Shin v. Lai CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/4/26 Shin v. Lai CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JEFF SHIN, B349621

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

v. 22STCV18323)

JAMES LAI et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber and Nicholas F. Daum, Judges. Dismissed.

Jeff Shin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Tredway, Lumsdaine & Doyle, Brandon L. Fieldsted, and Jonathan J. Coleman for Defendants and Respondents.

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When a dispute arose between a corporate tenant and a landlord over the tenant’s access to the leased commercial space, the corporate tenant’s individual shareholder sued the landlord. The trial court issued a minute order granting the landlord’s summary judgment motion based on the individual shareholder’s lack of standing, and later issued another minute order striking the individual shareholder’s unauthorized amended complaint filed after the summary judgment ruling. The individual shareholder has appealed from those two rulings. Because the trial court did not enter any final judgment or order dismissing the individual shareholder’s action, and because the corporate tenant’s separate complaint consolidated with the individual shareholder’s action remains pending in the trial court, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. The Lease On December 2, 2021, JC Business Center, Inc. entered into a lease agreement to rent a commercial space in Los Angeles from Broadway Hill Investment Group LLC (Broadway Hill). JC Business Center was required to pay $4,900 in rent per month, in addition to a security deposit. The term of the lease was one year, expiring on December 31, 2022.

Jeff Shin, who was the CEO and sole shareholder of JC Business Center, signed the lease on behalf of JC Business

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Center. Shin agreed to serve as the guarantor of JC Business Center’s obligations under the lease.

Shin also does business under the fictitious business name Alpha Sewing. At the premises leased by JC Business Center, Shin operates a store that sells sewing machines. II. Shin’s Lawsuit A. The operative complaint On June 6, 2022, Shin filed a lawsuit alleging he was unable to operate his business profitably because Shin was not provided with a remote control to open the gate to the leased premises and the gate was unlocked from only 10:00 o’clock in the morning until 1:30 in the afternoon.

In the operative second amended complaint filed in October 2023, Shin (doing business as Alpha Sewing) sued Broadway Hill and two individuals associated with that entity—James Lai and Kevin Lai (collectively, the landlord)—for (1) breach of the lease, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) fraudulent concealment.1 Shin sought compensatory damages in excess of $900,000 as well as punitive damages and attorney fees.

1 Shin filed a first amended complaint two days after commencing his action, against which the landlord moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted that motion but afforded Shin leave to file what became the operative second amended complaint.

Though the landlord demurred to that operative complaint and moved to strike certain prayers for relief, the trial court denied those motions.

The landlord never raised the issue of standing in its motion for judgment on the pleadings or in its demurrer.

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B. The landlord’s cross-complaint In July 2022, the landlord filed a cross-complaint against JC Business Center and Shin for (1) breach of the lease, (2) nuisance, and (3) trespass. The landlord alleged that JC Business Center engaged in the following actionable conduct: “taking up more than [its] allotted space”; “using the property for unsafe storage”; “overus[ing] the parking lot”; and the business was generally “being a nuisance to other tenants.” III. Motion for Summary Judgment The landlord moved for summary judgment in July 2024.

The landlord argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Shin is not a party to the lease and therefore cannot sue for any conduct associated with the lease, and (2) the only potential damages shown in discovery were suffered by JC Business Center, who is not a party to the action.

In opposition, Shin argued he was the proper plaintiff and could seek damages because (1) he was the guarantor under the lease, (2) he was the individual doing business as the tenant and therefore is the real party in interest in the action, and (3) the landlord was “aware of the true name of the contracting [plaintiff]” based on the parties’ negotiations prior to executing the lease.

Following the filing of a reply and a hearing, the trial court issued a minute order on February 18, 2025, granting the landlord’s summary judgment motion. The court reasoned that JC Business Center is the “named tenant under the lease agreement” but “did not bring the present action in any capacity” and all of Shin’s arguments for why he has standing to sue the landlord failed. Specifically, Shin did “not present[] any applicable legal authority which stands for the proposition that a

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guarantor under a lease may bring suit against the landlord”, and even if the court considered Shin to be the agent of JC Business Center, Shin “has no evidence that [the landlord] breached a duty owed to him personally.” The court also noted that Shin failed to show “which entity was damaged by the [landlord’s] actions.”

The trial court did not issue any judgment or order of dismissal following the summary judgment ruling. IV. JC Business Center’s Separate Lawsuit A. The complaint While the landlord’s summary judgment motion was pending—indeed, a month before Shin filed his opposition to that motion—JC Business Center filed its own, separate lawsuit against the landlord. Aside from the named plaintiff being JC Business Center, the complaint was largely identical to Shin’s operative complaint, alleging the same facts regarding the locked gate, asserting the same causes of action, and claiming the same damages.

B. Consolidation After ordering Shin’s lawsuit and JC Business Center’s lawsuit related, the trial court on October 25, 2024, consolidated the two lawsuits over the landlord’s opposition C. Demurrer Also while the summary judgment motion was pending, the landlord demurred to JC Business Center’s complaint on the ground that the plain language of the lease did not require the leased premises to be open for specific hours of operation. Shin, representing himself, filed an opposition that argued he would be dissolving JC Business Center to transform it into a sole proprietorship.

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On January 31, 2025, the trial court overruled the landlord’s demurrer to JC Business Center’s contract-based claims, but sustained the demurrer to the fraudulent concealment claim with leave to amend. In a nunc pro tunc order issued on February 3, 2025, the court explained that JC Business Center’s complaint “does not allege with specificity any information concealed by [the landlord]” but gave JC Business Center 20 days to file an amended complaint that “offer[s] specifics” as to the landlord’s “affirmative misrepresentations” about JC Business Center’s access to the premises.

JC Business Center did not file an amended complaint.

V. Shin’s Unauthorized Complaint A. Third amended complaint A week after the trial court granted the landlord’s summary judgment motion on Shin’s complaint, Shin filed a third amended complaint without leave of court.

B. Order striking complaint The landlord demurred, pointing out that, procedurally, Shin should have caused JC Business Center to file an amended complaint per the court’s demurrer ruling. Shin opposed the demurrer,2 and also filed an “assignment and ratification of claims” stating that he mistakenly dissolved JC Business Center and has been assigned the entity’s rights under the lease.

2 Shin also proffered a proposed fourth amended complaint that included totally new causes of action against the landlord— namely, (1) constructive eviction, (2) intentional interference with contractual relations, (3) abuse of process, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (6) violation of California’s unfair competition law.

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Following a reply by the landlord and a hearing, the trial court issued an order on August 25, 2025, striking Shin’s third amended complaint. The court explained that because “[n]o leave to amend was given” to Shin to file the third amended complaint, the court was exercising its discretion to strike that pleading which was “filed in direct contravention of the laws of th[e] state.” The landlord’s demurrer was overruled as moot. VI. Appeal Shin filed a notice of appeal, indicating he was appealing the trial court’s rulings granting the landlord’s summary judgment motion and striking Shin’s third amended complaint.3 DISCUSSION

Shin’s appeal must be dismissed due to several jurisdictional defects. (See Shpiller v. Harry C’s Redlands (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1179-1180 [noting how courts of appeal “have repeatedly admonished appellants about the failure to make the preliminary and fundamental determination that what they are appealing from is, in fact, an appealable order or judgment” and that litigants nevertheless “continue to ‘appeal’ from nonexistent orders and judgments and/or from documents which are not even orders or judgments”].)

First, as to both the trial court’s order granting the landlord’s summary judgment motion and the trial court’s order striking Shin’s third amended complaint, there is no final order or appealable judgment. “The right to appeal is wholly statutory. [Citation.] Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 lists appealable

3 Shin’s notice of appeal lists a third order, dated March 5, 2025, which denied the landlord’s discovery motion and request for sanctions against Shin. But that order is not addressed in the parties’ briefing on appeal.

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judgments and orders. Chief among them is a ‘judgment’ that is not interlocutory, e.g., a final judgment.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point); Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 91, 97-98.) Because “[t]he existence of an appealable judgment [or order] is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696), this court has a “‘duty to dismiss’” an appeal from a nonappealable order (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307). Here, Shin appealed from unsigned minute orders granting the landlord’s summary judgment motion and striking the unauthorized third amended complaint. Without a signed order or judgment of dismissal of Shin’s lawsuit against the landlord following those rulings, we lack jurisdiction to hear Shin’s appeal. (Saben, Earlix & Associates v. Fillet (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1030 [“a summary judgment is appealable, but an order granting summary judgment is not”]; Swain v. Burnette (1888) 76 Cal.299, 302 [order striking pleading “is not mentioned among the interlocutory orders which the statute makes the subject of an appeal. Hence it is not itself appealable.”], overruled on other grounds in Linehan v. Devincense (1915) 170 Cal.307, 311.)

Second, contrary to the landlord’s contention in response to our request for supplemental briefing on the issue of appealability, there is still a live dispute in the trial court. Based on the record before us, the landlord’s cross-complaint against Shin and JC Business Center has not been adjudicated. (See Dang v. Smith (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 646, 656 [“The general rule is that no appeal will lie from a ‘purported final judgment . . .

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rendered on a complaint without adjudicating the issues raised by a cross-complaint”]; Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 109, 132 [same].) Nor has JC Business Center’s complaint against the landlord been adjudicated. (Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5 [judgment is final and therefore appealable “‘“‘when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined’”’”].) To be sure, the trial court sustained the landlord’s demurrer to JC Business Center’s fraudulent concealment claim and JC Business Center did not timely file an amended complaint pursuant to the demurrer ruling. But the trial court overruled the landlord’s demurrer to the other claims; as such, JC Business Center’s claims for breach of the lease and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are still active in the underlying, consolidated matter.4 Third, even if we construed the trial court’s minute order granting the landlord’s summary judgment motion as, effectively, an appealable judgment, Shin did not timely appeal that ruling.

4 It is for the trial court to determine whether Shin can act on the purported assignment of JC Business Center’s claims or whether JC Business Center must litigate its complaint through counsel. (See Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729-730 [corporation can only appear through counsel]; CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149 [holding that “a corporation’s failure to be represented by an attorney [is] a defect that may be corrected, on such terms as are just in the sound discretion of the [trial] court”].) Although Shin represents himself on appeal, both Shin and JC Business Center were represented by counsel at various points during the proceedings in the trial court.

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Shin filed his notice of appeal on September 10, 2025, which is 204 days after the court granted summary judgment for the landlord based on Shin’s lack of standing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) [setting 180 days as the outermost limit to timely appeal].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. The landlord is entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KUMAR, J.*

We concur:

MOOR, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.