Shoffner v. Pilkerton

166 S.W.2d 870, 292 Ky. 407, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 104
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedDecember 11, 1942
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 166 S.W.2d 870 (Shoffner v. Pilkerton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shoffner v. Pilkerton, 166 S.W.2d 870, 292 Ky. 407, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 104 (Ky. 1942).

Opinion

'Opinion op the Court by

Morris, Commissioner

Affirming.

On April 15, 1940, appellee and her husband- entered into a written contract with appellant, a building contractor, for the erection of a residence. On June 30, before the completion of the residence, “and while in the possession and control of” appellant, so the petition states, appellee went into the building for the purpose of making, suggestions relative to some closets. She asserts that appellant and his employees had negligently and carelessly left a hole in the floor, covered with rock lathe, and when she stepped on the covering it gave way.

Appellee sought recovery for medical services, hospital bills-, etc., and to compensate her for physical and mental pain, the sum total of $5,800. In answer, in one paragraph which appellant both denies and affirmatively pleads, it was denied that appellee at the time she was injured was invited on the premises, and particularly denies she was invited into the room where the accident happened, but that appellee had entered the room without the knowledge or consent of defendant or any employee, or that he or any of them knew she was in the room until after the accident. Appellant then pleads contributory negligence. A controverting reply joined issue.

Following proof and instruction by the court the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee in the sum of $1,000; motion for a new trial was overruled and his appeal follows. The sole contention is that the court should have sustained appellant’s motion for directed verdict, because under the law, (1) the status of appellee at the time she fell and injured herself was that of *409 licensee, and if so appellant was only liable for willful acts of negligence; that since appellee had no invitation from appellant to be where she was at the time she fell, he owed her no duty as an invitee. (2) If she was a licensee she could not recover because she was guilty of contributory negligence. It is argued that neither the contract nor related facts show appellee to have been more than a bare licensee, if that.

Mrs. Pilkerton went to the building on the afternoon of June 4, as she said to supervise the placing of shelves in the closet and cabinet; that Mr. French, one of the carpenters, working on the cabinet, called her and asked about the shelves, and she went into the building “to show about the location of those shelves;” she first went into the kitchen, then into the adjoining bedroom. She had theretofore complained to appellant that the place for the register into which she fell was in the ‘ ‘walkway from either door.” The floor had been laid, and register opening had been cut out. She says when complaint was made appellant agreed to change or move the register. At the time she fell she did not know that the proposed change had not been made, or that a piece of rock lathe had been placed over the hole. Her foot went into the register opening, and the fall caused a fracture of the left arm and bruises about her body.

On cross-examination it was shown that she was around the premises frequently after construction got underway, and that she often “inspected” the work as it progressed; that she, with appellant, had located the openings for the furnace pipes before the time of the accident, and that thereafter she had seen the holes for the pipe openings and had seen this hole before the hardwood floor was laid, but insists that appellant, at her suggestion, had agreed to make a register opening in the bedroom in an entirely different place, and that she did not know that it had not been moved. She said she went into the kitchen and remained a few minutes, and then into the bedroom where Mr. Scott was at work putting the ceiling on the closet. She said to Mr. Scott, “put the shelves where I can reach them.” This particular closet was in the middle of one side of the bedroom. She admits that she was not called into the bedroom at “that particular time. ’ ’

Mr. Pilkerton testified that he had asked appellant *410 to move the register across the room, and he agreed. A part of the original opening had been cut one-half or three-quarters of the required size in the sub-floor. Appelant said the hole cut in the sub-floor would not bother; he would put the hardwood floor over it, and make the change across the room. The hole was about 10 inches from the wall. It was supposed to go against the wall. Mr. Shoffner told him he wanted Mrs. Pilkerton to come over and talk to Mr. French, the carpenter. After his wife was injured he went into the room and assisted her. "There were scraps of material lying over the floor, and some rock lathe.”

Scott testified that he was in the room at the time of .the accident, "facing the closet.” When Mrs. Pilkerton came in she said she didn’t want the shelves too high for her to reach, and she started toward the closet and stepped on some plaster board over the opening and fell through. There were scraps and pieces of lumber over the floor. Mr. Shoffner had told witness he wanted to see Mrs. Pilkerton about the kitchen cabinet, but he had not conveyed the information.

Appellant, a contractor of long experience, said that nothing was said when the contract was signed about supervision, other than contained in the contract and specifications. Mrs. Pilkerton was "on the premises two or three times every day.” On the day of the accident he was working in the basement; French, Scott and others working upstairs or around the building. He did not know that Mrs. Pilkerton was about the premises that afternoon. He had not told Mr. Pilkerton prior to that afternoon that he wanted his wife to come to the building. He said that Mrs. Pilkerton had, with him, located the register opening about two weeks before the accident; that when the sub-floor was laid these openings, 8x10 or 10x12 were in the sub-floor. After this particular opening was marked off, appellant told Scott that they had "hit a joist,” and Mrs. Pilkerton was called and told it would have to be moved over about 6 inches, and she agreed. This was two weeks before the accident, and she was in that room at least twice a day during the two weeks. He said rock lathe had been laid over the hole when Mr. Pilkerton was present, and he helped cover the holes. There was some argument about the replacement of the opening, but appellee told him to leave it where it was. He was positive that he had never agreed *411 to remove the register across the room over by the window, and denied that he told anyone he wanted to see her about the cabinet in the kitchen.

The broad question presented here, as to whether or not Mrs. Pilkerton was at the time of the injury an invitee, is narrowed to the contention that while she may have been invited into the kitchen for the purpose of giving directions about the cabinet shelving, she was not invited into the adjoining bedroom where the accident occurred. Cited as authority is the case of Wall v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 209 Ky. 258, 282 S. W. 730, where we held that it was the duty of a merchant to keep safe only that part of his premises where customers are invited; and Cumberland Hotel Co. v. Hartman, 264 Ky. 300, 94 S. W. (2d) 637, to the same effect.

Following the reasoning in the above and similar cases cited, it is argued that at the utmost Mrs. Pilkerton was only a licensee, hence appellant was only liable for any injury to her arising by his willful act.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Palmtag v. Gartner Construction Co.
513 N.W.2d 495 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1994)
Mahoney v. United States
180 F. Supp. 310 (W.D. Kentucky, 1960)
Scuddy Mining Company v. Couch
295 S.W.2d 553 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1956)
First National Bank of Birmingham v. Lowery
81 So. 2d 284 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1955)
Scuddy Coal Company v. Couch
274 S.W.2d 388 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1954)
Cain v. Stevens
274 S.W.2d 480 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1954)
City of Madisonville v. Poole
249 S.W.2d 133 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1952)
Standard Oil Co. v. Hagan
218 S.W.2d 969 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1949)
Durbin v. Louisville N. R. Co.
219 S.W.2d 995 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1949)
A. L. Dodd Trucking Service v. Ramey
194 S.W.2d 84 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1946)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 S.W.2d 870, 292 Ky. 407, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shoffner-v-pilkerton-kyctapphigh-1942.