Sheokand v. Mayorkas

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 5, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2919
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VISHWAJEET SHEOKAND,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 23-cv-2919 (DLF)

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff Vishwajeet Sheokand filed a pro se action to compel the U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services and its leaders in their official capacities (“USCIS”) to adjudicate his I-829

petition, which sought the removal of conditions on his lawful-permanent-resident status. Compl.,

Dkt. 1. Before the Court is USCIS’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 4. For the reasons that follow, the

Court will grant the motion.

Intervening events have mooted this action. “A case is moot when the issues presented are

no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Ameziane v. Obama,

620 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). In his October 2023 complaint,

Dkt. 1, Sheokand asked the Court to compel the adjudication of his I-829 petition without further

delay. Compl. at 11–13. But an official government website, USCIS Case Status Online,

https://egov.uscis.gov/, shows that on November 29, 2023, USCIS adjudicated and approved

Sheokand’s I-829 petition, listed as receipt number WAC2190030161. 1 See Compl. ¶ 14; Mot. to

1 At the time of writing, August 2024, the website reflects only the delivery of a receipt. However, USCIS has submitted an earlier record of the website showing the petition’s approval, Mot. to Dismiss at 1, and the plaintiff has lodged no disagreement. Dismiss at 1; see also Menoken v. Miles, 270 F. Supp. 3d 200, 208 (D.D.C. 2017) (“In deciding a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may consider materials outside the pleadings, including public

records from other proceedings that are the subject of judicial notice.” (citation omitted) (cleaned

up)). “Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional authority

extends only to actual cases or controversies.” Ameziane, 620 F.3d at 4 (citation omitted); e.g.,

Nine Iraqi Allies v. Kerry, 168 F. Supp. 3d 268, 277–78 (dismissing claims for visa application

adjudication as moot because the visas had been issued). So too here. Because the plaintiff has

received his requested relief, there is no longer a live controversy. Accordingly, the Court must

dismiss this action as moot.

Sheokand nonetheless maintains that the Court may still grant him relief because he

requested attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A). Opp’n ¶ 1, Dkt. 5; see Compl. at 13. But the EAJA allows the award of attorney’s

fees only to a “prevailing party,” 28 § 2412(d)(1)(A), and the plaintiff has not prevailed by

receiving a favorable “final judgment” in this case. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Nor has he otherwise

prevailed, such as by reaching a settlement with USCIS that Court could enforce or even by

showing that the initiation of his lawsuit spurred USCIS to adjudicate his petition more quickly.

That he “has other claims and exhibits” to present to the Court, see Opp’n ¶ 3, does not alter

Court’s mootness analysis because there is no further relief for the Court to award in this case.

And his assertion that “2000+ other I-829 petitions” are delayed, see id. ¶ 4, does not bear on this

case because he lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of other petitioners. See Lujan v. Defs.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (“[T]he injury-in-fact test requires more than an injury to a

cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”

(citation omitted)).

2 For the reasons stated, it is

ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 4, is GRANTED. The Clerk of

Court is directed to close the case.

________________________

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH August 5, 2024 United States District Judge