Sherrod v. State
This text of 784 So. 2d 256 (Sherrod v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Dennis SHERROD, Appellant
v.
STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
*258 Dennis Sherrod, Appellant, pro se.
Office of the Attorney General by Jean Smith Vaughan, Attorney for Appellee.
Before SOUTHWICK, P.J., CHANDLER, and MYERS, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Dennis Sherrod pled guilty to robbery and aggravated assault in 1997. A few months later he sought permission from the same circuit court to withdraw the plea. Without a hearing being held, the court denied the motion. On appeal Sherrod seeks reversal because he has always maintained his innocence; his codefendant's statements against him were coerced; he did not receive effective assistance of counsel; and he should have been given an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. We disagree that error is shown and affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. In September 1994, Dennis Sherrod was indicted by the grand jury of Noxubee County for aggravated assault and robbery. Sherrod and a co-defendant were charged with robbing the owner of a package liquor store in Macon, after striking him over the head with a wine bottle. Sherrod was not apprehended until ten months after the robbery. He was taken into custody by police in Joliet, Illinois, and extradited to Mississippi.
¶ 3. On March 13, 1997, Sherrod pled guilty to robbery and assault at a hearing in Noxubee County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to two ten-year terms to be served consecutively. Approximately five months later, on September 8, 1997, Sherrod filed a petition in the circuit court to withdraw his plea. He alleged these grounds: 1) new evidence had been discovered; 2) his plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was based on misrepresentation by his attorney; 3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call witnesses who could have exonerated him; and 4) his co-defendant, Willie Robinson, would testify under oath that he committed the crimes and that Sherrod had nothing to do with them. By order dated March 2, 1998, the court held that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary and denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Voluntariness of plea
¶ 4. Sherrod argues that his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily. He was "confused and bewildered" because his attorney failed to subpoena witnesses who could testify in his favor. He further alleges that his co-defendant submitted *259 an affidavit that the co-defendant committed the crimes and that Sherrod had not been involved.
¶ 5. A guilty plea is considered voluntary and intelligent if the defendant is advised regarding the nature of the charge and the consequences of the guilty plea, and it appears that he understood those rights. Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992). The trial judge informed Sherrod that he was going to conduct a hearing to assure that his plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily given. Sherrod was told that he had these rights: 1) a jury trial; 2) cross examination of all adverse witnesses; 3) subpoena witnesses who could testify on his behalf; 4) no self incrimination; and 5) assistance of a lawyer. Sherrod answered affirmatively that he realized that a guilty plea would operate as a waiver to all of these rights. The record also reveals that Sherrod was informed by the trial judge of the charges against him and the possible sentence that he could receive. Finally, Sherrod admitted that he in fact did commit the crimes charged.
¶ 6. In response to what is in the record, Sherrod urges that his plea was involuntary because his defense attorney failed to subpoena witnesses who could testify in his behalf. This assertion is simply not supported by the record. Sherrod was informed that he had the right to subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf. He was asked if he was satisfied with the advice and help that his attorney had given him, to which he also responded affirmatively. Based upon the plea colloquy, there is no basis for a determination that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
¶ 7. Sherrod also argues that the affidavit of Willie Robinson should have caused the plea to be withdrawn. Robinson's affidavit asserts that Sherrod had nothing to do with the crimes and that it was Robinson who committed them. There is no evidence in the record that the affidavit was presented to the trial court; instead, it appears on appeal attached to the brief. Our consideration of a case on appeal is limited to the record. Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476, 478 (Miss.1982)
¶ 8. Regardless, Sherrod at the plea hearing admitted that he committed the crimes involved. That a co-defendant is willing now to claim that is not true does not overcome the sworn statements at the earlier hearing.
II. Incriminating statements by co-defendant
¶ 9. Sherrod alleges that his co-defendant, Willie Robinson, was beaten by the Macon police and coerced into making incriminating statements against him. However, our review of the record does not reveal a statement made by Robinson to the Macon Police Department. It appears that any statement by Robinson was not presented to the trial judge at the plea hearing, nor was the statement or affidavit presented to the trial judge with the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
¶ 10. What the record does show is that Sherrod admitted under oath at the plea hearing that he in fact did commit the charged crimes. The role of any coerced statement made by a co-defendant cannot be addressed by this Court in the absence of evidence even of its existence.
III. Ineffective assistance of counsel
¶ 11. On appeal Sherrod alleges that his original counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation or call witnesses. He claims that his attorney advised him to plead guilty to the charges even though his attorney knew of witnesses who could have given testimony which could have been used to prove innocence at trial.
*260 ¶ 12. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must be able to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Strickland test also applies to challenges to guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Whenever the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised, a rebuttable presumption arises that defense counsel's conduct was reasonable and competent. Moody v. State, 644 So.2d 451, 456 (Miss.1994). Appellate review of the performance of defense counsel is "highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Whether or not the two prongs of the Strickland test are met is determined by "looking at the totality of the circumstances." Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss.1988).
¶ 13. In applying these standards we examine the plea hearing. The circuit judge asked Sherrod if his attorney had discussed the petition to plead guilty with him and if he understood everything within the petition. Sherrod answered that he understood.
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784 So. 2d 256, 2001 WL 410807, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sherrod-v-state-missctapp-2001.