Shields v. Keating

782 F. Supp. 1382
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 12, 1991
DocketMDL Docket No. 834; Nos. CIV 90-566 PHX-RMB to CIV 90-570 PHX-RMB, CIV 90-574 PHX-RMB and CIV 90-1270 PHX-RMB
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 782 F. Supp. 1382 (Shields v. Keating) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shields v. Keating, 782 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Ariz. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BILBY, District Judge.

Under consideration are motions by Bankers Trust Company (“Bankers Trust”) for summary judgment in two parallel consolidated class actions alleging securities fraud and racketeering under federal and state law. Class plaintiffs purchased securities issued by American Continental Corporation (“ACC”), parent company to Lincoln Savings and Loan Association (“Lincoln”). The ACC/Lincoln enterprise, headed by Charles H. Keating, Jr., has precipitated litigation against Keating, other ACC/Lincoln directors and officers, their lawyers, accountants, and business associates.

I.

Bankers Trust performed a variety of traditional and investment banking services for ACC/Lincoln. Plaintiffs allege that through its business dealings Bankers Trust knew that ACC/Lincoln was in “precarious financial condition,” “was operat[1384]*1384ing in an imprudent and fraudulent manner,” and “was placing unsuspecting subordinated bondholders at ever-increasing risk.” Yet despite this knowledge, Bankers Trust “provided ACC/Lincoln with financial assistance and non-routine banking services which enabled ACC/Lincoln to continue its operations and sell additional subordinated debentures.” Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion at p. 1. Plaintiffs complain that by propping the ACC empire up in this manner, Bankers Trust aided and abetted the primary fraud committed by ACC/Lincoln principals, who allegedly induced plaintiffs to purchase ACC’s unsecured subordinated debt through an extensive scheme of misrepresentation about the soundness of both ACC/Lincoln and the investment bonds.

Plaintiffs contend that Bankers Trust violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Sections 1962(c) and (d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); the Arizona Racketeering Act, A.R.S. § 13-2301 et seq.; and California Corporations Code §§ 1507 and 25401. In addition, plaintiffs allege that Bankers Trust has aided and abetted and/or conspired in violations of the common law of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

Plaintiffs assert that the evidence supports the following findings, precluding summary judgment:

1. In late 1985 or early 1986, Bankers Trust became aware that ACC/Lincoln was operating in an opportunistic, high risk, imprudent manner.

2. In 1986, Bankers Trust learned that ACC/Lincoln was selling subordinated debentures to buyers who were unaware of the true risks involved.

3. Despite its knowledge, Bankers Trust provided financing in late 1985 and again in 1988 which enabled ACC/Lincoln to continue its wrongdoing, including raising over $1 billion through various debt offerings.

4. In 1985, Bankers Trust helped ACC/Lincoln devise a financing mechanism to exploit ACC's employee stock ownership plan in a way which manipulated the price of ACC stock and benefitted ACC/Lincoln insiders.

5. Bankers Trust hired as a senior vice-president one Barbara Thomas, with knowledge that she was being paid by Keating. While at Bankers Trust, Thomas played a central role in the ACC/Lincoln account and exerted improper pressure on federal regulators on behalf of Keating.

6. Despite its knowledge that ACC/Lincoln had excessive junk bond holdings, Bankers Trust pressured Keating to make additional investments.

7. In October 1988, Bankers Trust knowingly assisted Keating in an unlawful stock manipulation to force short sellers out of the market.

8. Because of what Bankers Trust knew about ACC/Lincoln’s financial condition, prudent banking practice required that it withdraw from all business relations. Nevertheless, it continued to provide an array of non-routine banking services.

II.

Rule 10b-5, implementing Section 10(b), provides in relevant part:

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

In the Ninth Circuit, an aiding and abetting cause of action requires proof of the following elements:

(1) the existence of an independent primary wrong;
[1385]*1385(2) actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or her role in furthering it; and
(3) substantial assistance in the wrong.

Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822, 104 S.Ct. 89, 78 L.Ed.2d 97 (1983).

Proof of scienter is a requisite of any 10(b) action. Scienter has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1381, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). In Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.1990) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1621, 113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991), the Ninth Circuit determined the degree of recklessness which will satisfy the scienter requirement, adopting verbatim the standard approved by the Seventh Circuit:

[R]eekless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.

Id. at 1569, (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S.Ct. 224, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). Hollinger embraced the Seventh Circuit’s explication that “the danger of misleading buyers must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable [person] would be legally bound as knowing, and the omission must derive from something more egregious than even ‘white heart/empty head’ good faith.” Id. at 1569-70. The Hollinger standard is consistent with earlier Ninth Circuit pronouncements that “recklessness is a lesser form of intent rather than a greater degree of negligence.” Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569 (citing Vucinich v.

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Related

In Re American Continental/Lincoln S & L SEC. Lit.
782 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Arizona, 1991)

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782 F. Supp. 1382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shields-v-keating-azd-1991.