Shepard v. San Diego Sheriff Department

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 1, 2020
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01625
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAZHAE SHEPARD, Case No.: 3:19-cv-01625-JAH-MDD Booking No. #19728104, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE vs. A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND

15 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’s DEPT., et al., 16 Defendants. [ECF No. 4] 17 18 19 20 Razhae Shepard (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego County Sheriff 21 Department’s George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”), and proceeding pro se, has filed 22 this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23 I. Procedural Background 24 In his original Complaint, Shepard alleged that the San Diego Sheriff’s Department 25 (“SDSD”), unidentified members of its medical and food services staff, County Sheriff 26 William B. Gore, and a “contracted doctor” named Tran, deprived him adequate medical 27 care, failed to provide him an appropriate religious diet, and gave him the “run around” in 28 response to multiple grievances and internal affairs complaints he filed at both the San 1 Diego Central Jail (“SDCJ”), GBDF, and the Vista Detention Facility (“VDF”). See 2 Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-5. He sought injunctive relief as well as $6.6 million in general 3 and punitive damages. Id. at 7. 4 On November 18, 2019, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, screened 5 his Complaint, and dismissed it sua sponte for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). See ECF No. 3. Plaintiff was given 45 days leave in which 7 to file an amended complaint that addressed all his pleading deficiencies. Id. at 6-11; see 8 also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[A] district court 9 should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 10 determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured.”) (citations omitted)). 11 On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 4). 12 Plaintiff continues to refer broadly to the denial of his “medical needs,” his right to “free 13 enjoyment of religion without discrimination,” and to be free from “cruel and unusual 14 punishment,” but he offers even fewer factual details than he did in his original pleading, 15 and fails to connect any of the named Defendants to any particular act, omission, or incident 16 of constitutional wrongdoing. See FAC at 3‒5. Plaintiff also continues to allege, without 17 more, that SDSD officials as a group, and Sheriff William D. Gore in particular, “ignored” 18 more than a dozen of his inmate grievances. See FAC at 3. 19 II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) 20 As Plaintiff knows, the Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 21 (“PLRA”) to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 22 Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, 23 or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 24 parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time of filing “as soon 25 as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the 26 PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 27 frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are 28 immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27 (citing 1 § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 3 A. Standard of Review 4 “The purpose of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits 5 need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th 6 Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 7 2012)). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 8 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 9 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 10 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 11 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 12 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 12(b)(6)”). 14 Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 15 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 16 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 18 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are well-pleaded 19 factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 20 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint 21 states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 22 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of 23 misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. 24 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 26 indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 27 Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 28 obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 1 pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 2 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 3 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 4 pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 5 1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 6 civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. 7 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 8 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 9 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 10 v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 11 two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 12 States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 13 under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 14 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 15 C. Discussion 16 As noted above, Plaintiff’s FAC suffers from the same pleading deficiencies as his 17 original Complaint. While he cites his rights to “freedom of religion,” and the Eighth and 18 Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as the legal bases for his claims, see FAC 19 at 3‒6, these “naked assertions” which remain “devoid of further factual enhancement,” do 20 not “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference” that any of the Defendants he has 21 named as parties may be held liable under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations 22 omitted). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 23 be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 24 In its November 18, 2019 Order, the Court specifically advised Plaintiff that even 25 pro se litigants “must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 26 defendants engaged in” in order to state a plausible claim for relief. See ECF No. 3 at 8 27 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676‒77; Jones v. Comm’ty Redev. Agency of City of Los Angeles, 28 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)). “Liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of 1 personal participation by the defendant.” Victoria v. City of San Diego, 326 F. Supp. 3d 2 1003, 1013 (S.D. Cal. 2018). Except with respect to Sheriff Gore, whom Plaintiff claims 3 “ignored” his many inmate grievances, and enforced unidentified “policies adopted by 4 [the] County of San Diego,” see FAC at 5, Plaintiff still fails to even minimally describe 5 when, how, or what each individual Defendant either did, or failed to do, with respect to 6 providing him medical care or ensuring his right to freely exercise any sincerely held 7 religious belief. To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must link each Defendant’s 8 personal acts or omissions to each claim for relief, and include “sufficient factual matter 9 … to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 10 omitted); Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 11 2013). He still has not. 12 With respect to Sheriff Gore, Plaintiff claims broadly that he adopted unidentified 13 policies on behalf of the County, refused to provide “emergency medical help” on an 14 unspecified occasion, and denied him the right to petition for redress via inmate grievance 15 procedures. See FAC at 3, 5. First, to the extent Plaintiff again seeks to pursue any claim 16 of municipal liability against the County itself, his FAC still fails to allege that any 17 individual municipal employee violated his constitutional rights “pursuant to a formal 18 governmental policy or a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the “standard 19 operating procedure” of the local governmental entity.’” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 20 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). A § 1983 claim against a municipal entity requires an allegation 21 that “a deliberate policy, custom, or practice ... was the ‘moving force’ behind the 22 constitutional violation ... suffered.” Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th 23 Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Plaintiff still fails 24 to identify what policy, custom, or practice was at play‒‒and isolated or random acts of 25 wrongdoing are insufficient to sustain a municipal liability claim. See Thompson v. City of 26 Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. 27 City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Flesher v. Los 28 Angeles Cnty. Jail Med. Staff, No. CV 20-3937-AB (KK), 2020 WL 2523241, at *4 (C.D. 1 Cal. May 18, 2020) (finding claims that detainee’s “civil rights were violated on two 2 separate occasions” insufficient to plausibly allege a municipal custom or practice). 3 Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Sheriff Gore personally liable for 4 ignoring his many inmate grievances, internal affairs, and Citizen’s Law Enforcement 5 Review Board complaints, see FAC at 5‒6, he also fails to state a claim upon which relief 6 may be granted. The existence of an internal jail or prison grievance procedure does not 7 create any substantive rights enforceable under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Ramirez 8 v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional 9 entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 10 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (“With respect to the Due Process Clause, any right to a grievance 11 procedure is a procedural right, not substantive one. Accordingly, a state’s inmate 12 grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 13 Clause.”) (internal citations omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988) 14 (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.”). Thus, Plaintiff 15 cannot assert due process claims against Sheriff Gore based solely on the handling or 16 alleged mishandling of his inmate grievances. See McRoy v. Roe, 509 Fed. Appx. 660, 660 17 (9th Cir. Feb.19, 2013) (affirming dismissal of claims arising from defendants’ processing 18 of grievances) (citing Ramirez). 19 Finally, the Court’s November 18, 2019 Order specifically advised Plaintiff that 20 should he elect to amend and identify the individual SDSD deputies or medical personnel 21 who personally denied him adequate medical attention or failed to sufficiently 22 accommodate his sincerely held religious beliefs, he must also include facts to show how 23 each of those individual persons violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 24 ECF No. 3 at 9‒10. Because he does not specify, but appears to have been a pretrial 25 detainee at the time he alleges to have been denied appropriate medical care and/or 26 religious accommodations at either the SDCJ, GBDF, or VDF, the Court identified both 27 the First and Fourteenth Amendments as the appropriate constitutional bases for those 28 claims, and specifically set out the pleading requirements for both. See id. at 10 n.3 1 (“[I]nadequate medical care claims alleged by persons in pretrial custody ‘must be 2 evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.’”) (citing Gordon v. Cnty. of 3 Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124‒25 (9th Cir. 2018)); id. at 10 (“To state a claim under the 4 First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Shepard must allege facts to plausibly show the 5 defendant’s actions: (a) ‘substantially burden[ed]’ the exercise of a sincerely-held religious 6 belief, and (b) did so in an unreasonable manner—i.e., the official’s actions were not 7 ‘rationally related to legitimate penological interests.’”) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of 8 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1997); Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031, 1033 (9th 9 Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) 10 (citations omitted)). 11 Plaintiff’s FAC continues to invoke legally significant phrases like “cruel and 12 unusual punishment,” “deliberate indifference,” “discrimination,” and “equal protection,” 13 see FAC at 3‒5, but these types of “conclusory statements are not enough. See Iqbal, 556 14 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 15 be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. As pleaded, Plaintiff’s FAC continues to 16 provide “nothing more than conclusions.” Id. With respect to his need for medical care, he 17 does not plead any factual content sufficient to plausibly show any individual SDSD 18 official “made an intentional decision with respect to conditions under which [he] was 19 confined,” contend those conditions placed him “at substantial risk of suffering serious 20 harm,” allege that anyone failed to abate that risk, or claim that any individual SDSD 21 official’s conduct caused his injuries. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. Nor does Plaintiff allege 22 to hold any sincerely held religious belief or identify a “substantial burden” placed on the 23 exercise of that belief by any named Defendant.1 See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85; Malik v. 24 Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). 25

26 27 1 In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged he was provided incomplete, cold, and “expired” kosher meals. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4. His FAC is even less specific, and 28 1 Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC continues to fail to state a claim upon 2 which § 1983 relief can be granted and must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 4 D. Supplemental State Law Claims 5 Plaintiff also cites Art. I §§ 1, 3(a), 7(a), and 17 of the California Constitution, as 6 well as various provisions of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations as having been 7 violated. See FAC at 3‒5. 8 To the extent Plaintiff intends to raise independent state law claims for relief, the 9 Court finds they are subject to dismissal without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 10 “In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts 11 shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in 12 the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 13 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 14 However, “once judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental 15 jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., 16 Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district courts may decline to exercise 17 supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— (3) the district court has 18 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 19 Moreover, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before 20 trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. 21 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Thus, because the Court has found Plaintiff’s FAC fails 22 to state any plausible claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it hereby exercises its 23 discretion to dismiss all Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims without prejudice 24 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Id. 25 E. Leave to Amend 26 On November 18, 2019, the Court explained Plaintiff’s various deficiencies, and 27 because it was not absolutely clear he could not cure them by amendment, gave him 28 specific direction in order that he might “use[] the opportunity to amend effectively.” Aktar 1 || v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 2 || 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). Instead, Plaintiff’s FAC offers even fewer factual allegations than 3 ||his original Complaint, and it fails to even minimally address any of the pleading 4 || deficiencies the Court identified for him. Therefore, the Court finds further amendment 5 || would likewise prove futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 6 || (9th Cir. 2014) (‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... leave to 7 ||amend.’’’) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, 8 || LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has 9 || previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite 10 |/particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 11 || particularly broad.” Gnternal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)). 12 Conclusion and Order 13 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without further 14 leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be pursuant to 28 15 || U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be 16 || taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court 17 || to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to close the file. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 || Dated: June 1, 2020 21 22 Hn. John A. Houston 53 Jnited States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 9