Shepherd's Adm'r v. Chapman's Adm'r

21 S.E. 468, 2 Va. Dec. 88
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedMarch 28, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 21 S.E. 468 (Shepherd's Adm'r v. Chapman's Adm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shepherd's Adm'r v. Chapman's Adm'r, 21 S.E. 468, 2 Va. Dec. 88 (Va. 1895).

Opinion

Keith, P.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1849 a chancery suit was instituted in the circuit court of Orange county by Lewis B. Williams, administrator c. t. a. of George Shepherd, the general object of which was the settlement of the estate of which William Shepherd had died possessed some time about the year 1825. James Shepherd and Beynolds Chapman qualified as executors of the will of William Shepherd, deceased, giving separate bonds as such, and proceeded to administer the estate. At the time of the institution of this suit Beynolds Chapman had died, and Thomas T. Slaughter and John M. Chapman had qualified as his administrators, giving separate bonds. All the necessary parties were made to the suit, .including the administrators of Beynolds Chapman, deceased, and when the case was ready for a hearing all proper accounts were ordered. The commissioner, Mr. Murray, settled the accounts of both Slaughter and Chapman, and among other items passed upon by the commissioner is one for the sum of $2,400, which is the ground of contention in the present controversy. Among the assets which came into the hands of Slaughter and Chapman, as administrators of Beynolds Chapman, was a claim against Conway C. Macon and Ambrose Madison for a large sum. This claim was really a part of the estate of William Shepherd, deceased ; and, while the fact does not distinctly appear, it may be inferred that it was evidenced by bonds or notes of Macon and Madison, made payable to James Chapman, and Beynolds Chapman, executors of William Shepherd, deceased, and that, by the death of James Chapman, Beynolds Chapman became his surviving executor, and upon his death that they passed into the hands of his administrators. Certain it is that the claim was duly paid over to the administrators of Beynolds Chapman, deceased, in obedience to [90]*90a decree of the circuit court of Spottsyl vania county rendered at its May term, 1851. On page 151 of the “Old Record” the amount $3,737.85 was charged by the commissioner to John M. Chapman, and he is credited on the other hand with certain fees, commissions, and costs attending its collection, leaving a net balance against him on this account of $3,430.97. On page 79 of the “Old Record” occurs the following paragraph in the commissioner’s report: £ ‘Your commissioner further reports that in the year 1851 the said John M. Chapman, administrator as aforesaid, let his coadministrator, Thomas T. Slaughter, have $2,400 of the assets of the estate of Reynolds Chapman, deceased, which came to his (John M. Chapman’s) hands. Your commissioner, however, has not charged this sum to the said Slaughter, but has to the said Chapman, as it was a mere loan of money by the latter to the former. ” This report was returned to the court, divers exceptions were taken to it, but none affecting the question under consideration; and it came before the court at May term, I860, when part of the exceptions were sustained, others overruled, and the report sent back to the commissioner to be reformed. He at the same term returned a report in conformity with the -views of the court, which was confirmed without exception. From this decree an appeal was taken to this court, and after pending here until 1874 was decided, and the decree appealed from was, in every particular pertinent to the inquiry now before us, approved and affirmed. When the case went back to the circuit court of Orange county, Murray was directed to restate the accounts in those respects in which this court had found them to be erroneous, and on February 1, 1875, the commissioner filed his report. John M. Chapman appeared before the commissioner and represented to him that an error had been made by the commissioner in his report before referred to, greatly to his prejudice, in charging him with the whole of the money received from the Madison-Macon compromise; that in very truth Thomas T. Slaughter, his coadministrator, had received [91]*91$2,100 of that sum ; and he exhibited Slaughter’s bond to him dated January 25, 1861, which is an obligation on Slaughter’s part to pay Chapman, or those who may be entitled thereto, as creditors of Reynolds Chapman, deceased, the sum of $2,100, with interest from its receipt, and thereby to save Chapman harmless. The bond recites that Chapman, having received money from the suit in Fredericksburg, had immediately turned over, by his check, $2,100 part thereof to Slaughter, and that he (Slaughter) should have been charged with it in the original report instead of Chapman. The commissioner seems to have felt that the decree of this court, under which he was acting, having confirmed the report as to this item, that the matter had passed beyond his control, and refers to Campbell v. Campbell, 22 Grat. 649, as authority for that position. . He made, however, alternate statements upon the subject; and the court at its October term, 1876, entered a decree which is final in its character, so far as the liability of Thomas T. Slaughter and John M. Chapman is concerned. By that decree, notwithstanding the fact that Slaughter admitted his liability for this sum of $2,100 and interest, and though both he and Chapman excepted to the report because it did not place the liability for it upon Slaughter, by whom both agreed it should in justice be borne, the principal report of the commissioner was confirmed, the alternate statements which stood as exceptions to his principal report were overruled, and Chapman was required to pay a sum which embraced this item of $2,100, and Thomas T. Slaughter was relieved from its payment as administrator. The court in this decree continued to treat it as a mere loan from Chapman to Slaughter,- — a private transaction between them, — and, in pursuance of this view of the matter, gave Chapman a decree against Slaughter for. the sum of $2,100, with interest from the 29th of May, 1852. At July rules, 1876, an amended bill was filed, the object of which was to make Thomas Scott, surety on the administration bond of Thomas T. Slaughter, and John Willis, surety of John M. Chapman, parties defendant. [92]*92The case proceeded against them, and at October term, 1890, a decree was entered declaring, among other things, that Thomas Scott, surety as aforesaid, was not liable for this sum of $2,400 and interest. To this decree a bill of review was presented, praying that the decree complained of may be reviewed and reversed for error apparent on the “face of the record,” and for after-discovered evidence.

I cannot think that the first ground is seriously relied on. There is certainly nothing upon the “face of the record,” in the sense in which that term is used in this connection, which discloses error. We are confined to the consideration of what appears on the face of the £ ‘decrees, the opinion of the court, orders and proceedings in the cause, arising on facts either admitted by the pleadings or stated as facts in the decrees (or opinions of the court); and the evidence in the case cannot be looked into in order to show the decrees to be erroneous in the statement of the facts.” Thomson v. Brooke, 76 Va. 160. Now, all that is apparent to us upon the “face of the record” was equally so to this court when the decree of 1874 was rendered, and it is well settled that a bill of review will not lie to a decree of this court for errors apparent. It is also well settled that all decrees of this court partake of the equality of finality, and that an interlocutory decree of this court can no more be reviewed in this or any other court for apparent errors than could a final decree. A bill of review, however, does lie to a decree of this court upon the ground of after-discovered evidence.

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Bluebook (online)
21 S.E. 468, 2 Va. Dec. 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shepherds-admr-v-chapmans-admr-va-1895.