Shields v. Neah Bay Tribal Police

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJuly 15, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-05123
StatusUnknown

This text of Shields v. Neah Bay Tribal Police (Shields v. Neah Bay Tribal Police) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shields v. Neah Bay Tribal Police, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT TACOMA 10 11 JOHN SHIELDS, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05123-TL-SKV 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON REPORT AND v. RECOMMENDATION 13 NEAH BAY TRIBAL POLICE et al., 14 Defendants. 15

16 17 This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United States 18 Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan (Dkt. No. 14) (“R&R”) and Plaintiff’s objections to the 19 Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 16). Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation, 20 Plaintiff’s objections, and the remaining record, the Court ADOPTS the Report and 21 Recommendation and OVERRULES the objections. 22 A district court has jurisdiction to review a magistrate judge’s report and 23 recommendation on dispositive matters. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The district court “shall make 24 a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 1 recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 3 disposition that has been properly objected to.”). “The district judge may accept, reject, or 4 modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

5 magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A 6 party properly objects when the party files “specific written objections” to the report and 7 recommendation as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2). Plaintiff filed 8 timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. Dkt. No. 16. 9 Plaintiff’s case suffers from a threshold issue, as pointed out in the R&R: his claims are 10 barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. No. 14 at 6. As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not 11 contain its own statute of limitations, courts apply the statute of limitations for an analogous 12 cause of action under Washington state law. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 13 760 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has determined that a state’s personal injury statute is 14 the best alternative for determining the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Wilson v. Garcia,

15 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (“For 16 actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal 17 injury actions”). Washington’s statute of limitations for personal injury suits is three years. 18 Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2). Therefore, in Washington, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the 19 appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev. 20 Code § 4.16.080(2).” Bagley, 923 F.2d at 760. See also RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 21 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a 22 question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 23 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the

24 plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action.” Douglas v. 1 Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 2009 WL 1564235, at *6 (9th Cir. June 5, 2009) (citing Johnson v. 2 California, 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir.2000)). 3 Here, Plaintiff filed his first proposed complaint over four years after the incidents at 4 issue occurred. Plaintiff brought suit against officers from the Neah Bay Police, a detective from

5 the Clallam County Sheriff’s Department, a Neah Bay Tribal Court clerk, and a Neah Bay 6 prosecutor. Dkt. No. 12 at 3–4. The allegations stem from actions taken (or not taken) between 7 mid and late January 2021.1 Id. at 4–6. However, Plaintiff waited until February 12, 2025, to file 8 his lawsuit alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Dkt. No. 1; see also 9 Dkt. No. 1-2. As Plaintiff clearly knew about the alleged violations in 2021 when they occurred, 10 his complaint is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 11 Plaintiff asserts in his objections that he should be entitled to equitable tolling. Dkt. 12 No. 16 at 3. The Ninth Circuit has held that a forum state’s law regarding equitable tolling 13 applies to § 1983 claims. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Under Washington case law, “[e]quitable 14 tolling is a legal doctrine that allows a claim to proceed when justice requires it, even though it

15 would normally be barred by a statute of limitations.” Trotzer v. Vig, 149 Wn. App. 594, 607 n.9, 16 203 P.3d 1056 (2009) (citing Millay v. Cam, 135 Wn.2d 193, 205, 955 P.2d 791 (1998)). “The 17 predicates for equitable tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and 18 the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.” Millay, 135 Wn.2d at 206. Washington courts “permit 19 equitable tolling only sparingly.” Trotzer, 149 Wn. App. at 606–07 (citations omitted). 20 21

1 Plaintiff includes allegations regarding actions taken by Rachel Greene-Venske, his former fiancée, between 22 January and June of 2021. Dkt. No. 12 at 9. However, Plaintiff clarifies in his objection that “Ms. Greene-Venske is only mentioned as a particip[a]nt[,] not a defendant.” Dkt. No. 16 at 1. 23 2 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 30, 2025. Dkt. No. 12. The amended complaint is the operative complaint in this case. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (“an 24 amended pleading supersedes the original”); Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (same). ] The only reason Plaintiff gives for equitable tolling relates to his inability to find a lawyer 2 || to take his case. Dkt. No. 16 at 3. First, “[g]enerally, a person has no right to counsel in civil 3 || actions.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Related

Wilson v. Garcia
471 U.S. 261 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ayers v. Belmontes
549 U.S. 7 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Richard E. Loux v. B. J. Rhay, Warden
375 F.2d 55 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
Oscar W. Jones v. Lou Blanas County of Sacramento
393 F.3d 918 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Douglas v. Noelle
567 F.3d 1103 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Palmer v. Valdez
560 F.3d 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Millay v. Cam
955 P.2d 791 (Washington Supreme Court, 1998)
Millay v. Cam
135 Wash. 2d 193 (Washington Supreme Court, 1998)
Trotzer v. Vig
203 P.3d 1056 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2009)

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