Shiveley's Administrators v. Jones

45 Ky. 274, 6 B. Mon. 274, 1845 Ky. LEXIS 116
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 24, 1845
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 45 Ky. 274 (Shiveley's Administrators v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shiveley's Administrators v. Jones, 45 Ky. 274, 6 B. Mon. 274, 1845 Ky. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 1845).

Opinion

Judse Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The junior mortgagee not having made the elder mort. gagee a party to his suit for foreclosure and having proceeded to decree and sale after a decree and sale and conveyance to the purchaser under the elder mortgage, the legal title did not pass to the purchaser under the junior mortgage, and the sale was properly set aside on his petition disclosing the facts and his mistake as to the title which he was purchasing.

For the defect in the proceeding already stated, and because the heirs of the mortgagor were not propérly before the Court in the same suit, the decree of foreclosure and sale upon the junior mortgage, was properly reversed and set aside upon the bill of review of said heirs, and the administrator of the mortgagor. The suit upon the senior mortgage was perfect in its form and preparation unless it be a defect that the junior mortgagee was not made a party. If this were a defect, still the legal title passed to the purchaser under a decree of sale, and the only [275]*275question is whether it is held absolutely, and out of the reach of the junior mortgagee or whether because the latter was not a party he may afterwards regard the purchaser as mortgagee or trustee, and come in to redeem.

Is the equity of a junior mortgagee 'barred by a foreclosure and sale under a senior mortgage, where the senior mortgagee had no knowledge of the junior mortgage, and did not, therefore, make him a party — Qu. A mortgage which is fraudulent may be assailed on that ground by a senior mortgagee as well as any creditor, unless he may take benefit from it. —So a purchaser at a sale under a decree upon the senior mortgage may assail a junior mortgage asserted by a junior mortgagee, for fraud.

It does not appear that the senior mortgagee had notice during the pendency of his suit of the existence of the junior mortgage, and it is a serious question whether under this state of case, the latent -equity of the junior mortgagee, wasnot forever bound by the foreclosure of the equity of the mortgagor and the sale of the premises, and transfer of the legal title to the purchaser under the decree, Kurtz, &c. vs Carroll, &c., (4 B. Monroe, 40.) But the purchaser, not resting his case on this, principle alone, contests and impeaches successfully as we think the validity of the junior mortgage, on the ground that it was made with the fraudulent intent of hindering and delaying the creditors of the mortgagor, and to secure a pretended debt, when nothing was in fact due. And on the other side it is contended, that the junior mortgage if fraud ulent was nota fraud upon the senior mortgagee, nor inju rious to him ; that he could not have contested its validity, and therefore the purchaser under his mortgage cannot.

We however understand the principle to be, that a con-' veyance fraudulent as to any creditors, is fraudulent as to all, unless it be such as may take benefit from it, and that as to all others it is void, and may be so treated by them wherever it lies in their w»ay as an obstacle. If then this junior mortgage was made to defraud creditors, it was void as against the senior mortgagee as well as against other creditors; that is, it was void and might so be treated so far as it impeded him in the realization of his just demand, and a denial of his right to impeach it could be maintained only on the supposition that it could not be in his way as art obstacle.

But if a senior mortgagee is bound to make a fraudulent junior mortgagee a party, in order to give him an op portunity of contesting the debt, or if after a decree of foreclosure according to the English practice, without having made him a party, the fraudulent junior mortgagee would have a right to redeem ; or if he has such right after a [276]*276foreclosure and sale under our practice, and a purchase of the mortgage premises by the elder mortgagee, would not this be giving great/significance to his fraudulent mortgage? Would it not in these cases come directly in conflict with the elder mortgagee? And if under the circumstances of the last case stated, the elder mortgagee could not impeach it on the ground of fraud, would it not, though void as to all creditors, be made valid as to him? Without pursuing these enquiries we are of opinion, that either the elder mortgagee or a stranger purchasing under a decree of foreclosure and sale upon the senior mortgage, may resist the claim of the junior mortgagee coming in afterwards to redeem, on the ground that his mortgage was fraudulent. If it were so, whatever rights he might have had against the mortgagor, he has none against the creditor or purchaser but such as1 the mortgagor has, and as to these he must abide by the issue of the contest between the creditor as mortgagee, and the mortgagor. Nor do we peceive that the rights of the parlies, or the law of the case in this state of things, will be affected by the fact that the senior mortgagee had or had not notice of the fraudulent junior mortgage before his decree or purchase, or by the question whether any other purchaser had such notice.

A suit was brought to fore* close a junior mortgage in the winter of 1825-6 defendant died, adtn’n. in Sept. 1826, no revivor until 1830; between these periods a suit is broughton senior mortgage, decree of foreclosure and sale had— Held that the purchaser was not a pendente lite purchaser.

It seems however that in this case, the junior mortgagee had commenced his suit for foreclosure before that upon the senior mortgage was begun, and this circumstance is relied on as affecting the rights of the parties. But whatever might have been the case, if the sale under the senior mortgage had been made while the prior suit on the junior mortgage was pending, we do not think any question upon such a state of case, is presented'in this record. For by the death of the complainant in the first suit in the winter of 1825-6 that suit abated in fact, and it never was revived until June 1830, although administration was granted as early as September 1826. During this interval of four years the suit upon the senior morfgage, which had been commenced before the death of the junior mortgagee, was prosecuted to decree and sale and the title conveyed to the purchaser by deed approved by the Court; all of which was done in 1828» [277]*277And as no excuse is even alledged for the great delay in reviving the first suit, it cannot on the principle of the case of Watson vs Wilson, (2 Dana, 406,) be regarded as a pending suit at the time of the sale under the senior mortgage; and the purchaser at that sale not being a pendente lite purchaser, no question as to the effect which a Zispendens might have had upon his purchase, arises, and we intimate no opinion about it.

where more land is sold under a decree of fore¡rf^Lt^nder mortgage ^an is necessary to pay the^ ^mortgage not ’ absolutely n0ld’necessarily follow that the title of a purchaser, where such confirmed band ed6 wouidTe affeojed by a re- The English o™0tforeciosure an,4 sal“> wast° gaged estate and after1 satisfying toth^mofts.<*gor. The praeeraliy, is to sell isnlne°e™sary to paythe debt,

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Bluebook (online)
45 Ky. 274, 6 B. Mon. 274, 1845 Ky. LEXIS 116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shiveleys-administrators-v-jones-kyctapp-1845.