Sherman v. Sherman

Opinion

[Cite as Sherman v. Sherman, 2026-Ohio-2592.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

MARCUS SHERMAN, : APPEAL NO. C-250579 TRIAL NO. DR-2300485 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY BRANDY SHERMAN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 7/8/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Sherman v. Sherman, 2026-Ohio-2592.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

MARCUS SHERMAN, : APPEAL NO. C-250579 TRIAL NO. DR-2300485 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : OPINION BRANDY SHERMAN, :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 8, 2026

Goldberg Evans, LLC, and Leah A. Darpel, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Law Office of Arica L. Underwood LLC, and Arica L. Underwood, for Defendant- Appellant. [Cite as Sherman v. Sherman, 2026-Ohio-2592.]

CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} This is an appeal from the trial court’s decision in a post-divorce action.

A magistrate in the court of domestic relations found plaintiff-appellee Marcus

Sherman in contempt for failing to fulfill his spousal-support obligations and for

refusing to cooperate with defendant-appellant Brandy Sherman’s attempts to assume

the parties’ mortgage with the Department of Veteran Affairs (the “VA mortgage”).

Upon objections from Marcus, the trial court reversed the magistrate’s finding of

contempt regarding Marcus’s failure to cooperate with Brandy’s attempts to assume

the VA mortgage.

{¶2} Brandy now appeals, arguing in two assignments of error that the trial

court lacked continuing jurisdiction to modify the parties decree of divorce and

separation agreement, and that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the clear and

unambiguous terms of these documents. We find Brandy’s arguments to be without

merit and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶3} Marcus and Brandy were granted a decree of divorce in December 2023.

The decree incorporated and adopted a separation agreement that the parties had

entered. Both the decree and the separation agreement contained provisions awarding

Brandy the parties’ marital home, which was encumbered by the VA mortgage. Marcus

was the veteran in the relationship. As relevant to this appeal, the decree provided:

Wife shall be awarded the said real property at 9567 Wabash

Way, West Chester, Ohio 45069 as her own separate property with no

offset to Husband . . . .

Wife shall have six (6) months after the date of the Decree in this

matter to refinance or assume the mortgage note on the property to OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

remove Husband from financial liability. Husband shall execute any

necessary deed to convey his one half of the marital interest in this

property to Wife upon the date that Wife secures the refinance or

assumption of the mortgage note. If available, Wife shall also be entitled

to assume the current VA mortgage loan for the property. After the

refinance or assumption, Wife is awarded all of the net equity in the

property free of any rights or interest to Husband.

If Wife cannot refinance or assume the mortgage note to remove

Husband’s name within 9 months of the date of the Decree, then Wife

shall sell the real property at private sale.

{¶4} The separation agreement also addressed Brandy’s retention of the

parties’ home and the related refinancing or assumption of the mortgage on that home.

It provided:

Wife shall have six (6) months after the date of the Decree in this

matter to refinance or assume the V.A. mortgage note on the property

so as to remove Husband from financial liability. If Wife can timely

refinance or assume the mortgage note to remove Husband’s name,

Husband shall execute any necessary deed to convey his one half of the

marital interest in this property to Wife upon the date that Wife secures

the refinance or assumption of the mortgage note. After the refinance or

assumption, Wife is awarded all of the net equity in the property free of

any rights or interest to Husband.

If Wife does not refinance or assume the mortgage note to

remove Husband’s name within six (6) months after the date of the

Judgement [sic] Decree in this matter, then the parties agree that the

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

property is to be sold at private sale and the net proceeds after

customary and necessary payments shall be awarded to wife free and

clear of any rights, claims or interests to Husband . . . .

This court shall retain jurisdiction over this real property until it

is distributed or disposed of in accordance with the provisions stated

herein.

{¶5} Approximately nine months after the decree was granted, Brandy filed

a motion for contempt alleging that Marcus failed to execute a property deed

relinquishing his marital interest in the parties’ home and refused to execute

documents that were required for Brandy to assume the VA mortgage. She further

alleged that Marcus failed to pay spousal support.

{¶6} Marcus also filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Brandy failed to

comply with the provision in the decree requiring her to refinance the mortgage on the

marital residence to remove him from financial lability. He contended that Brandy’s

failure to do so impacted his ability to secure a mortgage for a new residence. Brandy

opposed Marcus’s motion, arguing that the “real issue in the matter is the VA loan

entitlement that [Marcus] is entitled to,” and that Marcus was aware at the time that

he signed the separation agreement that his VA entitlement benefits would be

impacted if Brandy assumed the mortgage loan.

{¶7} A hearing on the competing motions for contempt was held before the

magistrate.1 Brandy testified that, pursuant to the terms of the parties’ decree, she had

six months to either assume the VA mortgage, refinance the mortgage, or sell the

1 Because the trial court’s finding of contempt regarding Marcus’s compliance with his spousal-

support obligations is not challenged on appeal, we do not include any testimony that was offered on that topic in our summary of the testimony given at the hearing.

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

home. Her testimony made clear that assumption of the mortgage was the most

desirable option, as she would be saddled with a much higher interest rate if she

refinanced. Brandy acknowledged that Marcus would lose a portion of his VA

eligibility if she assumed the mortgage. She attempted to explain this impact, stating,

When he goes to buy another home, whatever portion is of the

mortgage of our current home, as on his VA entitlement, he would not

be able to—basically, the benefit is he doesn’t have to make a down

payment on a home. So if he can spend $800,000, they’re going to take

off $322,000, whatever my balance [on the current VA mortgage] is. So

if he purchases a home, that particular amount would get subtracted

from whatever his purchase amount is. If I were to default on the loan,

it will not count against his credit, but you don’t get that money back

towards his benefit.

{¶8} Brandy explained that she consulted with a bank in February 2024 to

determine how to apply for assumption of the VA mortgage. She learned that she was

unable to apply at that time because she did not have the necessary funds and she

needed to pay several outstanding bills. Brandy testified that she was able to begin the

application process in June 2024.

{¶9} Brandy testified that the parties’ VA mortgage was assumable, and that

she and Marcus had discussed the impact of an assumption on his entitlement benefits

during their predivorce settlement negotiations. She stated that Marcus was “well

aware” that his entitlement would be impacted by an assumption because this was not

the parties’ “first VA home purchase.” Brandy testified that she initially wanted to

include language in the separation agreement acknowledging the impact on Marcus’s

benefits and that she “should have fought harder to make sure that more things were

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

spelled out” in the agreement. Brandy also identified a form that the Department of

Veterans Affairs issued in April 2024 to inform veterans that “their entitlement will be

impacted if they allow someone to assume their loan.”

{¶10} Brandy testified that she received an email from the holder of the

parties’ VA mortgage informing her that Marcus was not willing to forfeit his

entitlement benefits and was refusing to sign a form necessary for her to assume the

mortgage. According to Brandy, in June 2024 Marcus offered her additional time to

refinance, acknowledged the high interest rates at that time, and told her that he was

not looking to purchase a house or to cause her any financial hardship.

{¶11} Brandy discussed several emails that she had received from Marcus

stating that he would not forfeit any portion of his VA entitlement or sign a quit-claim

deed and offering her additional time to shop for competitive interest rates. Brandy

testified that she has attempted to assume the mortgage, but that Marcus will not sign

the necessary documents.

{¶12} Marcus, in turn, testified that Brandy failed to assume or refinance the

mortgage within the six-month period accorded to her in the decree, and that he

refused to sign a quit-claim deed because doing so would not release him from

financial liability. He explained, “[I]n the event of an assumption, my name would

essentially no longer be attached to the mortgage via the mortgage company. However,

financial obligation and liability remains intact with the Department of Veteran

Affairs.”

{¶13} Marcus testified that if Brandy defaulted on the mortgage payment, he

would have to pay approximately $89,000 out of pocket to restore his benefits to their

maximum value. He explained that his entitlement remained attached to the property

until the mortgage note was paid in full, and that he would suffer the impact to his

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

benefits when he attempted to purchase another home. Marcus stated, “[T]he ultimate

responsibility for the VA entitlement, it rests upon the veteran, not the civilian who’s

attempting to assume it.” Marcus additionally testified that he did not learn that

Brandy was attempting to assume the loan until nine months after the decree was

issued, which was past the deadline set forth in the decree.

{¶14} The magistrate issued a decision denying Marcus’s motion for contempt

and granting Brandy’s motion. In support of the finding that Marcus was in contempt,

the magistrate stated that the decree’s clear language provided that “Wife shall be

entitled to assume the mortgage if that option is available, and Husband shall do all

acts necessary to carry out and effectuate that provision.” She found that the parties

presented ample evidence of Brandy’s attempts to assume the VA mortgage and to

obtain Marcus’s cooperation, and that Marcus refused to cooperate. The magistrate

additionally found that Marcus had failed to fulfill the entirety of his spousal-support

obligations. The decision provided that Marcus could purge the contempt by paying

Brandy the remainder of his spousal-support obligations and by doing “all acts

necessary to cooperate in the VA loan assumption process so that Wife can assume

said loan and transfer title of the real estate to her individual name.”

{¶15} Marcus filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. He challenged the

magistrate’s findings that (1) he had not complied with his spousal-support

obligations, (2) he was in contempt for “refusing to execute the property deed for the

marital residence,” and (3) Brandy was not in contempt for failing to timely remove

him from liability associated with the marital residence.

{¶16} As relevant to this appeal, Marcus argued in support of his objections

that his entitlement benefit, which he described as “the amount by which the VA will

secure a loan on behalf of [a] member,” was encumbered by the amount of the loan

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

remaining on the marital residence. He argued that a loan assumption did not remove

him from financial liability because if Brandy defaulted, he remained liable to the VA

for a percentage of the entitlement. He also argued that an assumption resulted in less

entitlement available to him to secure an additional VA loan for the purchase of his

own residence. For these reasons, he argued, he had not been removed from financial

liability and was within his rights to refuse to sign the property deed.

{¶17} Brandy opposed Marcus’s objections. As relevant to this appeal, she

argued that Marcus could not rely on a collateral issue, specifically his entitlement

benefits, to defeat his clear duty to execute necessary documents and cooperate with

her assumption of the loan.

{¶18} The trial court issued a decision sustaining Marcus’s objections in part

and overruling them in part. It sustained Marcus’s objection to the magistrate’s

finding that he was in contempt for failing to cooperate with Brandy’s assumption of

the VA mortgage. The court noted that the plain language of the separation agreement

provided that Brandy had six months to refinance or assume the mortgage “so as to

remove Husband from financial liability.” It found that,

based on the testimony surrounding the effect of assumption of the VA

loan on Husband’s entitlement that Wife’s assumption of the loan would

not fully remove Husband from financial liability as he would have to

pay approximately $89,000 to the VA if he wished to use his full

entitlement should Wife default. Accordingly, Husband was within his

rights to refuse to sign the documentation for Wife to assume the loan.

(Emphasis in original.) The court held that there was not sufficient evidence presented

to hold Marcus in contempt for failing to cooperate with the assumption of the VA

mortgage, and it awarded Brandy six additional months from the date of the decision

9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

to refinance the mortgage to remove Marcus from financial liability or to sell the

property. The trial court otherwise overruled Marcus’s objections.

{¶19} Brandy now appeals.

II. Alleged Modification of the Decree and Separation Agreement

{¶20} In her first assignment of error, Brandy argues that “the trial court erred

as a matter of law because it lacked continuing jurisdiction to modify the final Decree

of Divorce and Separation Agreement.” As such, she contends, the trial court could not

relieve Marcus of his clear obligation to cooperate with her assumption of the VA

mortgage.

{¶21} Marcus’s response is two-fold. He first contends that the trial court had

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over Brandy’s obligation to refinance the mortgage,

assume the mortgage, or sell the home because a clause in the separation agreement

provided that the court “shall retain jurisdiction over this real property until it is

distributed or disposed of in accordance with the provisions stated herein.” He further

argues that the trial court did not actually modify the terms of the parties’ decree and

separation agreement, but rather enforced them. We need not address Marcus’s first

argument because his second is dispositive.

{¶22} In finding that Marcus was not in contempt for failing to cooperate with

Brandy’s attempts to assume the VA mortgage, the trial court did not modify either

the decree or the separation agreement. The separation agreement provided, “Wife

shall have six (6) months after the date of the Decree in this matter to refinance or

assume the V.A. mortgage note on the property so as to remove Husband from

financial liability.” (Emphasis added.) The decree contained nearly identical

language. The trial court determined that, based on the evidence presented, Brandy’s

attempted assumption of the mortgage would not remove Marcus from financial

10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

liability and that Marcus was within his rights to refuse to cooperate with the

assumption. All the trial court did was enforce the provision as written, which it

indisputably had jurisdiction to do.

{¶23} Because the trial court did not modify the decree or separation

agreement, Brandy’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Review of Trial Court’s Finding that Marcus was not in Contempt

{¶24} In her second assignment of error, Brandy argues that the trial court

erred as a matter of law by failing to enforce the clear and unambiguous language of

the parties’ decree of divorce and separation agreement. She contends that these

documents permitted her to assume the loan and mandated Marcus’s cooperation with

the assumption process, and that the documents did not condition her assumption of

the VA mortgage on the preservation of Marcus’s VA entitlement.

{¶25} “[W]e review de novo the interpretation of a separation agreement

incorporated in a divorce decree.” Strohm v. Strohm, 2014-Ohio-3405, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).

Whether language in a decree is ambiguous is a question of law. Hoog v. Hoog, 1999

Ohio App. LEXIS 4421, *8 (1st Dist. Sept. 24, 1999). “Generally, when contract

language is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, then ambiguity

exists—and this situation can occur when a material phrase in the provision is

undefined.” (Cleaned up.) Ma v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2020-Ohio-

1471, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). When a contract is ambiguous, a court may look at extrinsic

evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Ruehl v. Air/Pro, Inc., 2005-Ohio-1184, ¶ 5

(1st Dist.).

{¶26} If an appellate court finds that the terms of a decree are ambiguous, the

trial court’s interpretation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 4; Stevens v.

Stevens, 2018-Ohio-2662, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when “a court

11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

exercise[s] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it

has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. It implies

that the trial court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Gipson v.

Mercy Health Sys. of S.W. Ohio, 2025-Ohio-2208, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). Under this

deferential standard of review, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court. Id.

{¶27} We do not agree with Brandy’s assertion that the language in the parties’

decree and separation agreement is unambiguous. These documents awarded Brandy

the marital residence and provided that she had six months after the date of the decree

to refinance or assume the mortgage on the property “to remove Husband from

financial liability.” Under these plain terms, Brandy was only entitled to assume the

mortgage if doing so removed Marcus from financial liability. But neither the decree

nor the separation agreement defined or explained what constituted “financial

liability.”

{¶28} While Brandy agrees that her assumption of the loan will have a

collateral impact on Marcus’s entitlement benefits with the VA, she argues that this

impact did not subject Marcus to financial liability. She also argues that the trial court

could not consider Marcus’s entitlement benefits when determining whether Marcus

was removed from financial liability because the benefits were not reserved or

addressed in the decree or separation agreement. Marcus takes the opposite position

and argues that the impact of an assumption on his entitlement benefits is a form of

financial liability. The fact that both Brandy and Marcus have put forth reasonable

interpretations of the phrase “financial liability” demonstrates the ambiguity in the

decree and separation agreement with respect to this term. See Ma, 2020-Ohio-1471,

at ¶ 17 (1st Dist.).

12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶29} The trial court agreed with Marcus and interpreted the term “financial

liability” to include a collateral impact on Marcus’s entitlement benefits. The court

found that an assumption would not remove Marcus from financial liability because

he “would have to pay approximately $89,000 to the VA if he wished to use his full

entitlement should Wife default.” Contrary to Brandy’s assertion, we find no error or

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s consideration of Marcus’s entitlement benefits

when determining whether he was removed from liability.

{¶30} Because of the ambiguity in the term “financial liability,” the trial court

relied on extrinsic evidence, specifically the testimony offered by the parties at the

hearing, to interpret the term and determine the parties’ intent. See Ruehl, 2005-Ohio-

1184, at ¶ 5 (1st Dist.). And the trial court’s finding that the impact on Marcus’s

entitlement benefits was a form of financial liability was supported by the testimony

presented at the hearing.

{¶31} Brandy’s testimony established that the parties were aware, prior to

signing the separation agreement, that an assumption of the VA mortgage impacted

Marcus’s entitlement benefits. She testified that she “should have fought harder to

make sure that more things were spelled out” in the documents regarding the

entitlement. From this testimony, the trial court could reasonably have determined

that the parties had considered the entitlement benefits, and that Marcus’s refusal to

include any language about the impact of an assumption on those benefits in the

separation agreement meant that he did not agree that an assumption of the mortgage

removed him from financial liability.

{¶32} Because it determined that Brandy’s assumption of the mortgage would

not remove Marcus from financial liability, the trial court found that Marcus was not

in contempt for failing to cooperate with the assumption of the VA mortgage and sign

13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

over the deed to the marital residence. This was not an abuse of discretion. See

Masters v. Masters, 2010-Ohio-5961, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.) (“An appellate court applies an

abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s decision whether to hold a

party in contempt.”). Further, the trial court’s decision did not leave Brandy without

recourse. While Brandy preferred to assume the mortgage because it was the best

option financially, per the terms of the decree she could still refinance the mortgage or

sell the home.

{¶33} We accordingly overrule Brandy’s second assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.