Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: CV-20-900690).
This text of Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: CV-20-900690). (Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: CV-20-900690).) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Rel: September 6, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2024
_________________________
SC-2023-0603 _________________________
Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr., deceased
v.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-20-900690)
COOK, Justice.
This is a product-liability action. Sheri Sawyer ("Sawyer"), as the SC-2023-0603
personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr.,
deceased, sued Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit
Court following a single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, in which her
son, Thomas, was killed. The accident occurred after one of the tires on
the vehicle in which Thomas was a passenger experienced a tread
separation. The tire was allegedly manufactured by Cooper Tire and
purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin ("Coggin"), an Alabama
resident and the mother of the driver, Joseph Daniel Coggin, who was
also an Alabama resident.
Cooper Tire moved to dismiss Sawyer's action for lack of specific
personal jurisdiction based on its lack of sufficient suit-related contacts
with Alabama. In other words, Cooper Tire argued that Alabama courts
do not have authority to decide Sawyer's claims.
In response to that motion, Sawyer argued that her claims against
Cooper Tire -- a national tire manufacturer with a significant dealer
network in Alabama -- "arise out of or relate to" its contacts with
Alabama, which, she argued, were established through its sale,
distribution, and advertising of the particular tire model at issue in
Alabama.
2 SC-2023-0603
While Cooper Tire's motion was pending, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), in which it recognized that,
in a product-liability action, a forum state may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant even when there is not a direct
causal relationship between the defendant's contacts with the forum
state and the injury. The Court explained that jurisdiction can exist if
the claim " ' arise[s] out of or relate[s] to' " the defendant's contacts with
the forum state. Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (citations omitted). The Court
wrote that a claim that "relates to" a defendant's contacts with a forum
state could include circumstances in which the defendant "systematically
served a market in [the forum state] for the very [product] that the
plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them" in that state, even
when the plaintiffs cannot show that the defective product was purchased
there. Id. at 365.
Afterward, the parties filed supplemental briefing addressing Ford,
and the trial court proceeded with holding a hearing on Cooper Tire's
motion to dismiss. Following that hearing, the trial court granted Cooper
Tire's motion. Among other things, the trial court concluded that it could
3 SC-2023-0603
not exercise personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire because (1) Sawyer
had failed to show that Cooper Tire had sold, distributed, and marketed
the particular tire model at issue in Alabama in the three years before
the underlying accident and (2) Sawyer and her son were not Alabama
residents and, thus, Alabama had "less of an interest" in providing a
forum for her action against an out-of-state defendant. Sawyer appealed.
As explained below, we conclude that the Supreme Court's decision
in Ford is binding in this case. After applying the analytical framework
from Ford to the facts in this case, we hold that Cooper Tire's unrefuted
sale, distribution, and advertising in Alabama of the particular tire model
at issue "relate to" Sawyer's claims against it and, thus, that specific
personal jurisdiction exists in this case. As a result, we further hold that
the trial court's findings concerning the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts
with Alabama before the underlying accident and Sawyer's place of
residency are not dispositive of the jurisdictional question here. We
therefore reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing Sawyer's action
and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
I. The Accident and the Underlying Lawsuit
4 SC-2023-0603
On March 31, 2018, Thomas, a Florida resident, was traveling
through Mobile County in a 2004 GMC Envoy driven by Joseph. As
stated previously, the Envoy was owned by Joseph's mother, who had
purchased the vehicle, including its tires, in Alabama.
During the trip, the vehicle's right rear tire -- a CS4 Touring tire,
size P235/65R17 ("the subject tire") -- experienced a tread separation. As
a result, it instantly became "unstable and uncontrollable," and, as
Joseph attempted to steady it, the vehicle struck a ditch and flipped over.
Thomas died in the crash.
On March 24, 2020, Sawyer, a Florida resident and the personal
representative of Thomas's estate, filed suit against Cooper Tire in the
Mobile Circuit Court.1 In her complaint, Sawyer alleged a series of
product-liability, negligence, wrongful-death, and breach-of-warranty
claims against Cooper Tire for which she sought damages.
Sawyer alleged that Cooper Tire was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Alabama because, she said, her claims "relate to Cooper
Tire's contacts with the State of Alabama." Among other things, her
1Sawyer also sued Joseph. However, he was later dismissed from
the action and, thus, is not a party to this appeal. 5 SC-2023-0603
complaint alleged:
"5. Defendant Cooper Tire is a for-profit corporation, which was engaged in business in the State of Alabama through the distribution of its products in the stream of commerce, and whose defective product did injure [Thomas] in the State of Alabama. Defendant Cooper Tire manufactured, assembled, marketed, warranted and placed in the stream of commerce the Cooper CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17 ('Subject Tire') which caused harm and injury to [Thomas] in the State of Alabama.
"6. Cooper Tire sells its passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire Model, to distributors and retailers throughout the State of Alabama.
"7. According to the Cooper Tire website, Cooper Tire maintains a tire dealer network comprised of approximately 324 Cooper Tire dealers across 117 cities throughout the State of Alabama.
"….
"9. Cooper Tire actively collected warranty information and tire failure data within the State of Alabama from Alabama consumers. Cooper Tire uses this information when creating and modifying the design of its tires, including the failed Subject Tire.
"12.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Rel: September 6, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2024
_________________________
SC-2023-0603 _________________________
Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr., deceased
v.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-20-900690)
COOK, Justice.
This is a product-liability action. Sheri Sawyer ("Sawyer"), as the SC-2023-0603
personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr.,
deceased, sued Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit
Court following a single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, in which her
son, Thomas, was killed. The accident occurred after one of the tires on
the vehicle in which Thomas was a passenger experienced a tread
separation. The tire was allegedly manufactured by Cooper Tire and
purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin ("Coggin"), an Alabama
resident and the mother of the driver, Joseph Daniel Coggin, who was
also an Alabama resident.
Cooper Tire moved to dismiss Sawyer's action for lack of specific
personal jurisdiction based on its lack of sufficient suit-related contacts
with Alabama. In other words, Cooper Tire argued that Alabama courts
do not have authority to decide Sawyer's claims.
In response to that motion, Sawyer argued that her claims against
Cooper Tire -- a national tire manufacturer with a significant dealer
network in Alabama -- "arise out of or relate to" its contacts with
Alabama, which, she argued, were established through its sale,
distribution, and advertising of the particular tire model at issue in
Alabama.
2 SC-2023-0603
While Cooper Tire's motion was pending, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), in which it recognized that,
in a product-liability action, a forum state may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant even when there is not a direct
causal relationship between the defendant's contacts with the forum
state and the injury. The Court explained that jurisdiction can exist if
the claim " ' arise[s] out of or relate[s] to' " the defendant's contacts with
the forum state. Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (citations omitted). The Court
wrote that a claim that "relates to" a defendant's contacts with a forum
state could include circumstances in which the defendant "systematically
served a market in [the forum state] for the very [product] that the
plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them" in that state, even
when the plaintiffs cannot show that the defective product was purchased
there. Id. at 365.
Afterward, the parties filed supplemental briefing addressing Ford,
and the trial court proceeded with holding a hearing on Cooper Tire's
motion to dismiss. Following that hearing, the trial court granted Cooper
Tire's motion. Among other things, the trial court concluded that it could
3 SC-2023-0603
not exercise personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire because (1) Sawyer
had failed to show that Cooper Tire had sold, distributed, and marketed
the particular tire model at issue in Alabama in the three years before
the underlying accident and (2) Sawyer and her son were not Alabama
residents and, thus, Alabama had "less of an interest" in providing a
forum for her action against an out-of-state defendant. Sawyer appealed.
As explained below, we conclude that the Supreme Court's decision
in Ford is binding in this case. After applying the analytical framework
from Ford to the facts in this case, we hold that Cooper Tire's unrefuted
sale, distribution, and advertising in Alabama of the particular tire model
at issue "relate to" Sawyer's claims against it and, thus, that specific
personal jurisdiction exists in this case. As a result, we further hold that
the trial court's findings concerning the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts
with Alabama before the underlying accident and Sawyer's place of
residency are not dispositive of the jurisdictional question here. We
therefore reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing Sawyer's action
and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
I. The Accident and the Underlying Lawsuit
4 SC-2023-0603
On March 31, 2018, Thomas, a Florida resident, was traveling
through Mobile County in a 2004 GMC Envoy driven by Joseph. As
stated previously, the Envoy was owned by Joseph's mother, who had
purchased the vehicle, including its tires, in Alabama.
During the trip, the vehicle's right rear tire -- a CS4 Touring tire,
size P235/65R17 ("the subject tire") -- experienced a tread separation. As
a result, it instantly became "unstable and uncontrollable," and, as
Joseph attempted to steady it, the vehicle struck a ditch and flipped over.
Thomas died in the crash.
On March 24, 2020, Sawyer, a Florida resident and the personal
representative of Thomas's estate, filed suit against Cooper Tire in the
Mobile Circuit Court.1 In her complaint, Sawyer alleged a series of
product-liability, negligence, wrongful-death, and breach-of-warranty
claims against Cooper Tire for which she sought damages.
Sawyer alleged that Cooper Tire was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Alabama because, she said, her claims "relate to Cooper
Tire's contacts with the State of Alabama." Among other things, her
1Sawyer also sued Joseph. However, he was later dismissed from
the action and, thus, is not a party to this appeal. 5 SC-2023-0603
complaint alleged:
"5. Defendant Cooper Tire is a for-profit corporation, which was engaged in business in the State of Alabama through the distribution of its products in the stream of commerce, and whose defective product did injure [Thomas] in the State of Alabama. Defendant Cooper Tire manufactured, assembled, marketed, warranted and placed in the stream of commerce the Cooper CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17 ('Subject Tire') which caused harm and injury to [Thomas] in the State of Alabama.
"6. Cooper Tire sells its passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire Model, to distributors and retailers throughout the State of Alabama.
"7. According to the Cooper Tire website, Cooper Tire maintains a tire dealer network comprised of approximately 324 Cooper Tire dealers across 117 cities throughout the State of Alabama.
"….
"9. Cooper Tire actively collected warranty information and tire failure data within the State of Alabama from Alabama consumers. Cooper Tire uses this information when creating and modifying the design of its tires, including the failed Subject Tire.
"12. Cooper Tire conducted extensive advertising and marketing campaigns for its passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire model, that reached consumers in the State of Alabama and connected Alabama consumers with the closest Cooper Tire dealer.
"13. Cooper Tire's advertising also includes Cooper Tire 6 SC-2023-0603
sponsorship for the Southeastern Conference (SEC) Basketball tournament for the University of Alabama collegiate basketball program; Cooper Tire sponsorship for the 'Cooper Tire Performer of the Week' for the University of Alabama collegiate sports program; Cooper Tire sponsorship for an Alabama football blog; Cooper Tire sponsorship of the Bassmaster Elite Series, which is headquartered in the State of Alabama; and Cooper Tire sponsorship for the Paul Finebaum sports talk show, which broadcasts in the State of Alabama. …"
(Emphasis added.) Her complaint also alleged the following:
"111. At all materials times, Cooper Tire has collectively been engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of automobile tires and has sold, distributed, and otherwise place[d] such products into the stream of commerce in the state of Alabama.
"112. Prior to the date of the incident giving rise to this litigation, Cooper Tire had manufactured, sold, and distributed automobile tires into [the stream of] commerce in the state of Alabama having the following specifications: a Cooper Tire tubeless radial bearing the name Cooper Tire CS4 Touring P235/65R17."
(Emphasis added.)
II. Cooper Tire's Motion to Dismiss
On August 21, 2020, Cooper Tire moved to dismiss Sawyer's claims
against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because it was undisputed that
Cooper Tire was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Alabama,
Cooper Tire's motion focused on the arguments for why specific personal
7 SC-2023-0603
jurisdiction did not exist for the claims by Sawyer. 2
In its motion, Cooper Tire admitted that it was "like many
companies whose products are placed into the stream of commerce and
distributed nationally" and that it had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in Alabama. However, relying on
Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114 (Ala. 2016),
in which a plurality of our Court held that specific personal jurisdiction
cannot be exercised when an allegedly defective product is not sold in
Alabama by the out-of-state defendant, Cooper Tire asserted that Sawyer
had neither pleaded nor shown that it had sold the subject tire on
Coggin's vehicle in Alabama. In other words, Cooper Tire argued that
there was not a direct causal connection between its contacts with
2Specifically, it was undisputed by the parties that the trial court
could not exercise general personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire because Cooper Tire is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Ohio. See Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1149 (Ala. 2022) (recognizing that a defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction only in states where it is "essentially at home" and explaining that, for a corporate defendant, that typically means only the state in which the defendant is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 & n.19 (2014))).
8 SC-2023-0603
Alabama and the claims in this lawsuit. Accordingly, Cooper Tire argued
that Sawyer had failed to meet her burden of establishing that the trial
court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over it and, thus, that
her claims against it were due to be dismissed.
In support of its motion, Cooper Tire attached the affidavit of Nicole
K. Schwieterman, who was the corporate counsel for the company. In her
affidavit, Schwieterman stated that she was familiar with Cooper Tire's
business operations and admitted that, for the years 2017, 2018, and
2019, "approximately 1% of Cooper Tire's nationwide unit sales were
made in Alabama." Although she admitted that Cooper Tire
manufactured the CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17, she explained that the
CS4 Touring tire was made by Cooper Tire only from 2007-2014 and was
never sold to General Motors -- the manufacturer of the 2004 GMC Envoy
involved in the underlying accident. She also noted that Sawyer's
complaint did not provide the Department of Transportation tire-
identification number of the subject tire so that Cooper Tire could verify
(1) whether it had manufactured that tire or (2) when and where that tire
had been manufactured.
On October 21, 2020, Sawyer filed an opposition to Cooper Tire's
9 SC-2023-0603
motion and served Cooper Tire with a jurisdictional discovery request to
help establish the existence of the contacts between Cooper Tire and
Alabama. 3
However, after filing the above documents, Sawyer notified the trial
court that the exact jurisdictional issue raised by Cooper Tire was
pending before the United States Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v.
Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021). Given the
factual and legal similarities between Ford and the present case, Sawyer
asked the trial court to defer ruling on Cooper Tire's motion until after
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford. 4
3In that request, Sawyer asked Cooper Tire to, among other things:
(1) disclose how many CS4 Touring tires were sold annually in Alabama between 2017 and 2019 and (2) disclose the total sales of that type of tire in Alabama. Sawyer also asked Cooper Tire to "[p]roduce all written agreements concerning advertising funds related to the marketing or advertisements of Cooper products in Alabama to the extent that such agreements were in force at any time from 2015 to the present and were either executed in Alabama or agreed by persons or corporate entities in Alabama." Finally, Sawyer asked Cooper Tire to admit that, in the last three years, it had advertised in Alabama and collected adjustment and/or tire-failure data about tires that had failed or had been returned in Alabama.
4Among other things, Sawyer attached to her request a copy of the
transcript from the oral argument held by the Supreme Court in the Ford.
10 SC-2023-0603
On October 23, 2020, the trial court issued an order in which it
agreed to defer ruling on Cooper Tire's motion until after the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Ford. It also agreed to stay further discovery
in the action pending its final ruling on Cooper Tire's motion.
III. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ford
On March 25, 2021, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford.
In the consolidated suits at issue in Ford, as explained in detail below,
two plaintiffs had been injured in vehicles manufactured by Ford. Ford
moved to dismiss those suits on the basis that the forum states lacked
personal jurisdiction over it because the subject vehicles were not
originally sold in the forum states.
The Supreme Court rejected Ford's assertion, emphasizing that
jurisdiction can exist if injuries either " ' arise out of or relate to' " the
defendant's forum contacts. Id. at 362 (citations omitted). Because Ford
conducted so much business in the forum states and because those
activities "related to" the plaintiffs' claims against it -- including
marketing, selling, and servicing "the very vehicles that the plaintiffs
allege[d] malfunctioned and injured them in those States" -- the Supreme
Court held that it was fair and foreseeable for the courts in the forum
11 SC-2023-0603
states to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford. Id. at 365.
IV. The Parties' Supplemental Briefing in Light of Ford
Following the issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Ford, on
January 27, 2022, both parties filed supplemental briefs on the impact of
the Ford decision. In support of her supplemental brief, Sawyer attached,
among other things, a copy of a portion of Joseph's deposition, a copy of
the accident report, and a copy of the "Carfax" report showing that the
2004 GMC Envoy's ownership history, maintenance history, and accident
history all occurred in Alabama.
V. The Trial Court's Order Directing the Parties to Conduct Limited Discovery
After the parties submitted their supplemental briefs, on May 26,
2022, the trial court held a hearing during which it heard arguments
from the parties regarding the impact of the Ford decision as well as the
need for additional jurisdictional discovery. Following that hearing, on
May 27, 2022, the trial court issued an order in which it directed the
parties to conduct limited discovery to establish (1) the state in which the
subject tire was purchased and (2) whether, in 2015, 2016, 2017, and/or
2018, Cooper Tire generally sold the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama.
Neither party raised any objections to the trial court's order. 12 SC-2023-0603
On June 16, 2022, Sawyer's counsel filed a copy of an affidavit from
Coggin, Joseph's mother. Coggin's affidavit stated, among other things,
that she was the owner of the 2004 GMC Envoy involved in the
underlying accident and that she had "purchased the subject tire at issue
in this lawsuit" in Alabama. She further stated that "[a]ny tire [she] ever
purchased for the 2004 GMC Envoy was purchased in the State of
Alabama" and that "[a]ll maintenance for the 2004 GMC Envoy was done
exclusively in the State of Alabama." Although she stated that she "[could
not] be certain as to where and when the subject tire was purchased," she
also stated that she "routinely purchased tires from A1 Tire Store located
in Semmes, Alabama or the Wal-Mart store located in Semmes,
Alabama" and that "[t]hese locations sell Cooper Tires."
Cooper Tire then filed a copy of an affidavit from Craig Marks, the
"Lead Professional for Distribution & Operations Planning" for Cooper
Tire. In his affidavit, Marks explained (1) that Cooper Tire did not sell
the CS4 Touring tire as "original equipment to GM" -- the manufacturer
of Coggin's vehicle -- and (2) that, although Cooper Tire "shipped
approximately 5,000 Cooper CS4 Touring size P235/65R17 tires to other
states from 2015-2018, including California, Texas, New York, and
13 SC-2023-0603
Pennsylvania," it "did not ship any of those tires to Alabama." (Emphasis
added.) Marks further explained that he had "reviewed the shipping
records with ship-to addresses in Alabama and located no records
indicating that Cooper tire shipped any tires of any brand or size to either
the A-1 Tire store in Semmes, Alabama or the Wal-Mart in Semmes,
Alabama from 2015-2018."
In addition to Marks's affidavit, Cooper Tire also submitted a copy
of the GMC Envoy's "Alabama Vehicle Title History," which purported to
show that Coggin had purchased the vehicle in Alabama in 2016.
VI. The Trial Court's Judgment Granting Cooper Tire's Motion to Dismiss
Following a final hearing on Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss, on
October 18, 2022, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
Sawyer's claims against Cooper Tire after concluding that it lacked
specific personal jurisdiction over the company.
In support of its decision, the trial court discussed at length the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford, supra, as well as this Court's
prior decision in Hinrichs, supra, and the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama's decision in Tyler v. Ford Motor Co.
(Case No. 2:20-CV-584-WKW, Nov. 17, 2021) (M.D. Ala. 2021) (not 14 SC-2023-0603
reported in Federal Supplement) (judgment vacated), and explained that
its "specific jurisdictional analysis must focus on whether Cooper Tire's
suit-related contacts create a substantial connection with Alabama."
Applying the jurisdictional principles of those cases to the facts of this
case, the trial court found:
"In this case, a non-resident plaintiff alleges her non-resident decedent suffered an in-state injury caused by an allegedly defective tire manufactured by Cooper Tire. The specific Subject Tire was purchased by Barbara Coggin in Alabama, but there is no evidence Cooper Tire distributed or sold that tire in Alabama. The evidence is Cooper Tire manufactured approximately 5,000 of the Cooper CS4 Touring size [P]235/65R17 tires during 2015-2018. [5] The record reflects that all of those tires were shipped to states other than Alabama. The record also reflects that Cooper Tire neither sold nor shipped to Alabama any Cooper CS4 Touring [P]235/65R17 tires from 2015-2018. Alabama also has less of an interest in asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant to provide a forum for an out-of-state plaintiff than if the plaintiff was an Alabama resident.
"For all these reasons, [Sawyer] has not met her burden of showing that the connection between [her] claims and Cooper Tire's activities in Alabama is close enough to support
5In its judgment, the trial court explained that both the "Carfax"
report submitted by Sawyer and the certified "Alabama Vehicle Title History" submitted by Cooper Tire showed that Coggin had purchased the 2004 GMC Envoy in Alabama in early 2016 and that the accident took place in March 2018. Based on that information as well as some of Sawyer's prior discovery requests, the trial court stated that it considered 2015-2018 to be the "relevant timeframe" for the purposes of evaluating Cooper Tire's personal-jurisdiction claim. 15 SC-2023-0603
specific jurisdiction. It therefore is the JUDGMENT of this Court that Cooper Tire's Motion to Dismiss … should be and is hereby GRANTED."
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
After the trial court issued its judgment, Sawyer filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the judgment which was later denied. This appeal
followed.
Standard of Review
"A Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion tests the [trial] court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction." Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Allen, 143 So. 3d 784, 787 (Ala. 2014). It is well settled that " ' " [a]n
appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a party's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." ' " Id. (quoting Ex
parte Lagrone, 839 So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Elliott v.
Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002)).
Discussion
On appeal, Sawyer contends the trial court erred in granting
Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss on the basis that it lacked specific
personal jurisdiction over the company.
I. Alabama's Long-Arm Rule Extends Long-Arm Jurisdiction to the "Fullest Extent" Under Federal Constitutional Law 16 SC-2023-0603
Our personal-jurisdiction law is coextensive with federal law, and
thus we are bound to apply Ford. Our Court has recently reiterated that
"[a]n Alabama court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant served
out of state … if doing so is consistent with due process and Rule 4.2(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P., which serves the function of Alabama's 'long-arm
statute.' " Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1148
(Ala. 2022). 6 That rule "extends long-arm jurisdiction to the fullest extent
consistent with due process under the United States and Alabama
Constitutions." Id. (emphasis added).
II. Personal-Jurisdiction Allegations in a Complaint Must be Taken as True Unless Controverted by Affidavit Testimony from the Defendant
The parties' respective burdens in a case testing personal
jurisdiction are well settled in Alabama:
" ' " 'The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' " ' Ex parte
6Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
"An appropriate basis exists for service of process outside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in this state when the person or entity has such contacts with this state that the prosecution of the action against the person or entity in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States ...."
17 SC-2023-0603
McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670, 674 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010), quoting in turn J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala. 2008), citing in turn Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004)).
" ' " ' "In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, a court must consider as true the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint not controverted by the defendant's affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996), and Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990), and 'where the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's affidavits conflict, the ... court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.' Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255 (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990))." '
" ' "Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)). However, if the defendant makes a prima facie 18 SC-2023-0603
evidentiary showing that the Court has no personal jurisdiction, 'the plaintiff is then required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof, and he may not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint.' Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See also Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471, 474-75 (D. Del. 1995) ('When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and supports that motion with affidavits, plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits with his own affidavits or other competent evidence in order to survive the motion.') (citing Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984))."
" 'Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004).' "
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 3d at 787-88 (quoting Ex
parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010)) (emphasis added).
In sum, the allegations of the complaint govern unless controverted by
affidavits from the defendant.
III. Specific-Personal-Jurisdiction Legal Principles 19 SC-2023-0603
Our Court's precedent has been consistent with past Supreme
Court precedent on personal jurisdiction. For instance, we have recently
stated the following with regard to the degree of contacts that must exist
for a trial court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant:
"The touchstone of specific jurisdiction is whether the defendant has ' "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." ' Ford Motor Co. [v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.], 592 U.S. [351] at 352, 141 S. Ct. [1017] at 1024 [(2021)] (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). … Crucially, specific jurisdiction must be based on ' "the defendant's contacts with the forum state that are related to the cause of action" ' in the suit at hand, and, though these contacts ' "need not be continuous and systematic," ' they must be substantial enough that the defendant could fairly anticipate a suit in the forum state. [Elliott v. VanKleef, 830 So. 2d 726] at 730 [(Ala. 2002)] (quoting Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result)); see also Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (stressing that 'the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State' (emphasis added))."
Pruitt, 358 So. 3d at 1149-50 (first emphasis added).
A. Our Court's Decision in Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114 (Ala. 2016)
However, in 2016, a plurality of our Court, in Hinrichs, appeared to
narrow the circumstances in which an out-of-state defendant's contacts 20 SC-2023-0603
with Alabama are deemed to "arise out of or relate to" an action. Cooper
Tire and the trial court relied, at least in part, on Hinrichs. Because
Sawyer asks that we overrule this plurality decision and because it is one
of the most recent cases with some of the most extensive analysis of the
"stream of commerce" test by our Court before Ford, we must discuss it.
In Hinrichs, Daniel Vinson purchased a vehicle in Pennsylvania
that had been manufactured by General Motors of Canada, Ltd. ("GM
Canada"). GM Canada manufactured vehicles for General Motors
Corporation, its parent company, to distribute to all 50 states in the
United States. Hinrichs suffered serious injuries in an automobile
accident in Alabama while he was a passenger in a GMC Sierra pickup
truck driven by Vinson.
Hinrichs thereafter brought a product-liability action against GM
Canada. GM Canada moved to dismiss Hinrichs's complaint based on a
lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted that motion.
On appeal, determining whether Alabama could exercise personal
jurisdiction over GM Canada, this Court considered
"whether a stream-of-commerce analysis consistent with existing precedent can be applied to uphold specific jurisdiction over GM Canada under the facts of this case. The starting point of the stream of commerce in this case is GM 21 SC-2023-0603
Canada's anticipation of the presence of its vehicles in all 50 states, necessarily including Alabama. But it is undisputed that the stream of commerce for the [GMC] Sierra [pickup truck] ended at its sale in Pennsylvania, approximately 1,000 miles from Alabama.
"....
"Although existing Supreme Court precedent on stream of commerce as a basis for specific jurisdiction is not a model of clarity, it is clear that a majority of the United States Supreme Court has yet to hold that foreseeability alone is sufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to specific jurisdiction in the forum state. This conclusion is consistent with a law-review article quoted with approval in Daimler[ AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014),] describing International Shoe [Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),] as clearly not saying that 'dispute-blind' jurisdiction is appropriate in cases involving specific jurisdiction. 571 U.S. at 138, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
"In Walden [v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014),] the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on specific jurisdiction and the first case in many years to garner a unanimous Court on the subject, the Supreme Court emphatically underscored the requirement that the claim against the defendant have a suit-related nexus with the forum state before specific jurisdiction can attach. The Walden Court left no room for any exceptions. 'For a State to exercise [specific] jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.' 571 U.S. at 284, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (emphasis added). Vinson, the owner of the vehicle in which Hinrichs was injured, brought the Sierra to Alabama. However, Vinson's ' " unilateral activity of [bringing the Sierra to Alabama, in which GM Canada did not participate,] is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify 22 SC-2023-0603
an assertion of jurisdiction." ' 571 U.S. at 284, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984))."
Hinrichs, 222 So. 3d at 1138-40 (all but final emphasis added).
In upholding the trial court's conclusion that it did not have specific
personal jurisdiction over GM Canada, a plurality of this Court stated
that "there simply is no 'suit-related conduct' that creates a substantial
connection between GM Canada and Alabama if the vehicle was not sold
in Alabama, even though Hinrichs was injured in Alabama." 222 So. 3d
at 1141 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). In other words,
a plurality of our Court held that it is only when the defective product is
sold in Alabama and that contact results in the plaintiff's injury that
specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised over the out-of-state
defendant.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ford
Five years after our decision in Hinrichs, the Supreme Court
decided Ford. As explained previously, in that case, two plaintiffs were
injured in vehicles manufactured by Ford, and the undisputed facts
showed that the vehicles involved in the accidents -- a 1996 Explorer and
23 SC-2023-0603
a 1994 Crown Victoria -- were originally sold outside the forum states.7
Those vehicles were eventually resold as used cars to the current owners
in Minnesota and Montana.
Ford moved to dismiss those suits on the basis that the forum states
lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Although Ford did not dispute that
(1) it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in both forum states and (2) it did substantial business in both
forum states, including advertising, selling, and servicing the same
models as the vehicles that the suits claimed were defective, it
nevertheless argued that each state court had jurisdiction over it only if
the company's conduct in those states had directly given rise to the
plaintiff's claims. According to Ford, that causal link could be established
only if the company had designed, manufactured, or sold the specific
vehicles involved in the accidents in the forum states. Because the
plaintiffs in each case could not make such a showing, Ford asserted that
their lawsuits against it were due to be dismissed.
The trial courts in each forum state denied Ford's motion. The
7One vehicle was originally sold in Washington and the other in
North Dakota. 24 SC-2023-0603
Supreme Court later granted certiorari review to consider whether Ford
was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and Montana.8
In its certiorari petition, Ford relied heavily on Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 582
U.S. 255 (2017). In Bristol-Myers, a large number of purchasers of an
allegedly defective drug sued the drug manufacturer in California state
court. Some of those purchasers were residents of California who had
purchased the drug in California. However, many of the plaintiffs were
residents of other states who had purchased and ingested the drug. The
Supreme Court concluded that the claims of those nonresidents, for
injuries suffered outside California, based upon sales made outside
California, did not "arise out of or relate to" the drug manufacturer's
contacts with California because those claims were for injuries and sales
that took place outside California. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in
Bristol Myers held that there was no specific personal jurisdiction over
the drug manufacturer as to the nonresidents' claims. 582 U.S. at 265-
8The Supreme Court did not address whether Ford could have been
subject to the general personal jurisdiction of those courts because, it noted, the parties agreed that general personal jurisdiction would attach only in Delaware or Michigan -- the states in which Ford was organized and had its principal place of business. 592 U.S. at 359. 25 SC-2023-0603
66.
Ford reasoned that Bristol-Myers precluded jurisdiction when the
defective product is sold outside the forum State, "even if the defendant
regularly sold 'the same kind of product' in the State." Ford, 592 U.S. at
369 (quoting Ford's reply brief at 2). According to Ford, because the
particular vehicles involved in the accidents were not designed,
manufactured, or first sold in the states where the plaintiffs' injuries
occurred, the necessary "causal link" between it and the forum states
could not be established and, thus, the forum states could not exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over it.
In considering Ford's argument, the Supreme Court first explained
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the basis
of the personal-jurisdiction doctrine and that it "limits a state court's
power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant." 592 U.S. at 358. The
Court quoted the foundational case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to explain how the Due Process Clause
balances (1) fairness to the defendant, (2) reasonableness, and (3) respect
for each state's authority in our federalist system, stating: "[A] tribunal's
authority depends on the defendant's having such 'contacts' with the
26 SC-2023-0603
forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is 'reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of government,' and 'does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " 592 U.S. at 358
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17) (emphasis added).
In applying this test, the Supreme Court then explained that a
defendant must have, at least, purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of doing business in the forum state. According to the Supreme Court,
this is normally determined by looking to see whether the "contacts"
between the defendant and the forum state are of a sufficient nature and
whether they are the result of the "defendant's own choice" and are not
merely " ' random, isolated, or fortuitous.' " 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). In other
words, the defendant "must take 'some act by which [it] purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State.' " 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)). See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (explaining that a
defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice' " (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
27 SC-2023-0603
457, 463 (1940))).
One example of such purposeful availment, the Supreme Court
noted, can be the defendant's cultivating a market, that is " ' exploi[ting]
a market' in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship
centered there." Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 285)
(emphasis added).
Since Ford conceded that it had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in the forum states, the Supreme Court's
analysis focused on the next step of the specific-personal-jurisdiction
analysis -- that is, whether a sufficient affiliation existed between the
forum states, Ford, and the underlying controversies. The Supreme Court
in Ford explained that in Bristol-Myers, although the defendant had sold
the same product (Plavix) in the forum state (California), the claims of
the plaintiffs who resided in other states did not have any connection to
California. In other words, there was simply no "activity or occurrence"
that took place in California connected to those nonresident plaintiffs.
592 U.S. at 369 (quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 265) (explaining that
" ' [w]hat is needed -- and what is missing here -- is a connection between
the forum and the specific claims at issue' " ).
28 SC-2023-0603
Ford's argument focused on the language from Bristol-Myers,
quoted above by the Supreme Court, requiring that the suit " ' arise out of
or relate to the defendant's contacts' with the forum." Id. at 359 (quoting
Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 256). In Ford's view, this meant that
jurisdiction could attach only in those states "where Ford sold the car[s]
in question, or else the States where Ford designed and manufactured
the vehicle[s]." Id. at 361. Because none of those things occurred in
Montana or Minnesota, Ford maintained that those states "have no
power over these cases." Id.
The Supreme Court squarely rejected Ford's causation-only
approach and wrote that such an approach "finds no support in this
Court's requirement of a 'connection' between a plaintiff's suit and a
defendant's activities." Id. (quoting Bristol Myers, 582 U.S. at 256).
Further, the Supreme Court noted that "[n]one of [its] precedents has
suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant's
in-state activity and the litigation will do." Id. at 362.
Instead, the Court emphasized that the phrase "arise out of or
relate to" can also be satisfied if there is a sufficient " ' " affiliation between
the forum and the underlying controversy." ' " Id. at 359 (citations
29 SC-2023-0603
omitted). Specifically, the Supreme Court explained:
"The first half of that standard ['arise out of'] asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or[]' ['relate to,'] contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again, we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation -- i.e., proof that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's in- state conduct. See also Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 261-62 (quoting Goodyear [Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S. [915] at 919 [(2011)] (asking whether there is 'an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,' without demanding that the inquiry focus on cause)."
Id. at 362 (emphasis added). In other words, even if there is no direct
causal link between the defendant's conduct in the forum state and the
plaintiff's claims, the Supreme Court explained that jurisdiction may still
exist so long as the claims are sufficiently "relate[d] to" the defendant's
conduct in the forum state.
Although the evidence affirmatively showed that Ford had sold the
subject vehicles in states other than the forum states, it also showed that
Ford had engaged in extensive activities in the forum states related to
those specific model vehicles. Id. at 357. Specifically, the Supreme Court
noted that (1) Ford had sold more than 2,000 of the exact models and
30 SC-2023-0603
years of the vehicles involved in the accidents at issue through
dealerships in the forum states; (2) Ford had, "[b]y every means
imaginable," urged residents of the forum states to buy its vehicles,
including through billboard ads, TV and radio commercials, print ads,
and direct mail; and (3) Ford had encouraged the forum states' citizens
to become "lifelong Ford drivers" through its ongoing marketing of
maintenance and repair services. Id. at 365.
The Court wrote that it "has stated that specific jurisdiction
attaches in cases identical to the ones here -- when a company like Ford
serves a market for a product in the forum State and the product
malfunctions there." Id. at 363 (emphasis added). This is so, the Supreme
Court explained, because, "when a corporation has 'continuously and
deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate
being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on'
products causing injury there." Id. at 364 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at
781) (emphasis added).
Thus, despite Ford's not having sold the particular vehicles
involved in the accidents in the forum states, the Supreme Court
concluded that Ford had conducted business in those states by, "among
31 SC-2023-0603
other things, advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle[s]
the suit[s] claim[] [are] defective," id. at 355 (emphasis added), and that
those contacts were sufficient to create a "strong 'relationship among the
defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation' -- the 'essential foundation' of
specific jurisdiction," id. (citations omitted).
The Court emphasized that "Ford had systematically served a
market" in the forum states "for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs
allege[d] malfunctioned and injured them in those States." Id. at 365
(emphasis added). This was different, the Supreme Court noted, from
Bristol-Myers, in which that Court had found jurisdiction to be improper
because "the forum State, and the defendant's activities there, lacked any
connection to the [nonresident] plaintiffs' claims." Id. at 369.
Because Ford had cultivated the market in the forum states and
because those activities related to the plaintiffs' claims against it, the
Supreme Court held that it was foreseeable for the courts in the forum
states to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford for injuries
caused by those products in those states:
"An automaker regularly marketing a vehicle in a State … has 'clear notice' that it will be subject to jurisdiction in the State's courts when the product malfunctions there (regardless where it is first sold). [World-Wide Volkswagen 32 SC-2023-0603
Corp. v. Woodson,] 444 U.S. [286], at 297 [(1980)]. … Precisely because that exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable, it is also predictable -- and thus allows Ford to 'structure [its] primary conduct' to lessen or even avoid the costs of state-court litigation. World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S., at 297."
Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
Sawyer contends that the Supreme Court's reasoning and holding
in Ford renders our plurality decision in Hinrichs "no longer good law"
and that we should instead apply Ford's analytical framework to the
present case. Sawyer's brief at 37. With Ford now being the controlling
law on this issue, we agree with Sawyer that we must apply that
analytical framework to this case. In issuing Ford, the Supreme Court
has now clarified that, even when there is no direct causal link between
a plaintiff's claims and an out-of-state defendant's contacts with the
forum state, specific personal jurisdiction may still attach if the
defendant's contacts with the forum state "relate to" the plaintiff's cause
of action. As it currently stands, our plurality decision in Hinrichs is
inconsistent with Ford and is thus overruled. 9
9Although we overrule Hinrichs, we do not intend to overrule, or
even cast doubt on, the vast bulk of our personal-jurisdiction caselaw. Our personal-jurisdiction caselaw is generally consistent with Ford. For instance, as noted previously in this opinion, our Court has recently accurately summarized the degree of contacts that must exist for a trial 33 SC-2023-0603
IV. Applying Ford to the Present Case
According to Sawyer, this case presents a straightforward
application of Ford. She argues that Cooper Tire's contacts with Alabama
"relate to" her cause of action because she alleged in her complaint that,
before the accident, Cooper Tire had cultivated a market for the CS4
Touring tire in Alabama and that her claims are related to Cooper Tire's
contacts with the State of Alabama because (1) Cooper Tire sold and
distributed that tire-- the exact type of tire that caused the accident
underlying her claims -- in Alabama through an authorized dealer
network, (2) Cooper Tire extensively advertised and marketed that same
model of tire in Alabama, and (3) the subject tire was purchased in
Alabama, by an Alabama resident, and the accident occurred in Alabama.
Sawyer also contends that the trial court's conclusion that Alabama has
less of an interest in providing a forum for an out-of-state plaintiff's
lawsuit against an out-of-state defendant is inconsistent with Ford, as
well as other well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent,
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. See Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1149-50 (Ala. 2022). See also Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d 122, 130 (Ala. 2019).
34 SC-2023-0603
especially because the accident occurred in Alabama. Because Cooper
Tire failed to offer any affidavit testimony refuting those jurisdictional
allegations, Sawyer contends, the trial court's judgment is due to be
reversed.
In response, Cooper Tire makes two principal arguments to
distinguish Ford from the present case. First, it argues that it did not
sell the CS4 Touring tire, including the subject tire, in Alabama during
the "relevant timeframe" identified by the trial court and that this alone
defeats Sawyer's personal-jurisdiction arguments. Second, it argues
that, unlike the plaintiffs in Ford, Sawyer was not a resident of the forum
state -- Alabama. Thus, Cooper Tire asserts that there is nothing showing
that it had contacts with Alabama that "relate to" Sawyer's action.
A. The Trial Court's Decision to Designate 2015-2018 as the "Relevant Timeframe" for its Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in this Case is Unsupported by the Record
Before we apply the framework from Ford to the arguments being
made here, we must first determine if the trial court was correct in
finding that the "relevant timeframe" for analyzing Cooper Tire's
contacts with Alabama was 2015-2018. Sawyer argues that that
limitation is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ford,
35 SC-2023-0603
which emphasized that Ford had sold "thousands" of the subject cars in
the forum states in the two decades leading up to the accidents at issue.
She also argues that this narrow focus "makes particularly little sense"
and runs the risk of creating odd results in cases similar to this one.
Sawyer's brief at 33.
Cooper Tire contends, however, that Sawyer conceded to the
designation of 2015-2018 as the relevant time frame for discovery in this
case. For example, Cooper Tire notes that in one of her interrogatories,
Sawyer asked: " ' [H]ow many Cooper CS4 touring tires sized P235/65R17
were sold annually in Alabama for 2017, 2018 and 2019?' " Cooper Tire's
brief at 39. Cooper Tire appears to contend that Sawyer's argument is, in
essence, waived and that, like the trial court, we too should confine our
personal-jurisdiction analysis to 2015-2018.
First, Cooper Tire does not provide this Court with citations to any
relevant legal authority that hold that the time frame either before or
after a manufacturer stops making a product should have any bearing on
whether the manufacturer had sufficient contacts with a forum state. See
Rule 28(b), Ala. R. App. P. (explaining that "[t]he brief of the appellee …
shall conform to the requirements of subdivisions (a)(1)-(12)," including
36 SC-2023-0603
the requirement under subdivision (a)(10) to provide "citations to the
cases … or other authorities … relied on" in support of a legal
proposition).
Likewise, we have been unable to locate any caselaw in this state
or elsewhere that appears to stand for this proposition. In fact, as noted
by Sawyer, the Supreme Court's decision in Ford includes facts that are
just the opposite of such a rule. In that case, the models of the subject
vehicles -- a 1996 Explorer and a 1994 Crown Victoria -- were
manufactured many years before the underlying accidents occurred in
2015. In fact, it appears that Ford had even ceased manufacturing the
Crown Victoria model before the accident occurred. 10 Had the Ford Court
applied a time frame similar to the one advocated by Cooper Tire (and
applied by the trial court), that decision almost certainly would have
come out the other way. In any event, adopting such a rule would be
illogical given that countless products, including car tires, often last
years after they are manufactured and can sit on the shelves of
10The accident involving the Crown Victoria at issue in Ford occurred in 2015. See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2019). At the time of this decision, the following website indicated that Ford had ceased manufacturing the Crown Victoria in 2011: https://www.cars.com/research/ford-crown_victoria/ 37 SC-2023-0603
distributors for years.
Cooper Tire also does not explain why only this "timeframe" is
"relevant" to the facts of the claims in this case. In any event, the facts
indicate otherwise. It appears undisputed that Coggin purchased the
subject tire in Alabama. It also appears undisputed that Cooper Tire
manufactured the subject tire and sold this same model of tire in
Alabama. Moreover, even if the subject tire had been sold in another
state first -- or even if it had been previously used -- the vehicles in Ford
were also sold first in another state and were previously used cars, but
the Supreme Court still found that personal jurisdiction existed.
Moreover, Cooper Tire's assertion that Sawyer conceded to 2015-
2018 as being the "relevant timeframe" for discovery in this case is not
supported by the record. Although the record reflects that Sawyer did ask
in one of her interrogatories the question identified by Cooper Tire, we
note that only the allegations made in Sawyer's complaint are what are
relevant to our personal-jurisdiction inquiry. The record shows that, in
paragraph 112 of her complaint, Sawyer specifically alleged that "[p]rior
to the date of the incident giving rise to this litigation, Cooper Tire had
manufactured, sold, and distributed automobile tires into [the stream of]
38 SC-2023-0603
commerce in the State of Alabama having the following specifications: a
Cooper Tire tubeless radial bearing the name Cooper Tire CS4 Touring
P235/65R17." (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the record before us
indicates that the parties agreed that the trial court could designate
2015-2018 as the "relevant timeframe" for evaluating whether Cooper
Tire had sufficient contacts with Alabama for the purpose of determining
specific personal jurisdiction. The trial court's application of such a time
frame is therefore unsupported by the record.
B. Cooper Tire's Contacts with the State of Alabama "Relate to" Sawyer's Claims in this Action
Without any law or facts indicating that we must treat 2015-2018
as the "relevant timeframe" for jurisdictional purposes, we will examine
the allegations in Sawyer's complaint and Cooper Tire's affidavits to
determine if Sawyer's claims "relate to" Cooper Tire's contacts with the
State of Alabama under the Supreme Court's framework in Ford.
As noted above, Sawyer's complaint broadly alleged that Cooper
Tire had sold and distributed CS4 Touring tires in Alabama before the
underlying accident and that it was the sale and distribution of the
subject tire in Alabama that had caused her son's death. For instance, in
paragraph 112 of her complaint, Sawyer alleged: "Prior to the date of the
39 SC-2023-0603
incident … Cooper Tire had manufactured, sold, and distributed
automobile tires into [the stream of] commerce in the State of Alabama
having the following specifications: a Cooper Tire tubeless radial bearing
the name Cooper Tire CS4 Touring P235/65R17." In paragraph 5 of her
complaint, Sawyer specifically alleged: "Cooper Tire manufactured,
assembled, marketed, warranted and placed in the stream of commerce
the Cooper CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17 ('Subject Tire') which caused
harm and injury to [Thomas] in the State of Alabama." Likewise, in
paragraph 6 of her complaint, Sawyer alleged: "Cooper Tire sells its
passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire Model, to
distributors and retailers throughout the State of Alabama." Finally, in
paragraph 7 of her complaint, Sawyer alleged: "Cooper Tire maintains a
tire dealer network comprised of approximately 324 Cooper Tire dealers
across 117 cities throughout the State of Alabama."
As explained previously, when considering a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, a trial court must consider as true the
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that are "not controverted by the
defendant's affidavits," and, "where the plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict," the trial court "must construe all
40 SC-2023-0603
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 3d at 787-88 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Although Cooper Tire presented affidavit testimony from two of its
employees -- Nicole K. Schwieterman and Craig Marks -- through which
it refuted some of Sawyer's jurisdictional allegations, it has never offered
any affidavit testimony disputing that it at one time sold or distributed
the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama. For example, although Schwieterman
and Marks dispute that Cooper Tire sold and distributed the CS4 Touring
tire in Alabama from 2015-2018, they do not dispute that, as Sawyer
alleges in her complaint, Cooper Tire sold and distributed that model tire
in Alabama before the underlying accident, which would necessarily
include the years before 2015.
Likewise, Cooper Tire never disputed -- even in its response brief in
this appeal -- that it maintains an extensive tire-dealer network
comprising of approximately 324 dealers across 117 cities throughout
Alabama. In fact, in her affidavit, Schwieterman acknowledged that
Cooper Tire's sales in Alabama are to independently owned businesses,
including distributors, dealers, or tire-service facilities. That admission
41 SC-2023-0603
bolsters Sawyer's allegations that Cooper Tire distributed the CS4
Touring tire in Alabama, as well as Coggin's statement in her affidavit
that she purchased the subject tire in Alabama.
Without such affidavit testimony by Cooper Tire, the trial court was
required to consider the unrefuted allegations in Sawyer's complaint
concerning Cooper Tire's sale and distribution of the CS4 Touring tire in
Alabama as true. Thus, the trial court's finding that there was no
"evidence" that Cooper Tire had sold and distributed the CS4 Touring
tire in Alabama incorrectly placed the burden for producing such
evidence on Sawyer when, under our well-settled standard, that burden
first rested on Cooper Tire.
But Sawyer alleged more than that Cooper Tire sold and
distributed the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama and that it maintained an
extensive authorized dealer network here. She also alleged that Cooper
Tire conducted extensive marketing and advertising of the CS4 Touring
tire in Alabama. In Ford, the Supreme Court concluded that Ford's
extensive marketing and advertising in the forum states of the same kind
of product at issue in the plaintiffs' actions showed that Ford
" ' continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market' " to such an
42 SC-2023-0603
extent that " ' it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's]
court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury [there]."
Ford, 592 U.S. at 364 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781). Relying upon
that holding in Ford, Sawyer contends that Cooper Tire's undisputed
marketing and advertising of the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama supports
a similar finding of specific personal jurisdiction in this case.
In its brief, Cooper Tire does not dispute that it has offered no
affidavit testimony refuting Sawyer's allegations that it marketed and
advertised its products, including the CS4 Touring tire, in Alabama.
Rather, it contends that Sawyer's assertions, if accepted by this Court,
would "fashion a new rule that subjects an out-of-state defendant to
personal jurisdiction based upon nothing other than the fact that the
defendant has advertised in the forum even when that advertising is not
related to the dispute." Cooper Tire's brief at 31. Cooper Tire therefore
contends that we should not hold that Sawyer's advertising allegations
establish that her claims "relate to" Cooper Tire's contacts with Alabama.
Cooper Tire is mistaken that its marketing of the CS4 Touring tire,
along with its past sales of that product, cannot establish specific
personal jurisdiction. In Ford, the Supreme Court wrote:
43 SC-2023-0603
"To see why Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases …, consider first the business that the company regularly conducts in Montana and Minnesota. See generally [Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,] 395 Mont. [478] at 488, 443 P.3d [407] at 414 [(2019)]; [Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co.,] 931 N.W.2d [744] at 748 [(Minn. 2019)]; supra, at 1023 - 1024. Small wonder that Ford has here conceded 'purposeful availment' of the two States' markets. See supra, at 1025 - 1026. By every means imaginable -- among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail -- Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars -- again including those two models -- are available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars' owners. The company's dealers in Montana and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, including those whose warranties have long since expired. And the company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to independent auto shops in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.
"Now turn to how all this Montana- and Minnesota- based conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by state residents in Montana's and Minnesota's courts. Each plaintiff's suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle -- an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria in the other -- caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both States for many years. … In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States." 44 SC-2023-0603
592 U.S. at 364-65. Because Ford had systematically served a market in
Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs alleged
had malfunctioned and injured them in those States, the Supreme Court
held that there was a strong " ' relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation' " -- the " ' essential foundation' " of specific
jurisdiction. Id. at 365 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded
that this served as a legitimate basis upon which the forum states could
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford. Id. at 366-68.
Like in Ford, in her complaint, Sawyer specifically alleged that
Cooper Tire "conducted extensive advertising and marketing campaigns
for its passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire model,
that reached consumers in the State of Alabama and connected Alabama
consumers with the closest Cooper Tire dealer." (Emphasis added.) She
also alleged:
"13. Cooper Tire's advertising also includes Cooper Tire sponsorship for the Southeastern Conference (SEC) Basketball tournament for the University of Alabama collegiate basketball program; Cooper Tire sponsorship for the 'Cooper Tire Performer of the Week' for the University of Alabama collegiate sports program; Cooper Tire sponsorship for an Alabama football blog; Cooper Tire sponsorship of the Bassmaster Elite Series, which is headquartered in the State of Alabama; and Cooper Tire sponsorship for the Paul 45 SC-2023-0603
Finebaum sports talk show, which broadcasts in the State of Alabama. …"
As explained previously in this opinion, when considering a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a trial court must consider as
true the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that are "not controverted
by the defendant's affidavits." Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 143
So. 3d at 787 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Taken
together, under the Supreme Court's decision in Ford, Sawyer's
unrefuted allegations that Cooper Tire (1) sold and distributed the CS4
Touring tire, including the subject tire, in Alabama, (2) maintained an
extensive dealer network in Alabama, and (3) marketed this tire model
in Alabama all support a finding that her claims "relate to" Cooper Tire's
contacts with Alabama. 11
V. The Trial Court's Conclusion that Sawyer's Florida Residency Prevents the Exercise of Specific Personal Jurisdiction in this Case
11In reaching our conclusion here, we need not reach the outer limits of the stream-of-commerce test, and nothing in this opinion should be construed as doing so. As the Supreme Court recognized in Ford, the conclusion that specific personal jurisdiction exists in cases with these types of facts "does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum." 592 U.S. at 362. Although there will be cases in which the facts may require this Court to address the outer limits of the stream-of-commerce test, this is not such a case. 46 SC-2023-0603
is Mistaken
Cooper Tire alternatively argues, however, that the trial court
correctly concluded that it should not exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over it because, unlike the plaintiffs in Ford who were
residents of the forum states, neither Sawyer nor her son were Alabama
residents. According to Cooper Tire, "Alabama's interest in providing
Florida residents a place to litigate is minimal." Cooper Tire's brief at 28.
In making this argument, Cooper Tire, like the trial court, relies
heavily on a post-Ford product-liability case from an Alabama federal
court -- Tyler v. Ford Motor Co. (Case No. 2:20-CV-584-WKW, Nov. 17,
2021) (M.D. Ala. 2021) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (judgment
vacated). In Tyler, a Florida resident brought claims against Ford for her
injuries, and for the death of her husband, which had been caused by an
accident that had occurred in Alabama while driving a Ford F-250 pickup
truck. Ford moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit against it on the basis
that the district court could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction
over it because (1) the plaintiff was a resident of Florida and (2) the
pickup truck had not been designed, manufactured, or sold to the plaintiff
in Alabama.
47 SC-2023-0603
In evaluating Ford's arguments, the district court summarized its
understanding of the holding in Ford by stating "that personal
jurisdiction exists where 'resident-plaintiffs allege that they suffered in-
state injury because of defective products that Ford extensively
promoted, sold, and serviced in [the forum state].' " (Quoting Ford, 592
U.S. at 371) (emphasis added). Applying that reading of Ford to the facts
of the case before it, the district court explained:
"There is no question that Ford has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Alabama. Ford purposefully reaches out to Alabama in a number of different ways -- supplying vehicles to dealerships in Alabama, advertising in Alabama, maintaining a resale market in Alabama, shipping replacement parts to Alabama, and so on. Ford admits that its contacts with Alabama are at least as extensive as its contacts with the forum states in Ford Motor [Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021)]."
Despite Ford "purposefully avail[ing]" itself of "the privilege of
conducting business in Alabama," the district court in Tyler concluded
that Ford's "contacts with Alabama have nothing to do with the
complained-of vehicle, and [the] Plaintiff has not drawn any connection
between Ford's contacts and the events-at-suit." It explained that any
actions by the plaintiff in bringing the vehicle at issue to Alabama were
insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ford: 48 SC-2023-0603
"It is well-settled that the actions of a plaintiff or third party cannot alone constitute a basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014). The minimum contacts analysis must focus on the defendant's actions in the forum state. Id. Thus, the fact that the Tylers drove their F-250 into Alabama cannot establish personal jurisdiction over Ford. The fact that Defendant Lane side-swiped the Tylers in Alabama also cannot establish personal jurisdiction over Ford. Indeed, none of the events with the particular F-250 at issue can be fairly characterized as contacts that Ford made with Alabama. The only contacts that Ford made with Alabama -- and thus the only contacts upon which personal jurisdiction can be based -- are the other marketing, servicing, repair, and sales contacts that Ford regularly performs in Alabama."
(Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added.)
In reaching its conclusion, the district court noted that the Supreme
Court has been concerned about expanding specific personal jurisdiction
so far that it would open the door for plaintiffs to sue a corporate
defendant in every state across the country. Specifically, the district
court explained that the Supreme Court in Ford had
"cringed at the idea of plaintiffs being able to sue in all fifty states for a local controversy. [Ford, 592 U.S.] at [362] n.3. This kind of unlimited jurisdiction has long been the bogeyman of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See Hanson [v. Denckla], 357 U.S. [235,] 251 [(1958)] ('But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.'). Yet, if Ford's contacts with Alabama -- related to this case solely because similar products are being marketed, sold, and repaired -- are sufficient to 49 SC-2023-0603
support personal jurisdiction, then there is essentially no limit on personal jurisdiction against Ford. Ford maintains such a market in every state, as do nearly all motor vehicle manufacturers. Personal jurisdiction would become irrelevant in suits against nationwide companies."
The district court in Tyler opined that the Supreme Court in Ford
had deemed the plaintiffs' residency to be especially relevant in
determining the relatedness of the defendant's contacts with the
plaintiffs' suits:
"Additionally, the Supreme Court in Ford Motor went to great lengths to explain how Ford's contacts with the forum states in those cases were relevant to the resident-plaintiffs' claims. [592 U.S. at 364-67]. The Court discussed at length the possibility of causation for resident-plaintiffs. Id. Further, the Court specifically mentioned the residency of the plaintiffs at least twenty times in the opinion. Id. If residency were irrelevant, much of the Court's analysis would be irrelevant. The Court's holding -- that 'resident-plaintiffs [who] allege that they suffered in-state injury because of defective products that Ford extensively promoted, sold, and serviced in Montana and Minnesota' can invoke the jurisdiction of their home states, id. at [371] (emphasis added) -- would be too narrow, as it would be unnecessary to qualify the holding by mentioning the residency of the plaintiff."
(Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added.) Based on the
foregoing, because the plaintiff in Tyler, a Florida resident, had not
drawn any connection "between Ford's contacts and the events-at-suit,"
50 SC-2023-0603
the district court concluded that it could not exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over Ford.
Echoing the district court's analysis in Tyler, Cooper Tire contends
that the Ford Court "plainly held that 'related to' jurisdiction includes an
assessment of the plaintiff's residency." Cooper Tire's brief at 30.
Specifically, Cooper Tire asserts:
"The fact that the accident took place in Alabama is not enough to allow for the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire. The critical factor is the purposeful suit-related contact the defendant has with the forum. The plaintiff's residency 'still may be relevant in assessing the link between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's suit ….' [Ford, 592 U.S. at 369].
"In this instance, Cooper Tire did not send into Alabama any of the approximately 5,000 CS4 Touring size [P]235/65R17 tires it distributed from 2015 through 2018. … Thus, Alabama has no interest in exerting personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant with no suit- related contacts. In other words, Alabama has no interest in providing a forum for an out-of-state plaintiff."
Cooper Tire's brief at 30 (final emphasis added).
Cooper Tire is misreading Tyler. Such an argument about the
plaintiff's residency conflicts with decades-old precedent from the
Supreme Court that has upheld jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant even when contacts between the plaintiff and the forum state
51 SC-2023-0603
are entirely lacking. Those cases have done so because it is the
defendant's contacts with the forum state -- not the plaintiff's contacts --
that are most relevant to determining whether there are sufficient
contacts with the forum state. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (stating that
the "plaintiff's residence in the forum State is not a separate
requirement, and lack of residence [by the plaintiff] will not defeat
jurisdiction established on the basis of [the] defendant's contacts"
(emphasis added)). In fact, Tyler itself states: "The minimum contacts
analysis must focus on the defendant's actions in the forum state."
(Emphasis altered.)
Although the Supreme Court in Ford mentioned the plaintiffs'
residencies, it did so for reasons other than creating a new, independent
requirement for specific personal jurisdiction. This included refuting
Ford's contention that the states of first-sale, design, or manufacture --
all states that had no connection to either the plaintiffs or the injuries --
were the more proper forums. Ford, 592 U.S. at 361, 368.
The Supreme Court also mentioned residency to demonstrate that
the courts in Montana and Minnesota had an interest in providing people
injured within their borders with a convenient forum to enforce their own
52 SC-2023-0603
safety regulations. Like those states, Alabama has a strong sovereign
interest in providing a forum to people who are injured on its roads and
in enforcing its own safety regulations within its borders. This is
particularly relevant here, where the owner of the subject tire was an
Alabama resident who had purchased the tire in Alabama.
Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff's residency has any
relevancy, Tyler is distinguishable from the present case. In that case,
the vehicle at issue had been manufactured in Mexico, sold to an
independent dealer in Tennessee, and purchased by the plaintiff in
Florida. Here, however, as established previously in this opinion, Cooper
Tire has not offered any affidavit evidence refuting that the CS4 Touring
tire -- including the subject tire -- was sold, distributed, and marketed in
Alabama. Even more to the point, unlike Tyler, the purchaser here was
an Alabama resident who had made the purchase in Alabama. It is
therefore reasonable for this Court to conclude that Alabama has a much
stronger interest in this lawsuit as compared to the lawsuit in Tyler.
Under Ford and the facts of this case, the fact that Sawyer and her
son were not Alabama residents is not determinative because Cooper
Tire's contacts with Alabama are sufficient for the exercise of specific
53 SC-2023-0603
personal jurisdiction in this case. 12 Thus, for the reasons previously
stated, we hold that the trial court erred in determining that it could not
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire in this case.
Conclusion
For all the reasons explained above, under the Supreme Court's
analytical framework in Ford, the connection between Sawyer's claims
and Cooper Tire's unrefuted sale, distribution, and marketing of the CS4
Touring tire in Alabama is sufficient to support the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire in this case. We therefore reverse
the trial court's judgment dismissing Sawyer's claims against Cooper
12Because the facts in this case establish the existence of sufficient
contacts between Cooper Tire and Alabama, we need not decide whether the district court's emphasis on the plaintiff's residency in Tyler was mistaken under the facts in that case. Compare Chavez v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, 527 P.3d 652 (N.M.Ct.App. 2022) (holding that the fact that resident motorist's fatal accident occurred out of state in Texas rather than in New Mexico did not preclude the determination that tire manufacturer had sufficient minimum contacts with New Mexico for one of that state's courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the tire manufacturer); and Martins v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, 266 A.3d 753 (R.I. 2022) (holding that claims brought by resident driver's estate against manufacturers and designers of allegedly defective tires on truck that driver was operating out of state, which allegedly caused his death, did not arise out of or relate to manufacturers' and designers' contacts with Rhode Island and, thus, that specific personal jurisdiction could not be established).
54 SC-2023-0603
Tire and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 13
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Shaw, Wise, Bryan,∗ Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Parker, C.J., joins.
Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion.
13Becausethis issue is dispositive in this case, we pretermit discussion of the remaining issues raised on appeal. See Johnson v. Ellis, 308 So. 3d 1, 3 n.3 (Ala. 2020) (citing Favorite Market Store v. Waldrop, 924 So. 2d 719, 723 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (stating that this Court would pretermit discussion of further issues in light of the dispositive nature of another issue)).
Although Justice Bryan did not attend oral argument in this case, ∗
he has viewed a video recording of that oral argument. 55 SC-2023-0603
MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully with the majority opinion. I write separately to
encourage parties in future personal-jurisdiction cases to analyze the
original public meaning of Alabama's Due Process Clause, rather than
rely solely on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Rule 4.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure allows Alabama
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants when
it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the
Constitution of the United States" to do so. (Emphasis added.) But past
cases from this Court have deemphasized the role of the State
Constitution in this inquiry.
The majority opinion correctly points out that our Court "has
interpreted the due process guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution
to be coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the United
States Constitution" in the personal-jurisdiction context. Elliott v. Van
Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 730 (Ala. 2002); see also Pruitt v. AAA Interstate
Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1148 (Ala. 2022). As a result, our Court
has relied heavily on federal caselaw in personal-jurisdiction cases. See,
e.g., Pruitt, 358 So. 3d at 1148-49 (relying heavily on federal caselaw);
56 SC-2023-0603
Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114, 1123-41
(Ala. 2016) (plurality opinion) (same); Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 730-32 (same);
Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So. 2d 141, 146 (Ala. 1983)
(same); DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus., Inc., 350 So. 2d 447, 449-50 (Ala.
1977) (same).
Our Court, in other words, seems to be engaged in "lockstepping"
-- tethering the interpretation of Alabama's Constitution to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. See Jeffrey S. Sutton,
51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American
Constitutional Law 174 (2018). That practice is questionable. As
Georgia Supreme Court Justice Nels Peterson has observed, "it is
difficult to square lockstepping with a focus on original public meaning."
Nels S.D. Peterson, Principles of Georgia Constitutional Interpretation,
75 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 21 (2023). By interpreting the Alabama and federal
due-process guarantees as coextensive, we have signed our State up to
follow the ebbs and flows of a federal court's interpretation of a federal
constitutional provision, regardless of whether that practice reflects the
original public meaning of our State's Constitution. Without more
evidence about the original public meaning of the Alabama Constitution,
57 SC-2023-0603
the practice of lockstepping makes little sense.
The problems associated with lockstepping are magnified in
instances in which the text of the State constitutional provision differs
substantially from that of the federal constitutional provision. Here,
Alabama's Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause have little in common except for the phrase "due process
of law." Compare Ala. Const. 2022, art. I, § 13 ("[E]very person, for any
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a
remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay.") with U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1 ("No State
shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."). 14 It would be unusual for two provisions that are
worded so differently to have an identical meaning and application in all
cases.
In an appropriate case, I believe this Court should consider what
protections the Alabama Constitution provides independent of the
14For a useful tool to compare state and federal constitutional provisions, see Am. Juris Link State Const. Tool, which, at the time of this decision, could be located at: https://stateconstitutiontool.org.
58 SC-2023-0603
Fourteenth Amendment. To do so, we need parties to brief and argue the
original public meaning of Section 13 of the Alabama Constitution -- and
any other constitutional provision that may be relevant. See Barnett v.
Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 768-69 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring
specially) (encouraging "parties and amici curiae in future state-
constitutional cases to provide appropriate research and arguments
about the original public meaning" of State constitutional provisions).
Neither party to this appeal has questioned our Court's practice of
lockstepping with federal courts in personal-jurisdiction cases. As a
result, I agree with the majority opinion that, under the United States
Supreme Court's current personal-jurisdiction precedent, Cooper Tire &
Rubber Company has sufficient contacts with Alabama to support
specific personal jurisdiction. See Ex parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 509
n.7 (Ala. 2011) (noting this Court's "disinclination to overrule existing
caselaw in the absence of either a specific request to do so or an adequate
argument asking that we do"). But with the assistance of proper original-
public-meaning briefing, I would be willing to reconsider our Court's
lockstepping of the Alabama Constitution's and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due-process guarantees in the personal-jurisdiction
59 SC-2023-0603
context.
Parker, C.J., concurs.
60 SC-2023-0603
COOK, Justice (concurring specially).
In my view, the main opinion presents a relatively straightforward
application of the "relate to" test for specific personal jurisdiction as
discussed in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
592 U.S. 351 (2021). Unfortunately, application of that test will not
always be so straightforward in future cases with more complex fact
patterns. Although I am the author of the main opinion, I write
separately to provide some suggestions to the bench and bar in such
future cases. To be clear, this is a test of the United States Supreme Court
and I am bound by it. Further, I speak only for myself in this writing.
Thus, I write as a fellow traveler attempting to explain the map -- rather
than as a mapmaker.
In his concurrence in the judgment in Ford, Justice Neil Gorsuch,
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, recognized the ambiguity created by
the majority's decision to treat a defendant's contacts with a forum state
that "relate to" the plaintiff's claims as an "independent" basis of specific
personal jurisdiction, writing: "Where this leaves us is far from clear."
592 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added). He noted that, although "the majority
says[] it is enough if an 'affiliation' or 'relationship' or 'connection' exists
61 SC-2023-0603
between" a defendant's in-state conduct and a plaintiff's injuries, it is
unclear "what … this assortment of nouns mean[s]" and that, "[l]oosed
from any causation standard, we are left to guess." Id. (emphasis altered).
Although Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that "[t]he majority promises
that its new test 'does not mean anything goes,' " he remained concerned
that this "hardly tells us what does." Id.; see generally Anthony
Petrosino, Rationalizing Relatedness: Understanding Personal
Jurisdiction's Relatedness Prong in the Wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb
and Ford Motor Co., 91 Fordham L. Rev. 1563 (2023).
Perhaps some of this ambiguity created by the "relate to" test is
simply inherent in any personal-jurisdiction test given that a trial court's
authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
must be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ford, 592 U.S. at 358
(recognizing the key role of the Due Process Clause). The question of
specific personal jurisdiction "depends on the defendant's having such
'contacts' with the forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is
'reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,' and 'does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id.
62 SC-2023-0603
(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17
(1945). In other words, establishing brightline tests for personal
jurisdiction may be extremely difficult given that it must cover such a
wide variety of cases and fact patterns while also taking into account due-
process principles.
Despite this need for flexibility, I sympathize with Justice
Gorsuch's frustration with the "relate to" test. I am certain that judges
across our state and country will feel that same frustration as they
attempt to apply the Supreme Court's new analytical framework for the
"relate to" test in Ford to the dizzying permutation of facts that future
lawsuits will inevitably present. 15 Having reflected upon the Ford
opinion, I believe that there are two metrics that the Supreme Court
implicitly introduced in that case that can help the bench and bar as we
seek to apply Ford's new analytical framework for the "relate to" test. As
explained below, because these metrics are consistent with the values
that drive the Supreme Court's specific-personal-jurisdiction precedent,
15See, e.g., Schrier v. Qatar Islamic Bank, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1335,
1359 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (discussing Ford and noting that, "[u]nfortunately, while we now know what the standard isn't (but-for causation), it's a little unclear what the right standard is"). 63 SC-2023-0603
I believe that they are the logical tools that can be used when applying
Ford's "relate to" test in cases with more complex fact patterns.
I. The Values Driving Specific Personal Jurisdiction in Ford -- Fairness and Federalism
In Ford, the Supreme Court explained that, to establish specific
personal jurisdiction, a trial court should first ask if (1) the defendant
" ' purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State' " -- for instance, by cultivating a market -- and
(2) "[t]he plaintiff's claims … '… arise out of … the defendant's contacts'
with the forum" or "[t]he plaintiff's claims … "… relate to the defendant's
contacts' with the forum." Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (citation omitted;
emphasis added). Each of those factors bears on whether the defendant
could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum state in
connection with the claims brought by the plaintiff. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
The Supreme Court then noted that "[t]hese rules derive from and
reflect two sets of values -- treating defendants fairly and protecting
'interstate federalism.' " Id. at 360 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 293) (emphasis added). In Ford, the Supreme Court
noted that, when evaluating personal jurisdiction in the past, it has 64 SC-2023-0603
"appl[ied] the standards set out in International Shoe and its progeny,
with attention to their underlying values of ensuring fairness and
protecting interstate federalism." Id. at 360 n.2 (emphasis added).16
In Ford, both the fairness and the federalism interests were easily
16Likewise, Ford explained that
"[o]ne State's 'sovereign power to try' a suit, we have recognized, may prevent 'sister States' from exercising their like authority. [Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.] at 293. The law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with 'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the controversy. Bristol-Myers [Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.], 582 U.S. [255], at [263] [(2017)]."
592 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). Some on the Court have gone further in their emphasis on federalism. For example in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), a plurality of the Court described jurisdiction as a matter of state authority (thus respecting federalism). 564 U.S. at 883 (recognizing that "jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness" (emphasis added)). And in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255 (2017), the Court explained restrictions on jurisdiction as a result of " 'territorial limitations' " on state power. 582 U.S. at 263 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). Despite the clear statements from the Supreme Court emphasizing federalism, some commentators have criticized the consideration of federalism. See generally Robert M. Bloom & Janine A. Hanrahan, Back to the Future: The Revival of Pennoyer in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Demise of International Shoe, 56 San Diego L. Rev. 581 (2019) (criticizing this consideration of authority and federalism and instead emphasizing fairness). 65 SC-2023-0603
satisfied under the "relate to" test. The forum states had a strong and
legitimate interest in adjudicating the disputes because (among other
reasons) (1) the plaintiffs "used the allegedly defective products in the
forum States," (2) the plaintiffs "suffered injuries when those products
malfunctioned in the forum States," and (3) Ford was selling and
advertising the very same model products in the forum states. Id. at 370.
It was not surprising that a state would have the power to exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over a corporation in such circumstances.17
Thus, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Ford was both fair
and protected interstate federalism. As Justice Alito stated very
succinctly in his concurrence in the judgment in Ford:
"Ford has long had a heavy presence in Minnesota and Montana. It spends billions on national advertising. It has many franchises in both States. Ford dealers in Minnesota and Montana sell and service Ford vehicles, and Ford ships replacement parts to both States. In entertaining these suits, Minnesota and Montana courts have not reached out and grabbed suits in which they 'have little legitimate interest.' Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San
17As some commentators have written: "Indeed, what is most remarkable about Ford is that, seventy-five years after International Shoe Co. v. Washington and forty years after World-Wide Volkswagen, Ford could argue with a straight face that specific jurisdiction was lacking." Maggie Gardner, Pamela K. Bookman, Andrew D. Bradt, Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, The False Promise of General Jurisdiction, 73 Ala. L. Rev. 455, 456-57 (2022). 66 SC-2023-0603
Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 263 (2017). Their residents, while riding in vehicles purchased within their borders, were killed or injured in accidents on their roads. Can anyone seriously argue that requiring Ford to litigate these cases in Minnesota and Montana would be fundamentally unfair?"
Id. at 372 (final emphasis added).
II. The Two Metrics
These two values -- fairness and federalism -- help explain two
metrics that I believe can be distilled from the Ford opinion.
A. "The Most Natural State" Metric
In Ford, the Supreme Court explained that each of the plaintiffs
had brought suit in "the most natural State." 592 U.S. at 370 (emphasis
added). As a result, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over
Ford by Minnesota and Montana easily satisfied the values of fairness
and interstate federalism. For example, federalism was satisfied because
Minnesota and Montana were not "reach[ing] out and grabb[ing] suits in
which they 'have little legitimate interest.' " Id. at 372 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Likewise, fairness was satisfied because
nobody should have been surprised by the exercise of jurisdiction. By
virtue of cultivating a market in those states, Ford should have
"reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court" in those states for such
67 SC-2023-0603
claims. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
Comparing Ford to Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California, San Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255 (2017) -- a case on which
Ford relied in arguing against the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction -- underscores this point. In Bristol-Myers, the plaintiffs did
not purchase the product in the forum state, did not use the product in
the forum state, and were not even residents of the forum state. In fact,
there was no affiliation between the forum state and the underlying
controversy because no activity relevant to the claims of the nonresidents
took place in that forum and the forum did not have an interest in the
outcome of the plaintiffs' litigation. As a result, California clearly was not
"the most natural State" for the plaintiffs to bring their claims. Allowing
California to exercise specific personal jurisdiction in such a case would
have been contrary to federalism and would have improperly allowed
California to infringe on the authority of the other states that should
have had authority to adjudicate such claims. 18
18It is thus not surprising that some commentators have referred to
the lawsuit in Bristol-Myers as an example of forum shopping. See, e.g., Anthony Petrosino, Rationalizing Relatedness: Understanding Personal Jurisdiction's Relatedness Prong in the Wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb and Ford Motor Co., 91 Fordham L. Rev. 1563, 1590-91 (2023). 68 SC-2023-0603
However, the language in Ford about "the most natural State" does
not mean that there will be only one forum where specific personal
jurisdiction can apply. 19 Thus, it is possible that more than one forum
state could have specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
Given that there are so many possible permutations of facts, this
metric may not help resolve every case. 20 Nevertheless, I believe that this
19Nor does such language imply that there always must be at least
one forum state where specific personal jurisdiction exists. In fact, although unlikely, it might be possible that no state would have specific personal jurisdiction.
20Some of the many possible permutations that these metrics might
(or might not) reach include: (1) cases against manufacturers of component parts for other products, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); (2) cases involving electronic commerce or electronic communication, see Gregory C. Cook & Andrew Ross D'Entremont, No End in Sight?: Navigating the "Vast Terrain" of Personal Jurisdiction in Social Media Cases After Ford, 73 Ala. L. Rev. 621 (2022); (3) cases involving intentional torts, especially those other than defamation, see Ex parte M.E.J., [Ms. SC-2023-0062, Oct. 13, 2023] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2023); and (4) cases involving closely related models of a product, but not the exact same model (for instance, a sport-utility vehicle and a truck based upon the same vehicle frame), see Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 506-07 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that Ford found specific jurisdiction "because Ford sold the relevant models to consumers in the forum states" and concluding that the batteries that LG sold in the forum state (Hawaii) were "as different as sedans and 18-wheelers" from the batteries at issue in the lawsuit and therefore finding no personal jurisdiction). 69 SC-2023-0603
is a helpful metric in a specific-personal-jurisdiction analysis because, if
the forum state is "the most natural State" (emphasis added), it will be,
in my humble view, very likely that both fairness and interstate
federalism will support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction by
that state. I believe, therefore, that "the most natural State" metric can
be a useful way of overcoming the perceived ambiguity created by the
Supreme Court's new analytical framework for the "relate to" test
provided in Ford.
B. The "Constructive Causation" Metric
In addition to "the most natural State" metric, the Supreme Court
in Ford also appeared to examine whether causation was theoretically
possible even if "but for" causation has not been demonstrated in the
facts:
"Small wonder that Ford has here conceded 'purposeful availment' of the two States' markets. … By every means imaginable -- among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail -- Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars -- again including those two models -- are available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars' owners. The company's dealers in Montana and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, including 70 SC-2023-0603
those whose warranties have long since expired. And the company distributes replacement parts both to its own dealers and to independent auto shops in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.
"Now turn to how all this Montana- and Minnesota- based conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by state residents in Montana's and Minnesota's courts. Each plaintiff's suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle -- an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria in the other -- caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both States for many years. (Contrast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed the models in only a different State or region.) In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States. So there is a strong 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' -- the 'essential foundation' of specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros[ Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall], 466 U.S. [408], at 414 [(1984)] ….
"… For the owners of these cars might never have bought them, and so these suits might never have arisen, except for Ford's contacts with their home States. Those contacts might turn any resident of Montana or Minnesota into a Ford owner -- even when he buys his car from out of state. He may make that purchase because he saw ads for the car in local media. And he may take into account a raft of Ford's in-state activities designed to make driving a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to service the car; that other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and that Ford fosters an active resale market for its old 71 SC-2023-0603
models."
592 U.S. at 365-67 (emphasis added). In his concurrence in the judgment,
Justice Alito makes the same point:
"To say that the Constitution does not require the kind of proof of causation that Ford would demand -- what the majority describes as a 'strict causal relationship,' ante, at 362 -- is not to say that no causal link of any kind is needed. And here, there is a sufficient link. It is reasonable to infer that the vehicles in question here would never have been on the roads in Minnesota and Montana if they were some totally unknown brand that had never been advertised in those States, was not sold in those States, would not be familiar to mechanics in those States, and could not have been easily repaired with parts available in those States. See ante, at 367 (describing this relationship between Ford's activities and these suits). The whole point of those activities was to put more Fords (including those in question here) on Minnesota and Montana roads. The common-sense relationship between Ford's activities and these suits, in other words, is causal in a broad sense of the concept, and personal jurisdiction can rest on this type of link without strict proof of the type Ford would require. When 'arise out of' is understood in this way, it is apparent that 'arise out of' and 'relate to' overlap and are not really two discrete grounds for jurisdiction."
Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added). Justices Gorsuch and Thomas appear to
make a similar point. See Ford, 592 U.S. at 378.
Why did the Court refer to causation when it was not relying upon
the "arise out of" language in evaluating the nature of Ford's contacts
with Minnesota and Montana? And why did the Supreme Court signal
the use of a theoretical causation standard when it stated that the 72 SC-2023-0603
plaintiffs "might never have bought" the subject vehicles absent Ford's
extensive contacts with the forum states? I think here the Supreme Court
is signaling the use of what I will call a "constructive causation" metric
for answering such questions because such a metric provides both
fairness to the out-of-state defendant while also protecting interstate
federalism.
It was fair to subject Ford to specific personal jurisdiction for the
plaintiffs' claims arising from the accidents at issue in that case because
those accidents could have been caused by its contacts with the forum
states. Ford should have anticipated being haled into court over this
specific type of fact pattern. Likewise, each forum state had a legitimate
interest in regulating conduct within its borders that could cause those
accidents; thus the federalism interest was satisfied. Under such facts, a
forum state is not overreaching or grabbing for cases.
Thus, constructive causation is another helpful metric -- a cross-
check -- for the application of the full Ford test. Notably, both the main
opinion and both concurrences in the judgment in Ford discuss some
version of constructive causation having been met. Thus, in my view, if
this constructive-causation standard is met, it is more likely that the
73 SC-2023-0603
"relate to" test has been met.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I believe that "the most natural State"
metric and the "constructive causation" metric can assist the bench and
bar as they navigate how to apply the Supreme Court's new analytical
framework for the "relate to" test for specific personal jurisdiction from
Ford. However, I should not be understood as advocating that these
metrics replace the "relate to" test or that they be viewed as additional
elements of that test. Instead, my thoughts here should be understood
only as encouraging the bench and bar to use these metrics as tools to
confirm the results arising from the application of the full Ford test --
that is, to avoid "guessing" on how to apply the "relate to" test in cases
with more complex fact patterns.
74 SC-2023-0603
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The critical question on appeal is whether,
for jurisdictional purposes, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company's Alabama-
based conduct relates to Sheri Sawyer's claims. In my view, Cooper Tire's
contacts with Alabama fall short of supporting specific personal
jurisdiction; thus, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
forbids this Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire
in this case.
To ensure that an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction accords
with due process, courts apply a three-part analysis, inquiring: (1)
"whether the nonresident defendant 'purposefully availed' himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefit of the forum state's laws"; (2) "whether the plaintiff's claims
'arise out of or relate to' at least one of the defendant's contacts with the
forum"; and (3) "whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013).
Cooper Tire concedes that it has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within [Alabama]." Hanson v. Denckla,
75 SC-2023-0603
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). And neither party addresses the third prong of
the analysis. Thus, this case requires us to review Cooper Tire's contacts
with Alabama to determine whether Sawyer's claims "aris[e] out of or
relate[] to" one or more of those contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
The complaint and the affidavits filed by the parties reveal the
following regarding Cooper Tire' s contacts with Alabama. Cooper Tire
sells its tires to 324 independently owned dealers across 117 cities.
Between 2007 and 2014, it manufactured the subject tire model, the
"Cooper CS4," and it does not deny that, during that time frame, it sold
the Cooper CS4 to those dealers and "conducted extensive advertising
and marketing campaigns for its passenger and light truck tires,
including the [Cooper CS4]." Additionally, Cooper Tire collects warranty
information and tire-failure data from Alabama consumers, "maintains
an interest in a manufacturing facility in ... Alabama," "lists job postings
for Tire Engineers in the Florence[] ... area," sponsors numerous
University of Alabama-related and State of Alabama-centric sports
programs, and cosponsors a teen driver and tire-safety campaign for
Alabama teenagers.
76 SC-2023-0603
Between 2015 and 2018, however, Cooper Tire shipped only 5,000
Cooper CS4 tires matching the subject tire's dimensions. None of those
tires were shipped to Alabama. Indeed, Cooper Tire shipped no tires of
any brand or size to either of the stores where the subject vehicle's owner
purchased tires. And Cooper Tire did not directly sell tires to Alabama
customers between 2015 and 2018.
Those contacts are a far cry from those that supported specific
personal jurisdiction in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial
District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021) -- "the most recent Supreme Court
guidance on personal jurisdiction." Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th
496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023). In that case, Ford had employed "every means
imaginable" to encourage Minnesotans and Montanans to purchase its
vehicles, including, relevantly, the Explorer and Crown Victoria. Ford,
592 U.S. at 365. "And apart from sales, Ford work[ed] hard to foster
ongoing connections to its cars' owners." Id. Ford's dealers consistently
maintained and repaired Ford vehicles whose warranties were long
expired, and Ford even "distribute[d] replacement parts both to its own
dealers and to independent auto shops in [both states]." Id. In sum, Ford
77 SC-2023-0603
sought not just one-time vehicle purchasers but "lifelong Ford drivers."
Id.
Indeed, it was Ford's nonsale activities and used-market
exploitation that made the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
reasonable. Specifically, one of the vehicles in Ford was the Crown
Victoria, a model that, by the time of the accident and resulting litigation,
had long since been discontinued. See note 10, supra. But because Ford
had fostered the sale of its used vehicles through its dealerships and had
put considerable effort into keeping the Crown Victoria on the road, the
Supreme Court found reasonable a Minnesota court's exercising specific
personal jurisdiction over Ford -- even though the specific Crown Victoria
at issue originally had been sold outside the state. See Ford, 592 U.S. at
364-66.
The facts of this case are substantially different. Unable to draw a
causal connection between the purchase of the subject tire and Cooper
Tire's contacts with Alabama, Sawyer proceeds under the "back half" of
the "arise out of or relate to" rule. Id. at 362 ("The first half of th[e]
standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,'
contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a
78 SC-2023-0603
causal showing."). Thus, Sawyer must specifically show that one or more
of Cooper Tire's contacts with Alabama relates to her claims. The
evidence, however, does not support her. Of Cooper Tire's contacts with
Alabama listed above, the only ones Sawyer can plausibly relate to her
claims are that Cooper Tires: (1) sells its tires in Alabama to hundreds of
dealerships in over a hundred cities; (2) manufactured and sold to dealers
in Alabama the Cooper CS4 between 2007 and 2014; and (3) in that time
frame, extensively advertised and marketed its tires, including the
Cooper CS4. The majority opinion holds that those contacts are enough
to support specific personal jurisdiction; I disagree. Sawyer's problem is
that those contacts predate the sale of the subject tire, by which time
Cooper Tire no longer shipped the Cooper CS4 into Alabama. What is
missing here are two important activities present in Ford: (1) Cooper
Tire's promoting a marketing plan to support additional sales and (2)
Cooper Tire's fostering ongoing connections with its Cooper CS4 tires'
owners by advertising the Cooper CS4 outside of its original sales
between 2007 and 2014. Without any allegations that Cooper Tire
engaged in some conduct that related particularly to the Cooper CS4 at
the time of the subject tire's sale to Barbara Coggin, the owner of the
79 SC-2023-0603
vehicle Sawyer's son was traveling in at the time of the accident, there
can be no specific personal jurisdiction in this case. It is not enough that
Cooper Tire sold the Cooper CS4 in Alabama for some period predating
the sale of the subject tire and extensively marketed and advertised the
Cooper CS4 during that period. And it is not enough that Cooper Tire
continues to advertise, market, and sell other tire models in Alabama.
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco
Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 264 (2017) ("[S]pecific jurisdiction is lacking
regardless of the extent of a defendant's unconnected activities in the
State."). More is needed. As the Supreme Court stated: "In the sphere of
specific jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits ...."
Ford, 592 U.S. at 362. Those limits are supported by the facts of this case
and precedent.
But, Sawyer has " 'allege[d] facts that would support a colorable
claim of jurisdiction' " such that jurisdictional discovery could be
permitted. Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d
459, 468 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Schenck v. Walt Disney Co., 742 F. Supp.
838, 840 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)) (emphasis omitted). And, to this end,
Sawyer even requested that the trial court grant her leave "to conduct
80 SC-2023-0603
discovery on personal jurisdiction, or alternatively, compel Cooper Tire
to respond to [her] previously-served jurisdictional discovery." In
response and without objection, the trial court granted some limited
discovery to establish where the subject tire was purchased and whether,
between 2015 and 2018, Cooper Tire generally sold the same make,
model, and size tire as the subject tire in Alabama. But now Sawyer
contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion in so limiting the
jurisdictional discovery she requested. I disagree.
"[W]e review for excess of discretion trial courts' decisions on the
availability and scope of jurisdictional discovery." Pruitt v. AAA
Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1148 (Ala. 2022). Sawyer
presented the trial court with two options: a general request for
jurisdictional discovery or a request for jurisdictional discovery that
included interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for
admission regarding Cooper Tire's conduct in Alabama between 2017 and
2019. In exercising its discretion, the trial court split the difference
between the two options Sawyer proposed: it expanded and shifted the
time frame of discovery -- from the requested time frame of 2017-2019 to
2015-2018 -- while otherwise limiting the scope of discovery. In essence,
81 SC-2023-0603
the trial court granted much of, if not more than, the jurisdictional
discovery Sawyer requested. Thus, Sawyer cannot show, and I cannot
agree, that the trial court exceeded its discretion by limiting the scope of
the jurisdictional discovery in this case.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: CV-20-900690)., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheri-sawyer-as-the-personal-representative-of-the-estate-of-thomas-ala-2024.