6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
9 SHERMARRIE RIVERS, Case No. 1:25-cv-01250-SAB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT OF THIS MATTER TO A DISTRICT JUDGE 11 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 MARRY ISRAEL, et al., RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION 13 Defendants. (ECF No. 9) 14 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 15 DAYS
16 17 On September 22, 2025, Plaintiff Shermarrie Rivers, who is proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis, filed a complaint against Marry Israel. (ECF No. 1.) On September 23, 2025, the Court 19 granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) On October 8, 2025, 20 the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to state a claim. (ECF No. 6.) The Court 21 gave Plaintiff leave to amend, and she timely filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) The 22 Court now undertakes screening of the first amended complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 23 As explained herein, the Court will recommend that this matter be dismissed because further leave 24 to amend would be futile. 25 I. 26 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 27 The in forma pauperis statute provides that a court shall dismiss a case if, inter alia, the complaint is “frivolous or malicious,” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court uses the 2 same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint need only 3 contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of 5 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 7 555 (2007). 8 To survive screening, a plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 9 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 10 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 11 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, 12 and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the 13 plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 14 Moreover, federal courts are under a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter 15 jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 12; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). If the Court 17 determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court must dismiss the case. Id.; Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 19 Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be 20 cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 II. 22 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 23 Plaintiff is Shemarrie Rivers, who is currently incarcerated in the California Institution 24 for Women. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants are Donecia Wright, who works for CPS in Madera 25 County, and Marry Israel, legal guardian and foster parent to Plaintiff’s child. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) 26 Plaintiff alleges that Wright “removed my son without evidence[].” (Id. at p. 3.) 27 Seemingly referring to her previous case in this Court, Rivers v. Wright, No. 1:19-cv-00916- 1 DAD-BAM, Judgment ECF No. 30 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2020), Plaintiff states “[t]he United 2 Eastern District said . . . there were no evidence[] saying why [D.R.] was removed.” (Id.)1 3 Plaintiff later alleges that Israel is a legal guardian, and she has to follow all court orders. 4 (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff explains that “[D.R.] is in her home and the legal guardian is not allowing 5 us to be in touch. The Juvenile Dependency Court order: [D.R.] biological mother can visit him 6 stay in touch through mail and attend all events at his schooling.” (Id.) Plaintiff continues, 7 alleging that both Wright and Israel “are to follow all federal laws. Both of them work for child 8 custody[.] They have to follow Child Protective Custody and Juvenile Dependency laws. That 9 is the facts in both of my claims.” (Id. at p. 5.) 10 In her prayer for relief, Plaintiff states, “I want the Courts to address my rights that [I] am 11 entitled to be in his life. I have my rights.” (Id.) 12 III. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Plaintiff’s Child Custody Claim 15 As narrowed by her amended complaint, the only claim the Court construes as Plaintiff 16 bringing is one of child custody. As described in its previous screening order, the Court does not 17 write on a blank slate. Plaintiff brought a lawsuit in 2019 that included a substantially similar 18 child custody claim. The Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe stated in her findings and 19 recommendations that “the Court is without jurisdiction over [child custody] claims because they 20 are exclusively matters of state law.” Rivers v. Wright, No. 1:19-cv-00916-DAD-BAM, 2020 21 WL 3052253, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020), F&R adopted, 2020 WL 3047796; see Ankenbrandt 22 v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-704 (1992). “Even when a federal question is presented, federal 23 courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic 24 matters.” Id., quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir.1986). 25 In its previous screening order, the Court found that there had been no shift in the law 26 that would alter this analysis and thus found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim that could be 27 1 The Court assumes that Plaintiff’s child is a minor. Because the child’s specific identity is not necessary for the 1 brought in federal court. (ECF No. 6.) Because Plaintiff has raised the exact same claim as 2 before, the Court again finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that can be brought in this 3 Court. 4 B. Leave to Amend 5 Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 advises courts that “leave shall be freely 6 given when justice so requires.” This policy is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. 7 Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.2001), quoting Morongo Band of 8 Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990).
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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
9 SHERMARRIE RIVERS, Case No. 1:25-cv-01250-SAB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT OF THIS MATTER TO A DISTRICT JUDGE 11 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 MARRY ISRAEL, et al., RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION 13 Defendants. (ECF No. 9) 14 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 15 DAYS
16 17 On September 22, 2025, Plaintiff Shermarrie Rivers, who is proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis, filed a complaint against Marry Israel. (ECF No. 1.) On September 23, 2025, the Court 19 granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) On October 8, 2025, 20 the Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to state a claim. (ECF No. 6.) The Court 21 gave Plaintiff leave to amend, and she timely filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) The 22 Court now undertakes screening of the first amended complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 23 As explained herein, the Court will recommend that this matter be dismissed because further leave 24 to amend would be futile. 25 I. 26 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 27 The in forma pauperis statute provides that a court shall dismiss a case if, inter alia, the complaint is “frivolous or malicious,” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court uses the 2 same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint need only 3 contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of 5 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 7 555 (2007). 8 To survive screening, a plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 9 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 10 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 11 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, 12 and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the 13 plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 14 Moreover, federal courts are under a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter 15 jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 12; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). If the Court 17 determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court must dismiss the case. Id.; Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 19 Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be 20 cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 II. 22 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 23 Plaintiff is Shemarrie Rivers, who is currently incarcerated in the California Institution 24 for Women. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants are Donecia Wright, who works for CPS in Madera 25 County, and Marry Israel, legal guardian and foster parent to Plaintiff’s child. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) 26 Plaintiff alleges that Wright “removed my son without evidence[].” (Id. at p. 3.) 27 Seemingly referring to her previous case in this Court, Rivers v. Wright, No. 1:19-cv-00916- 1 DAD-BAM, Judgment ECF No. 30 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2020), Plaintiff states “[t]he United 2 Eastern District said . . . there were no evidence[] saying why [D.R.] was removed.” (Id.)1 3 Plaintiff later alleges that Israel is a legal guardian, and she has to follow all court orders. 4 (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff explains that “[D.R.] is in her home and the legal guardian is not allowing 5 us to be in touch. The Juvenile Dependency Court order: [D.R.] biological mother can visit him 6 stay in touch through mail and attend all events at his schooling.” (Id.) Plaintiff continues, 7 alleging that both Wright and Israel “are to follow all federal laws. Both of them work for child 8 custody[.] They have to follow Child Protective Custody and Juvenile Dependency laws. That 9 is the facts in both of my claims.” (Id. at p. 5.) 10 In her prayer for relief, Plaintiff states, “I want the Courts to address my rights that [I] am 11 entitled to be in his life. I have my rights.” (Id.) 12 III. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Plaintiff’s Child Custody Claim 15 As narrowed by her amended complaint, the only claim the Court construes as Plaintiff 16 bringing is one of child custody. As described in its previous screening order, the Court does not 17 write on a blank slate. Plaintiff brought a lawsuit in 2019 that included a substantially similar 18 child custody claim. The Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe stated in her findings and 19 recommendations that “the Court is without jurisdiction over [child custody] claims because they 20 are exclusively matters of state law.” Rivers v. Wright, No. 1:19-cv-00916-DAD-BAM, 2020 21 WL 3052253, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020), F&R adopted, 2020 WL 3047796; see Ankenbrandt 22 v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-704 (1992). “Even when a federal question is presented, federal 23 courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic 24 matters.” Id., quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir.1986). 25 In its previous screening order, the Court found that there had been no shift in the law 26 that would alter this analysis and thus found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim that could be 27 1 The Court assumes that Plaintiff’s child is a minor. Because the child’s specific identity is not necessary for the 1 brought in federal court. (ECF No. 6.) Because Plaintiff has raised the exact same claim as 2 before, the Court again finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that can be brought in this 3 Court. 4 B. Leave to Amend 5 Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 advises courts that “leave shall be freely 6 given when justice so requires.” This policy is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. 7 Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.2001), quoting Morongo Band of 8 Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990). The Supreme Court of the United 9 States has offered the following factors that a district court should consider in deciding whether 10 to grant leave to amend: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 11 repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 12 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Foman 13 v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). While in this Circuit prejudice carries the greatest weight 14 among these factors, “a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors” can support 15 dismissal with prejudice. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 16 2003). 17 Leave to amend would be futile in this matter. In its previous screening order, the Court 18 explained exactly why Plaintiff’s child custody claim failed in to state a claim that could be 19 brought in federal court. The Court then liberally construed Plaintiff’s original complaint and 20 outlined the possible federal claims Plaintiff might otherwise be attempting to raise, along with 21 the respective legal standards. Plaintiff’s amended complaint doubles down on the child custody 22 claim, abandoning any others. As stated above and in its last order, federal courts are without 23 jurisdiction to hear child custody claims. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 702-04. Therefore, leave to 24 amend would be futile here because any further amendment would still lead the Court to the 25 same conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s child custody claim. For this reason, the Court will 26 recommend dismissal be with prejudice. 27 / / / 1 IV. 2 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to randomly 4 | assign this matter to a District Judge. 5 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure 6 | to state a claim. 7 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 8 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen 9 | (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file 10 | written objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The 11 document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 12 | Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 13 | may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th 14 | Cir. 2014), citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. Se 17 | Dated: _ October 30, 2025 " STANLEY A. BOONE 18 United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28