Shepley v. Johnson & Johnson

582 F.3d 231, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21214
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedSeptember 28, 2009
DocketNo. 08-1002
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 582 F.3d 231 (Shepley v. Johnson & Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shepley v. Johnson & Johnson, 582 F.3d 231, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21214 (1st Cir. 2009).

Opinion

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Theresa Shepley and Larry Young, representing a class of nationwide consumers, appeal from the district court’s adverse entry of a final judgment as to their claims against Defendants-Appellees Johnson & Johnson; Centocor, Inc.; and Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. (collectively “J & J”). The appellants contend that the district court improperly entered judgment against them before trial. For the reasons that follow, we remand this matter to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal represents just one case in a sprawling, nationwide multi-district class action involving the pricing of physician-administered pharmaceutical drugs which were reimbursed by Medicare, private insurers and patients making co-insurance payments from 1991 through 2003. The gravamen of the nationwide litigation against the pharmaceutical companies is that they unfairly and deceptively inflated the drugs’ “average wholesale prices” (“AWPs”), a price published by the pharmaceutical companies in various private industry publications and widely used as a benchmark for reimbursement payments, while simultaneously offering secret discounts and rebates to physicians. The result of this scheme was that the AWPs dramatically diverged from the physicians’ actual acquisition costs, a divergence referred to as the “spread,” thereby creating a windfall profit for the physicians who bought the drugs at the lower prices but were reimbursed based on the higher prices. The plaintiffs further allege that the pharmaceutical companies exploited this system by “marketing the spread,” by which a company used the prospect of windfall profits to induce physicians to prescribe its drug, thereby protecting or increasing market share vis-a-vis competitor drugs. This case involves just a slice of the larger litigation: the claims against J & J by Class 1 plaintiffs' — the group of natural persons nationwide who made co-payments based on AWP for relevant Medicare Part B drugs.1 For a detailed [233]*233discussion of this scheme, and of the district court’s case management efforts, see In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, No. 08-1056, 582 F.3d 156, 2009 WL 3019691 (1st Cir. Sept. 2009), and In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 491 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.Mass.2007). This opinion assumes familiarity with those two decisions.

As part of the broader litigation, the district court held a twenty-day bench trial adjudicating the claims of the Class 2 and Class 3 plaintiffs, see In re Pharm. Industry Average Wholesale Price Litig., 233 F.R.D. 229, 231 (D.Mass.2006) (defining Classes 2 and 3), against a set of pharmaceutical companies, including J & J. See In re Pharm., 491 F.Supp.2d at 31 (“This bench trial involved two Massachusetts classes. One class, Class 2, consists of third-party payors (‘TPPs’) in Massachusetts that reimburse Medicare beneficiaries for their statutory twenty percent coinsurance obligations under Medicare, known as Medigap insurance or supplemental insurance. The other class of plaintiffs, Class 3, consists of all third party payors, end-payors, consumers who make coinsurance payments, and consumers who have no insurance for these drugs in Massachusetts and who pay for drugs based on AWP.” (footnotes omitted)). In June 2007, the district court entered a split judgment, finding in favor of the Class 2 and 3 plaintiffs as to some of the defendants but not others. Id. at 31-32 (summarizing findings).

J & J was one of the victorious defendants. Although the district court noted that the company’s conduct was “at times troubling,” it ultimately found that J & J’s conduct had not damaged the class because the spread for the two relevant J & J-manufactured drugs, Procrit (epoetin alfa) and Remicade (infliximab), had not substantially exceeded industry expectations about the size of the spread, and therefore J & J’s conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness necessary to trigger liability under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A (“Chapter 93A”). Id. at 31, 103-04. In reaching this conclusion, the district court rejected the Class 2 plaintiffs’ contention that any spread at all should trigger potential liability for the defendants (an approach that the court labeled the “per se” liability theory), and instead applied a 30% “speed limit” or “yardstick” for potential liability, whereby only spreads that exceeded 30% would trigger potential liability. The 30% potential liability trigger was also applied to the claims of the Class 3 plaintiffs. Because the spreads for Procrit and Remicade were approximately 30% or less during the class period, the district court declined to find liability as to either Class 2 or Class 3.

On the strength of those findings, during a July 2007 conference relating to the Class 1 plaintiffs’ claims against the Bristol Myers Squibb Company (which ultimately settled before trial), the district court characterized its post-trial findings as having cut off the claims of the Class 1 plaintiffs against J & J. Specifically, the following exchange occurred between the district court and Steve Berman, the attorney representing the Class 1 plaintiffs:

THE COURT: ... So, there will be no more trials with respect to the first five defendants in Track 1 with respect to, as I understand it, Class 1....
MR. BERMAN: There’s one issue on Track 1, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah?
MR. BERMAN: And, that is Johnson & Johnson. I know that you said that their drugs didn’t exceed the 30 percent rule for the purposes of Class 2 and 3. But, it’s our position — and we would like the opportunity to present this or maybe [234]*234you’ve already decided — that the 30 percent would not apply to [Class] 1.
THE COURT: I thought I ruled that. The 30 percent did apply to Track — to Class 1.
MR. BERMAN: Well, you have a footnote that talks about — -implies that, but you did not rule in that way. That’s your ruling, that we have no J & J Class 1 trial.
THE COURT: I thought it was not a footnote. I thought I went on and on about it. I think I went on and on about everything. So, maybe I ought to look at it again.
MR. BERMAN: I don’t think you did—
THE COURT: I think I said that I rejected plaintiffs’ position that the per se liability for Class 1 and that I thought that the 30 percent speed limit should apply to Class 1 as well. And, that would be, I thought applicable to all of the defendants.
So why is that not clear?
MR. BERMAN: Well, I didn’t see that in your order, your Honor.
THE COURT: They’ve got it.
MR. BERMAN: At the time we negotiated the — via that [BMS] settlement, both sides thought that was a risk that could go either way. And, we discussed that with the mediator. The mediator didn’t think that it was clear either.
THE COURT: Well—
MR. BERMAN: It’s clear now.
THE COURT: It’s clear now. And, I will look at it again.

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582 F.3d 231, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shepley-v-johnson-johnson-ca1-2009.