Shields v. New York Livery Leasing, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Shields v. New York Livery Leasing, Inc.

90 A.D.3d 1018, 934 N.Y.2d 842

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 27, 2011

StatusPublished

This text of 90 A.D.3d 1018 (Shields v. New York Livery Leasing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Shields v. New York Livery Leasing, Inc., 90 A.D.3d 1018, 934 N.Y.2d 842 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

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Opinion

The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the lumbosacral region of her spine and her shoulders sustained certain injuries as a result of the subject accident. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff provided competent medical evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the lumbosacral region of her spine constituted serious injuries under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance [1019]*1019Law § 5102 (d) (see Dixon v Fuller, 79 AD3d 1094 [2010]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.E, Angiolillo, Belen, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.

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The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the lumbosacral region of her spine and her shoulders sustained certain injuries as a result of the subject accident. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries did not constitute serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff provided competent medical evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the lumbosacral region of her spine constituted serious injuries under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance [1019]*1019Law § 5102 (d) (see Dixon v Fuller, 79 AD3d 1094 [2010]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Skelos, J.E, Angiolillo, Belen, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

90 A.D.3d 1018, 934 N.Y.2d 842, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shields-v-new-york-livery-leasing-inc-nyappdiv-2011.

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