Shepard v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedApril 11, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-00357
StatusUnknown

This text of Shepard v. Commissioner of Social Security (Shepard v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shepard v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _______________________________________________

JEREMY S., DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff, 21-CV-0357L

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. ________________________________________________

Plaintiff appeals from a denial of disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). The action is one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to review the Commissioner’s final determination. On January 25, 2019, plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, and for supplemental security income, alleging an inability to work since November 25, 2017. (Administrative Transcript, Dkt. #6 at 15). His applications were initially denied. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held July 14, 2020 via teleconference before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Vincent M. Cascio. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 31, 2020 (Dkt. #8 at 15-26). That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review on February 2, 2021. (Dkt. #6 at 1-3). Plaintiff now appeals. The plaintiff has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c) and requests remand of the matter for further proceedings (Dkt. #7), and the Commissioner has cross moved (Dkt. #9) for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff’s motion is granted, the Commissioner’s cross motion is denied, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. DISCUSSION

Determination of whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act follows a well-known five-step sequential evaluation, familiarity with which is presumed. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986). See 20 CFR §§404.1509, 404.1520. The Commissioner’s decision that a plaintiff is not disabled must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, and if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002). The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s medical records, and concluded that plaintiff had the following severe impairments, not meeting or equaling a listed impairment: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post laminectomy surgery with post laminectomy syndrome; chronic pain syndrome; complex regional pain syndrome; obesity; severe chronic venous

hypertension and congestion; and pelvic varices and pelvic derived venous disease of the lower extremities with chronic venous insufficiency and symptomatic varicose veins. (Dkt. #6 at 17-18). Because plaintiff also claimed to suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and alcohol abuse disorder in remission, the ALJ applied the special technique for mental impairments. He concluded that plaintiff has a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, no limitation in interacting with others, no limitation in concentration, persistence and pace, and no limitation in adapting or managing himself. (Dkt. #6 at 18-19). He accordingly found plaintiff’s mental health impairments to be non-severe, but indicated that his RFC finding “reflects the degree of limitation” determined by application of the special technique. (Dkt. #6 at 22). Plaintiff was 44 years old on the alleged onset date, with a high school education and past relevant work as an industrial truck operator, and mix operator/light and oven operator. (Dkt. #6

at 24). The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, with no more than occasional stooping, balancing, crouching, kneeling, crawling, and climbing of ramps or stairs. Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, nor be exposed to unprotected heights or hazardous machinery. (Dkt. #6 at 20). When presented with this RFC as a hypothetical at the hearing, vocational expert Dawn Blythe testified that such an individual could perform the sedentary unskilled jobs of ticket counter, document preparer, and addresser. (Dkt. #6 at 25). The ALJ accordingly found plaintiff not disabled. I. Medical Opinions of Record Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his assessment of the medical opinions of record with respect to plaintiff’s exertional RFC,1 and that his rejection, in whole or in part, of all of those

opinions resulted in an RFC determination that was unsupported by substantial evidence, and constituted the substitution of layperson opinion for competent medical opinion. The Court concurs. Pursuant to recent amendments to agency regulations, the Commissioner “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.”

1 Plaintiff does not allege, nor does the Court find, that the ALJ committed any errors with respect to his finding that plaintiff did not have any severe mental impairments, and did not require other and further RFC limitations to account for mental symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Rather, the Commissioner will consider all medical opinions in light of five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency with other evidence of record; (3) the source’s relationship with the claimant, including the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, and the nature, purpose and extent of the treating or examining

relationship; (4) area of specialization; and (5) any other factors that “tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). The ALJ must articulate his consideration of the medical opinion evidence, including how persuasive he finds the medical opinions of record, and must specifically explain how the supportability and consistency factors were weighed. See Salleh D. v. Commissioner, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 427 at *9-*11 (W.D.N.Y. 2022). “Although an ALJ may afford various weights to portions of a medical source opinion, the ALJ is still required to provide reasoning to support [his or] her various weight determinations,” in order to permit meaningful judicial review. Yasmine P. v. Commissioner, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154176 at *10 (W.D.N.Y. 2022). A. Medical Opinions Regarding Plaintiff’s Exertional RFC

The record contained medical opinions from three treating or examining physicians, assessing plaintiff’s exertional RFC. Consulting internist Dr. Russell Lee examined plaintiff on April 4, 2019. Dr. Lee noted plaintiff’s self-reported history of nerve pain, nerve damage, disc herniation, back pain exacerbated by prolonged standing, lifting, and bending, and prior spinal surgeries. On examination, Dr. Lee noted a limp favoring the right side, inability to walk on heels and toes, squat reduced to ¼ of normal, reduced range of lumbar spinal motion, positive straight leg raising tests on the left side (both sitting and supine), reduced range of motion and strength in the left ankle, and purple discoloration of the foot with edema up to the mid-calf. Dr. Lee reviewed X-rays of the lumbosacral spine showing mild degenerative changes at L5-4 and moderate degenerative changes at L4-S1.

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Shepard v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shepard-v-commissioner-of-social-security-nywd-2023.