Shoneka Hall v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 26, 2024
DocketCH-0714-18-0418-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Shoneka Hall v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Shoneka Hall v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shoneka Hall v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SHONEKA L. HALL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0714-18-0418-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: February 26, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Clinton D. Hall , Indianapolis, Indiana, for the appellant.

Kyle C. Mardis , Indianapolis, Indiana, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal of the agency’s removal action taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714 as untimely filed. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the initial decision’s analysis of the Board’s authority to waive or toll the filing deadline of an appeal filed under 38 U.S.C. § 714, we AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). By notice dated April 25, 2018, the agency informed the appellant of her removal for alleged misconduct, effective May 4, 2018. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 16-19. The notice further informed the appellant that she could file an appeal of her removal with the Board “not later than 10 business days after the effective date” of the removal action. Id. at 17. On June 3, 2018, the appellant filed this appeal by mail. IAF, Tab 1 at 28. She indicated in her appeal that she received the removal notice on April 28, 2018. Id. at 3. She further stated that, according to the 2013 version of the Board appeal form she used to file her appeal, “I understand that I have 30 days to file my appeal.” Id. at 6. After the agency filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed, to which the appellant did not respond, the administrative judge scheduled a telephonic status conference. IAF, Tab 7. The appellant did not appear for the status conference. Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an Order to Show Cause in which she informed the appellant that her appeal appeared to be untimely filed and that she must show that her appeal was timely 3

filed or that good cause existed for the delay in filing. IAF, Tab 8 at 1-2. The appellant did not respond to the administrative judge’s order. The administrative judge issued an initial decision in which she dismissed the appeal as untimely filed by 20 days without a showing of good cause. IAF, Tab 10. The appellant has filed a petition for review in which she argues the merits of her appeal but does not address the timeliness issue. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has responded in opposition to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3. An appeal of a removal action taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714, such as this one, “may only be made if such appeal is made not later than 10 business days after the date of such removal.” 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(4)(B); Ledbetter v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 41, ¶ 6. The appellant’s removal was effective May 4, 2018. IAF, Tab 5 at 16, Tab 6 at 4. Under 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(4)(B), her appeal was due on or before May 17, 2018. She filed her appeal on June 3, 2018, and, thus, her appeal was untimely filed by 17 days. The remaining question, therefore, is whether the Board may waive or toll this statutory deadline. A deadline prescribed by statute or regulation may be waived when: (1) the statute or regulation itself specifies circumstances in which the time limit will be waived; (2) an agency’s affirmative misconduct precludes it from enforcing an otherwise applicable deadline under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, unless the application of equitable estoppel would result in the expenditure of appropriated finds in contravention of statute; and (3) an agency’s failure to provide a mandatory notice of election rights warrants the waiver of the time limit for making the election. Ledbetter, 2022 MSPB 41, ¶ 8. The Board has also recognized that the doctrine of equitable tolling may be available under certain circumstances to toll a statutory deadline in an untimely filed appeal. Id. The statutory time limit for filing an appeal under 38 U.S.C. § 714 cannot be waived under the first basis because Congress did not provide for it. Id., ¶ 9. 4

It cannot be waived for “good cause shown,” id., and we find that the administrative judge erred by applying a good cause standard in this appeal. In addition, 38 U.S.C. § 714 does not require the agency to notify employees of their election rights or any filing deadlines associated with those elections, and there is similarly no regulatory notice requirement. Ledbetter, 2022 MSPB 41, ¶ 10. Thus, the deadline cannot be waived under the third basis. The deadline could potentially be subject to equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. Id., ¶ 11. However, equitable tolling is a rare remedy that is to be applied in unusual circumstances and generally requires a showing that the appellant has been pursuing her rights diligently and some extraordinary circumstances stood in her way. Id., ¶ 13. We find that the appellant has not met this burden. The record reflects that the agency provided her with accurate notice of her right to file a Board appeal and the deadline for doing so, and that she received this notice before the effective date of the removal action. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 5 at 16-17. The appellant has not explained why she chose to disregard the notice provided by the agency and rely instead on a statement on the obsolete Board appeal form she filed.

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Percy Ledbetter v. Department of Veterans Affairs
2022 MSPB 41 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Bluebook (online)
Shoneka Hall v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shoneka-hall-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.