Sherry Lynn Smith v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 13, 2008·No. 13-05-00714-CR·Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-05-714-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

SHERRY LYNN SMITH, Appellant, v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 278th District Court of Grimes County, Texas.

OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Benavides, and Vela Opinion by Justice Benavides

Appellant, Sherry Lynn Smith, was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life in prison. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Her conviction was based on the testimony of an alleged accomplice, Daniel “Boone” Gardner. On appeal, Sherry argues that, excluding Boone’s testimony, the evidence was insufficient to connect her to the crime. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 38.14 (Vernon 2005). Additionally, she argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to determine

whether Boone was an accomplice as a matter of fact, when it should have instructed the jury that Boone was an accomplice as a matter of law. By her third and fourth issues, Sherry argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it could not consider extraneous offense evidence unless the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Sherry had committed the extraneous offense. In her fifth issue, Sherry argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when the State commented during closing argument on her pre-arrest silence.

We hold that Boone was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury to determine whether Boone was an accomplice. We also hold that the non-accomplice testimony in this case does not adequately connect Sherry to the crime. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and render a judgment of acquittal, and we do not reach Sherry’s third, fourth, and fifth issues. TEX . R. APP. P. 47.1.1 I. Accomplice as a Matter of Law or as a Matter of Fact?

Sherry was married to Carey Smith. She lived with Carey and his ailing father, Charles Smith, at their home in Grimes County, Texas. In the early morning hours of Saturday, December 7, 2002, Carey and Charles were shot and killed with a high-powered rifle. At approximately 4:30 p.m., Sherry discovered their bodies at the home and called

1 The dissent states that it would not render a judgm ent of acquittal because it finds that the evidence tends to connect Sherry to the crim e. The dissent is incom plete in that it does not explain how it would resolve the rest of the issues. For exam ple, Justice Vela’s dissent does not state whether she joins our resolution of the jury charge error. If Justice Vela agrees with that portion of the opinion, then her dissent should discuss whether Sherry is entitled to a new trial by analyzing whether the jury charge error is harm ful. See Herron v. State, 86 S.W .3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim . App. 2002) (“W hen the error is properly preserved, a reversal is required if ‘som e harm ’ is shown.”); Burns v. State, 703 S.W .2d 649, 652 (Tex. Crim . App. 1986) (holding that accom plice witness charge error requires reversal and rem and for new trial). Furtherm ore, if Justice Vela believes the jury was correctly charged, she does not address Sherry’s rem aining issues. By doing so, the dissent deprives Sherry, the State, and the Court of Crim inal Appeals the benefit of a proposed resolution of this case.

9-1-1 to report the two deaths. Sherry became a suspect and was indicted for capital murder.

Boone is Sherry’s ex-husband and the father of her children, and he testified during Sherry’s jury trial. Sherry’s first argument is that, excluding Boone’s testimony, the evidence is insufficient to connect her to the crime. In her second issue, Sherry argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to determine whether Boone was an accomplice as a matter of fact. The State urges this Court to first consider whether Boone was an accomplice as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. We will indulge the State.2 A. Sherry’s Reports to the Police Officer Johnny Martinez testified that he was dispatched to the Smith residence on Saturday, December 7. After he arrived at the Smith residence, he learned that Charles and Carey Smith had been killed. Officer Martinez’s supervisor asked him to interview Sherry, so he asked her to accompany him to the sheriff’s office for an interview. Sherry agreed to go with him. The interview began at 9:19 p.m. that night and was tape recorded. Officer Martinez testified that Sherry did not express any reservation about talking to him. He testified that before the interview began, he did not discuss any of the particulars of the

2 The State argues that Boone’s status as an accom plice as a m atter of fact controls the outcom e of this appeal— in other words, the State asserts that if Boone was not an accom plice as a m atter of law, the State wins and the judgm ent m ust be affirm ed. That is not the case. The trial court’s error in instructing the jury would require this Court to rem and for a new trial if we found that the error caused “som e harm .” See Herron, 86 S.W .3d at 632; Burns, 703 S.W .2d at 652. In contrast, if, excluding the accom plice-witness testim ony, there is no evidence that tends to connect Sherry to the crim e, we are required to render a judgm ent of acquittal. W incott v. State, 59 S.W .3d 691, 703 (Tex. App.–Austin 2001, pet. ref’d). Thus, even if the question of Boone’s status as an accom plice was properly subm itted to the jury, we would have to determ ine whether rendition is appropriate by evaluating whether there was sufficient evidence to connect Sherry to the crim e. Badillo v. State, 963 S.W .2d 854, 858 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1998, pet. ref’d) (determ ining that trial court erroneously subm itted accom plice witness status to jury, recognizing that rem and was required for that error, but then acquitting defendant because non-accom plice witness testim ony did not tend to connect defendant to crim e). W e recognize that we are addressing a rem and point before a rendition point, contrary to our custom ary practice. See id. W e do so for the benefit of the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals in the event it exercises discretionary review.

offenses with Sherry.

Texas Ranger Bryant Wells was present at the interview. He testified that Sherry told the officers that she had been home the night of December 6, babysitting her granddaughter, Logan, until approximately 12:30 a.m. on December 7. Sherry’s daughter, Tori Sword, is Logan’s mother. After Tori picked Logan up from the Smith residence, Sherry went to bed at 1:00 a.m.

Sherry left the Smith residence at 4:00 a.m. on December 7 and went to the Wal-

Mart in Huntsville, Texas. She told the officers that Carey and Charles were asleep when she left. Ranger Wells testified that he retrieved a surveillance videotape from Wal-Mart. Scott Carson, a Wal-Mart employee, testified as to the contents of the videotape. The videotape from Wal-Mart shows that Sherry arrived at 5:15 a.m. in the Wal-Mart parking lot. She remained at Wal-Mart until 6:42 a.m.

Sherry told the officers that after leaving Wal-Mart, she went to the home of her friend, Joretta Mitchell, in Houston. Sherry and Mitchell then went to Northeast Medical Hospital in Humble, Texas, to visit Sherry’s cousin, Donnie Helton. Mitchell confirmed that Sherry arrived at her house at about 7:30 a.m. on December 7, and that she went with Sherry to the hospital.

After visiting her cousin, Sherry left the hospital at 1:00 p.m. and drove to the Cingular phone store in Huntsville to purchase a new cell phone. Sherry then went to the Diamond Shamrock where Tori worked. Sherry stated that she went there to pick up Logan so that she could babysit her while Tori worked. Boone was also at the Diamond Shamrock at the same time. Officer Martinez testified that he viewed a videotape from a Diamond Shamrock that was taken on December 7, the day of the murders, at

approximately 4:00 p.m. The video shows Sherry, Tori, Logan, and Boone at the Diamond Shamrock.

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