted from with an improper purpose is required. Such evidence was present in Zamos
but is not present in this case.
Shontz also argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the
opposition, ignoring the standard for resolving anti-SLAPP motions, and considering the
14 evidence submitted by Reid & Hellyer. These arguments are devoid of merit. On a silent
record, we presume the trial court acted correctly (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 564), and Shontz has provided no reason to think the trial court proceeded in
an improper manner. In any event, our review of the trial court decision is de novo, which
means we stand in the shoes of the trial court and make the same determination based on
the same record, which includes all the evidence Shontz put forward for establishing
malice. (Zamos, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 965.)
Shontz faults the trial court for failing to make express reference to the opposition
to the anti-SLAPP motion or his declaration as evidence of malice. He contends the trial
court should have addressed his “sworn declaration and incorporation of the facts stated
in the Memorandum by reference” which “might be considered evidence which a trial
court should read and consider in ruling on a SLAPP motion.”
We conclude, as we presume the trial court did, that the declaration (including the
factual claims made in the memorandum) adds no evidence of malice. The two-page
declaration itself focuses on the documents Shontz asked the court to judicially notice
and the financial injuries he claims to have suffered due to the protraction of the
litigation. It also purports to “incorporate the factual statements in the preceding
Memorandum” and attests to their truth, though without identifying the statements. Our
review of the memorandum discloses Shontz conceded the broad factual outlines in
attorney Swan’s declaration. Beyond those basic facts about the history of the litigation in
January 2022, the memorandum contains only legal conclusions on the topic of malice,
15 not factual statements. Thus, in the section entitled “Malice is shown,” the memorandum
makes the following statements: (1) “Malice is shown by being initiated solely for the
purpose of depriving the opponent of a beneficial use of property, which is what [the first
unlawful detainer lawsuit] was all about”; (2) “Continuing [the litigation] until the eve of
trial was brinksmanship, intended to scare Plaintiffs into giving up with the ominous trial
looming”; (3) “The lack of probable cause to continue was ignored in favor of scaring
Plaintiffs into giving up without a trial, using fear to manipulate Plaintiffs rather than a
lawful basis for the action.” Absent from the memorandum and the entire record is any
evidence that could make it reasonable for a factfinder to reach these conclusions.
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.