SHEPPARD v. BURWELL

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 31, 2019
Docket2:18-cv-04633
StatusUnknown

This text of SHEPPARD v. BURWELL (SHEPPARD v. BURWELL) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SHEPPARD v. BURWELL, (E.D. Pa. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MELISSA JOYCE SHEPPARD : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of : NO. 18-4633 Social Security1 :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELIZABETH T. HEY, U.S.M.J. October 31, 2019

Melissa Joyce Sheppard (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). I conclude that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying benefits is supported by substantial evidence and will affirm the Commissioner’s decision. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB on July 13, 2015, claiming that she became disabled on April 1, 2013, due to migraine headaches, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), dizziness, and leg and knee pain and swelling. Tr. at 61, 119, 150.2 The application was denied initially, id. 64-68, and Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an ALJ, id. at 70, which took place on May 10, 2017. Id. at 27-51. On

1Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) on June 17, 2019, and should be substituted for the former Acting Commissioner, Nancy Berryhill, as the defendant in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2For DIB eligibility, a claimant must establish disability on or before her date last insured. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.101(a); Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s date last insured for purposes of DIB is June 30, 2017. Tr. at 52. September 19, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 11-21. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on September 25, 2018, id. at 1-3, making the ALJ’s September 19, 2017 decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff commenced this action in federal court on October 19, 2018. Doc. 1. The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review. Docs. 15-16.3 II. LEGAL STANDARD To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for . . . not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The Commissioner employs a five-step process, evaluating: 1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantially gainful activity;

2. If not, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly limits her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

3. If so, whether based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the listing of impairments (“Listings”), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, which results in a presumption of disability;

3Defendant consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), see Standing Order, In RE: Direct Assignment of Social Security Appeal Cases to Magistrate Judges (Pilot Program) (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2018), and I previously concluded that Plaintiff is deemed to have consented based on her failure to file a consent or declination following notice. Docs. 2, 5, 6. 4. If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment, whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past work; and

5. If the claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to establish that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs in the local and national economies, in light of her age, education, work experience, and RFC. See Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007). The court’s role on judicial review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, the issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s conclusions that Plaintiff is not disabled and is capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and must be “more than a mere scintilla.” Zirnsak, 777 F.2d at 610 (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). The court has plenary review of legal issues. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431. III. DISCUSSION A. ALJ’s Findings and Plaintiff’s Claims The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from three severe impairments at the second

step of the sequential evaluation; migraines, degenerative joint disease of the right knee, and obesity. Tr. at 13. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met the Listings, id. at 15, and that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work except she is limited to no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no kneeling or crawling; no more than occasionally performing all other

postural maneuvers; no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; no outdoor work; no bright or flickering lights such as those found in metal-cutting or welding; and no more than moderate noise. Id. at 16. At the fourth step of the evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a medical assistant. Id. at 19. In the alternative, the ALJ found at step five that there were

other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Id. at 20. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ (1) failed to properly consider the opinions of her treating neurologists, (2) mischaracterized the evidence of record, (3) erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony, and (4) failed to properly utilize Vocational Expert

(“VE”) testimony. Doc. 15 at 5-13. Defendant responds that the ALJ properly considered the medical opinions, Plaintiff’s testimony, and the VE testimony, and argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 16 at 6-14 B. Summary of Medical Evidence The record references Plaintiff’s treatment for various physical ailments, and I will summarize these first before turning to her primary complaint of migraines. Her history

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