RENDERED: FEBRUARY 28, 2025; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1471-MR
SHERI JERVIS (FKA SHERI CONN), APPELLANT AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE TYRELL BURCHETT, AND NEXT FRIEND/GUARDIAN OF WYATT ROBBIE BURCHETT
APPEAL FROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DANIEL M. HEADY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 19-CI-00073
WEBSTER COUNTY COAL, LLC APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; A. JONES AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: The Appellant, Sheri Jervis, as administratrix of the Estate of
George Tyrell Burchett and next friend/guardian of Wyatt Robbie Burchett
(collectively, “the Estate”), filed wrongful death and loss of consortium claims
against the Appellee, Webster County Coal, LLC (“WCC”). The Estate alleged that WCC should be held liable for the death of George Burchett, one of its
employees, at the hands of another employee, Christopher Johnston.
The Webster Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of
WCC, reasoning that all the Estate’s claims were time-barred by a contractual
limitations period in Burchett’s agreement with WCC. Alternatively, the court
found no genuine issues of material fact.
While we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the wrongful
death and loss of consortium claims are time-barred, we affirm its alternative
finding that WCC is entitled to summary judgment because no issues of material
fact exist that would make WCC liable for Burchett’s death. Accordingly, having
reviewed the record and being otherwise sufficiently advised, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
During the relevant time period, WCC operated an underground coal
mine in Dixon, Kentucky, where Burchett and Johnston were both employed as
roof bolters. Before hiring the men, WCC conducted background checks, fitness
for duty examinations, and drug and alcohol screens.1 The results revealed no
propensity for violence and no reason to believe either man was unfit for the
position of roof bolter.
1 WCC hired Burchett in January 2018; it hired Johnston in April 2018.
-2- During the course of his employment, Johnston did not commit any
disciplinary infractions. While Burchett was disciplined for attendance issues, he
did not commit any serious infractions. Their supervisor, Ryan Hammers
(“Supervisor Hammers”), testified that Burchett and Johnston were friendly before
the incident in question. Although Burchett was known to have a temper,2 neither
man exhibited violent tendencies at work.
In the days leading up to July 2, 2018, Burchett and Johnston became
embroiled in a personal dispute involving Burchett’s ex-girlfriend and the mother
of his young son, Mika Ramey. About a week before the incident, Johnston and
Ramey began messaging one another. At one point, Johnston told Ramey that
Burchett had been showing nude photographs of her to other coal miners. When
Burchett learned of this, he became angry.
Around midday on July 2, 2018, Burchett began messaging Johnston
on Facebook Messenger. Although Johnston could not recall the exact wording, he
testified that Burchett was upset, and that he may have threatened physical
violence. Johnston responded with something to the effect of “just leave me alone
and drop it,” and he then blocked Burchett from contacting him further on
Facebook.
2 During his deposition, Supervisor Hammers explained that, while he had never seen Burchett get into any kind of a physical altercation, he was known to “vent and rant” from time to time.
-3- Johnston denied agreeing to meet Burchett at WCC later that evening.
However, before Johnston left for work that night, Ramey contacted him and
warned him to “watch out for Burchett because he might do something.” Johnston
testified that he was unsure whether Burchett planned to confront him that evening,
the following week when they were both scheduled to work, or whether he might
show up at Johnston’s home. Regardless, Johnston did not tell anyone at WCC
about Burchett’s threatening messages.
That evening, on July 2, 2018, Johnston was scheduled to work the
third shift, which began around 10:00 p.m. Burchett was not scheduled to work
that night. When Supervisor Hammers arrived at WCC around 9:00 p.m., he
noticed a car parked inside the premises near the entrance. Shortly thereafter,
Burchett called Supervisor Hammers and identified himself as the driver of the car
near the entrance. Burchett then proceeded to tell Supervisor Hammers that:
[Burchett] was waiting on [Johnston], and [Burchett] said about [Johnston] telling his little boy’s mom [Ramey] what [Burchett] had been doing and [Burchett] was – and they had been messaging each other back and forth all day, and [Burchett] was going to meet [Johnston] out there and go down the road and [Burchett] was going to smack the “F” out of [Johnston].
(Record (“R.”) at 748.)
According to Supervisor Hammers, the phone call was brief, and he
did not counsel Burchett regarding his intentions. Supervisor Hammers testified
-4- that while Burchett sounded upset, he did not seem intoxicated. It is undisputed
that Supervisor Hammers did not inform his supervisor or law enforcement that
Burchett was in the parking lot.
Johnston described what happened when arrived he at WCC shortly
before his shift as follows:
I pulled into the parking lot. [Burchett] said – he said a few words. I can’t remember all the words. I just know he said, “Follow me down here to this four-way stop.” I did. He got out; I exited the vehicle; once we had stopped; once we had stopped, there was a couple of words; and then he – and then he struck me – he hit me in the head – and then pinned me down on top of my car; and then that is where I began to stab him; and then it – and then it ended; and then, realizing I had hurt [Burchett] badly, I got in my car, went down to the coal mine to find a medical person, upon which I talked to [Supervisor Hammers] – I’m sure you know all the details anyway – but I talked to [Supervisor Hammers]; told him that I had hurt [Burchett]; I needed somebody medically trained to come down there; somebody did – I think it was Keith Gipson – and then the two others followed, just to be able to help, or whatever reason they wanted to and – and then we all got down there, and that was about it.
(R. at 646.) According to Johnston, he did not bring the knife with him that
evening intending to use it against Burchett. Instead, he testified that the knife – a
standard-size pocketknife – was one he regularly kept in his car. Before exiting his
vehicle, he picked it up in case he needed to defend himself.
-5- Law enforcement officers were called to the scene, and Burchett was
pronounced dead. Johnston was charged with murder but ultimately pleaded guilty
to first-degree manslaughter.3 He was sentenced to ten years in prison.
On May 6, 2019, the Estate filed suit against WCC and Johnston,
alleging that Johnston was responsible for Burchett’s death and that WCC was
vicariously liable for his actions. The Estate further claimed that WCC was
negligent, asserting that Supervisor Hammers had “instructed and ratified”
Burchett’s and Johnston’s decision to leave WCC to engage in a physical
altercation. Additionally, the Estate argued that WCC was liable for negligently
hiring and retaining Johnston, contending that WCC knew or should have known
that Johnston was likely to engage in an altercation that could result in harm to
Burchett. The Estate was later permitted to amend its complaint to include a loss
of consortium claim on behalf of Burchett’s minor son.
After a period of discovery, WCC filed a motion for summary
judgment. The Estate responded. After briefing and argument, the circuit court
granted WCC’s motion. Its order includes a CR4 54.02 certification.5 This appeal
followed.
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.030. 4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 “[CR] 54.02 allows a trial court dealing with multiple claims or multiple parties in a single action to grant a final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties upon a determination
-6- II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03. The
movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
material fact in dispute.
The party opposing the motion then has the burden to present, “at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky.
1991); Watson v. Landmark Urology, P.S.C., 642 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Ky. 2022). “A
party responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot merely
rest on the allegations in its pleadings.” Versailles Farm Home and Garden, LLC
v. Haynes, 647 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Ky. 2022) (citing Continental Cas. Co. v.
Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 281 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. 1955)). “[S]peculation
and supposition are insufficient to justify a submission of a case to the jury, and
that the question should be taken from the jury when the evidence is so
that there is no just reason for delay.” Watson v. Best Financial Services, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 722, 723 (Ky. 2008). A certification was necessary in this case because the Estate also sued Johnston. As those claims remained pending, certification was required to allow for an immediate appeal of the summary judgment ruling.
-7- unsatisfactory as to require a resort to surmise and speculation.” O’Bryan v. Cave,
202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Yates,
239 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Ky. 1951)).
“An appellate court’s role in reviewing a summary judgment is to
determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact
exist[ed] and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Feltner v. PJ Operations, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. App. 2018). The standard of
review for an appellate court is de novo because only legal issues are involved.
Isaacs v. Sentinel Ins. Co. LTD., 607 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Ky. 2020).
III. ANALYSIS
The trial court granted summary judgment to WCC on two alternative
grounds: (1) the Estate’s claims were time-barred by a contractual limitations
period in Burchett’s agreement with WCC, and (2) no genuine issues of material
fact existed, entitling WCC to judgment as a matter of law. We address each
ground below, providing additional facts where necessary.
A. Contractual Limitations Period
It is undisputed that, as a condition of his employment with WCC,
Burchett signed an agreement on January 15, 2018. The agreement limited the
time to file any claims or lawsuits related to his employment with WCC to no more
than six months from the date of the action giving rise to the claim or lawsuit. The
-8- trial court found that all the Estate’s claims were time-barred by this contractual
period.
KRS 336.700(3)(c) provides:
Any employer may require an employee or person seeking employment to execute an agreement to reasonably reduce the period of limitations for filing a claim against the employer as a condition or precondition of employment, provided that the agreement does not apply to causes of action that arise under a state or federal law where an agreement to modify the limitations period is preempted or prohibited, and provided that such an agreement does not reduce the period of limitations by more than fifty percent (50%) of the time that is provided under the law that is applicable to the claim.
Id. Furthermore, KRS 336.700(8) provides that “[t]his section shall apply
prospectively and retroactively.” Under the plain language of the statute, “the
provision in [Burchett’s] employment application is not void as against public
policy.” Croghan v. Norton Healthcare, Inc., 613 S.W.3d 37, 42 (Ky. App. 2020).
Moreover, the agreement did not shorten the applicable statutes of limitations by
more than fifty percent (50%) of the time provided under the law, as it is
undisputed that the relevant statutes of limitations are one year. This is essentially
where the trial court concluded its analysis. However, the issue is more nuanced
than it initially appears.
Burchett could only bargain away rights that belonged to him. We do
not dispute that some of the Estate’s claims were personal to Burchett, including
-9- those for his injuries, physical and mental pain and suffering, and medical
expenses. Pursuant to KRS 411.140, claims for pain and suffering, or other claims
that arise during a decedent’s lifetime and survive his death, are for the benefit of
the estate, and must be brought by the personal representative. As the Kentucky
Supreme Court explained in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581,
598 (Ky. 2012):
This is the so-called survival statute, another extension of the common law, and under it a personal injury claim does not lapse upon the death of the injured person, as was the common-law rule, but may be ‘brought or revived by the personal representative’ on behalf of the decedent’s estate.
In such cases, the personal representative merely stands in the shoes of the
decedent. Accordingly, the personal representative is bound by any agreements the
decedent entered into during his lifetime that affect the claim, including the
contractual limitations provision Burchett signed with WCC.
KRS 411.130(1) provides as follows:
[w]henever the death of a person results from an injury inflicted by the negligence or wrongful act of another, damages may be recovered for the death from the person who caused it, or whose agent or servant caused it. If the act was willful or the negligence gross, punitive damages may be recovered. The action shall be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased.
Notably, “the wrongful death action begins where the personal injury action
ends[.]” Farmers Bank and Tr. Co. of Bardstown v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512
-10- (Ky. 1984). A wrongful death claim is “a distinct interest in a property right that
belongs only to the statutorily-designated beneficiaries.” Preferred Care Partners
Mgmt. Grp., L.P. v. Alexander, 530 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Ky. App. 2017). The claim
is created by the decedent’s death, but the claim never belonged to the decedent.
Moore v. Citizens Bank of Pikeville, 420 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Ky. 1967). The
wrongful death claim is not derived through or on behalf of the decedent but
accrues separately to the wrongful death beneficiaries and is intended to
compensate them for their own pecuniary loss. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 599.
For this reason, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that a decedent
cannot bind his beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claim by any action
he takes during his lifetime. Id. Only the beneficiaries have the right to
contractually limit the wrongful death claim. LP Louisville East, LLC v. Patton,
651 S.W.3d 759, 773 (Ky. 2020), as modified (Apr. 29, 2021).
The logic of Ping extends to the contractual limitations provision
Burchett signed with WCC. Just as a decedent cannot bind his wrongful death
beneficiaries to arbitration through a pre-death agreement, he likewise cannot
unilaterally waive or restrict their independent statutory right to bring a wrongful
death claim. The wrongful death cause of action belongs exclusively to the
beneficiaries, not to the decedent or his estate, and is intended to compensate them
for their own losses, rather than those suffered by the decedent during his lifetime.
-11- Because Burchett had no authority to bargain away the rights of his statutory
beneficiaries, any contractual provision shortening the time frame to bring claims
can only apply to those claims that belonged to him – such as his personal injury
claims – and not to the independent wrongful death claim. To hold otherwise
would improperly allow employers to circumvent Kentucky’s wrongful death
statute by contract, effectively stripping beneficiaries of a cause of action that the
legislature has expressly conferred upon them.
The same logic applies to the minor’s loss of consortium claim, as it
flows directly from Burchett’s death and never belonged to him. Like the
wrongful death claim, a child’s loss of consortium is a separate cause of action
intended to compensate for the child’s own loss, not any harm suffered by the
decedent. Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Ky. 1997). Because Burchett
had no authority to waive or limit claims that did not belong to him, the contractual
limitations provision cannot bind his minor son’s consortium claim.
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as it
relates to the Estate’s personal injury claims, as those claims belonged to Burchett
and were subject to the contractual limitations provision. However, we do not
agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the wrongful death and loss of
consortium claims were likewise time-barred, as those claims belong to the
statutory beneficiaries and were not subject to Burchett’s employment agreement.
-12- Accordingly, we must analyze the trial court’s alternative basis for granting
summary judgment on the wrongful death and loss of consortium claims – whether
genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude judgment as a matter of law.
B. Vicarious Liability
The Estate sued WCC, Johnston’s employer, under a vicarious
liability/respondeat superior theory, arguing that WCC should be held vicariously
liable for Johnston’s actions in stabbing Burchett to death. Although the trial court
did not conduct a separate analysis of vicarious liability claim, it did determine that
it was undisputed that Burchett and Johnston were “engaged in personal business”
when Burchett was killed.
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Papa John’s International, Inc. v.
McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44 (Ky. 2008), reaffirmed that an employer can only be held
vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the employee’s
tortious conduct occurred within the scope of his employment. The Court
emphasized that an employer is not liable when the employee’s actions arise from
personal motives unrelated to the employer’s business. In McCoy, a pizza delivery
driver made allegedly false statements to the police that led to a customer’s arrest.
The Court held that this conduct was an independent act, not undertaken to further
the employer’s business, and thus did not impose liability on the employer.
-13- Applying McCoy, this Court held in Hensley v. Traxx Management
Company, 622 S.W.3d 652 (Ky. App. 2020), that a gas station could not be held
liable when its clerk shot a fleeing robber, as the act was unrelated to his job duties
and motivated by personal concerns for his safety. Likewise, in Feltner v. PJ
Operations, supra, we held that a pizza delivery company was not liable when a
delivery driver, after clocking out, struck and killed a pedestrian while driving
home. We emphasized that the determinative factor was not whether the driver
had used a required work vehicle, but whether he was acting in furtherance of the
employer’s business at the time of the accident.
The Estate cites Dennert v. Dee, 215 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1948),
and Frederick v. Collins, 378 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1964), to support its vicarious
liability claim. In Dennert, the Court held the owners of a nightclub liable for an
assault committed by a bartender, reasoning that the bartender was acting within
the scope of his employment when he forcibly removed a patron, as maintaining
order was part of his job duties. Similarly, in Frederick, the Court found an
employer liable when a grocery store manager shot and killed a customer who had
announced a holdup, concluding that protecting the store was within the scope of
his employment.
These cases are distinguishable from the present case because, in both
Dennert and Frederick, the employees’ actions were directly tied to their job
-14- responsibilities – maintaining order in a business or protecting an employer’s
property. Here, under the undisputed facts, Johnston was not acting in furtherance
of WCC’s business when he stabbed Burchett to death. The dispute between
Johnston and Burchett was entirely personal, arising from Johnston’s alleged
romantic involvement with Burchett’s ex-girlfriend and accusations regarding
Burchett’s conduct toward her. Their conflict had no connection to their work at
WCC, their job duties as roof bolters, or any workplace-related matter. Moreover,
the altercation occurred offsite before Johnston’s shift began and when Burchett
was not scheduled to work. There is no evidence that Johnston’s actions were in
any way intended to serve WCC’s interests. Given these facts, Johnston’s attack
was a personal act wholly outside the scope of his employment, making vicarious
liability inapplicable. Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment with respect to
this claim.
C. Negligent Retention & Hiring
The Estate argues that disputed issues of material fact exist regarding
its negligent hiring and retention claim, citing evidence that Johnston had a prior
criminal history. Specifically, the Estate points to Johnston’s 2013 guilty plea to
unlawful transaction with a minor in the third degree under KRS 530.070.
However, the Estate concedes that in 2015 – three years before WCC hired
Johnston – he was permitted to withdraw his plea, and the charge was dismissed.
-15- Negligent hiring and retention claims “require that an employer use
reasonable care in the selection or retention of its employees.” Ten Broeck
Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 732 (Ky. 2009). “To succeed on a
negligent hiring and retention claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the employer
knew or reasonably should have known that an employee was unfit for the job for
which he was employed, and (2) the employee’s placement or retention at that job
created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff.” Ritchie v. Turner, 559
S.W.3d 822, 842 (Ky. 2018).
We have examined the record to determine whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether WCC knew, or reasonably should have known:
(1) Johnston was unfit for the job for which he was employed, and (2) whether his
placement or retention in that job created an unreasonable risk of harm to Burchett.
Here, the Estate’s contention that WCC negligently hired and retained Johnston
fails to create a disputed issue of material fact. During his deposition, Johnston
explained that his 2013 charge for unlawful transaction with a minor stemmed
from a personal relationship – he was 19 years old at the time and had run away
with his underage girlfriend. Crucially, in 2015, he was allowed to withdraw his
plea, and the charge was dismissed, meaning that by the time WCC hired him in
2018, he had no criminal conviction. Given that the charge was unrelated to
workplace violence or aggression and had been dismissed years before his
-16- employment, there was no reasonable basis for WCC to have known that Johnston
was unfit for his job or posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Accordingly, this
evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether WCC
negligently hired or retained Johnston. Therefore, the issue of liability on those
claims was properly disposed of via summary judgment.
D. Negligent Supervision
The Estate argues that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on its negligent supervision claim, asserting that WCC failed to take
appropriate action despite having notice of the escalating personal conflict between
Burchett and Johnston. The Estate contends that WCC, through its supervisor,
Ryan Hammers, knew that Burchett was waiting for Johnston in the parking lot
and was upset, yet failed to intervene, notify security or law enforcement, or
otherwise prevent the confrontation. By allowing the situation to unfold
unchecked, the Estate argues that WCC breached its duty to exercise reasonable
care in supervising its employees and maintaining a safe work environment. Based
on these assertions, the Estate maintains that there are genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether WCC’s inaction contributed to Burchett’s death, making
summary judgment inappropriate.
Kentucky law recognizes that an employer can be held liable for the
negligent supervision of its employees. McDonald’s Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d
-17- 274, 291 (Ky. App. 2009). To assert a claim of negligent supervision, the plaintiff
must allege that “the defendant knew or had reason to know of the employee’s
harmful propensities; that the employee injured the plaintiff; and that the hiring,
supervision, or retention of such an employee proximately caused the plaintiff’s
injuries.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840,
844 (Ky. 2005).
In Johnson v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 326 S.W.3d 812 (Ky. App.
2010), this Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding
that an employer does not have a general duty to protect others from an employee’s
violent acts unless a special relationship exists or the employer has specific
knowledge of an imminent threat. The Court found that the employer had no duty
to warn a future employer about the employee’s prior aggressive behavior because
no recognized legal duty required it to do so. Importantly, the Court emphasized
that foreseeability alone is insufficient to impose liability without a corresponding
duty.
Applying Johnson to this case, WCC similarly had no legal duty to
supervise or intervene in a purely personal dispute between Johnston and Burchett,
particularly when there was no history of workplace violence or threats between
them. The altercation arose from a private matter unrelated to their employment,
occurred offsite, and happened before Johnston’s shift even began.
-18- Furthermore, a critical distinction in this case is that Supervisor
Hammers only knew that Burchett was upset and waiting in the parking lot –
suggesting that Burchett, not Johnston, was the likely to be the aggressor. There is
no evidence that Supervisor Hammers had any reason to believe that Johnston
would respond with deadly force, nor is there any indication that he knew Johnston
had a weapon. Under Johnson, an employer cannot be held liable for negligent
supervision unless it had specific knowledge that an employee posed an
unreasonable risk of harm. Without any reason to foresee Johnston’s violent
response, WCC had no duty to act. Because negligent supervision requires proof
that an employer knew or should have known an employee posed a danger, the
Estate cannot establish that WCC was negligent in supervising Johnston.
Moreover, a general commitment to workplace safety does not impose
a duty to act when an employer has no reasonable basis to foresee deadly harm,
especially in a case like this, where the conflict was personal and took place
outside of working hours. Without clear evidence that WCC knew or should have
known that Johnston posed an imminent threat, the Estate’s reliance on the
handbook6 is insufficient to support a negligent supervision claim, and summary
judgment was properly granted.
6 We note here that WCC’s employee handbook, relied upon by the Estate as supportive of its claims, merely references making “safety a top priority.”
-19- E. Loss of Consortium
The loss of consortium claim is derivative and cannot stand
independently of the underlying claims. In Godbey v. University Hospital of
Albert B. Chandler Medical Center, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Ky. App. 1998),
this Court reaffirmed that a loss of consortium claim fails if the plaintiff cannot
establish causation for the injury giving rise to it, stating: “As far as the claim of
Mrs. Godbey to damages for loss of consortium, if no causation is established for
the injuries which she alleges caused her loss, no recovery can be had.”
Here, because the trial court properly granted summary judgment on
all of the Estate’s underlying claims the loss of consortium claim necessarily fails.
Without an actionable claim against WCC for Burchett’s death, there is no legal
basis to hold WCC liable for loss of consortium. Accordingly, the trial court
correctly concluded that there could be no recovery on this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Webster Circuit Court’s
November 29, 2023, amended order granting summary judgment to WCC.
ALL CONCUR.
-20- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John C. Whitfield Melanie J. Kilpatrick Madisonville, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
-21-