Shenzhen Root Technology Co Ltd v. Chiaro Technology Ltd

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 SHENZHEN ROOT TECHNOLOGY Co., CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00631-JHC 8 Ltd., ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 Plaintiff, RECONSIDERATION 10 v. 11 CHIARO TECHNOLOGY Ltd.,

12 Defendant. 13

14 I 15 INTRODUCTION 16 Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. Dkt. # 53. The Court 17 DENIES the motion. 18 II 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Reconsideration of Merits Determination 21 The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order largely because the 22 Court concluded that the harm alleged was not so irreparable as to justify a temporary restraining 23 24 1 order on an emergency basis. See Dkt. # 43 at 7. However, the Court also “tentatively” 2 concluded that, based on the briefing before it, Plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits. Id. 3 While Defendant prevailed on the ultimate issue presented in the motion for a temporary

4 restraining order, Defendant requests modification or clarification of the Court’s order. 5 According to Defendant, Plaintiff provided Amazon a copy of the Court’s order shortly after it 6 was issued. Dkt. # 53 at 3. Based on that order, Amazon re-listed the S12 Pro products. Id. 7 Accordingly, Defendant argues that the Court should “clarif[y] that the Court’s Order should not 8 be interpreted as an order finding that the S12 Pro products do not infringe unless and until the 9 Court is provided full briefing from both parties on the issue of infringement and issues an order 10 finding as much.” Id. at 8. 11 The Court declines to do so. The Court’s order accurately reflected its understanding of 12 the issues at the time the order was issued. To be sure, the Court agrees with Defendant that its

13 decision was based on briefing provided by Defendant on a rushed timeline, and that its merits 14 determination is—as the order states—at most “tentative.” Any third parties are welcome to take 15 such factors into consideration when reading the Court’s order. But the Court does not believe 16 that the actions of either Plaintiff or Amazon justify reconsideration. See LCR 7(h) (“Motions 17 for reconsideration are disfavored. The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of 18 a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling. . . .”). 19 Defendant also says that it “will not have an opportunity to present its infringement 20 positions to the Court for months if not years.” Dkt. # 53 at 5 n.3. This does not justify 21 reconsideration of the Court’s order on Plaintiff’s motion. If Defendant believes it will be 22 irreparably harmed by Plaintiff’s alleged infringement, it may seek whatever relief it deems

23 proper. But it does not justify reconsideration of Plaintiff’s motion. 24 1 Moreover, the Court notes that the current status quo—in which Plaintiff continues to 2 manufacture and sell the accused products—represents a garden-variety patent case. In many 3 patent cases, a patentee must litigate a case to judgment; if successful, a patentee may be entitled

4 to a prospective injunction as well as money damages to compensate for past infringement. 5 Plaintiff’s continued sale of the accused products while the parties litigate this case does not, on 6 its own, justify reconsideration of the Court’s prior order. 7 B. Reconsideration of Jurisdiction Determination 8 In the Court’s order, the Court concluded that “at this stage, the Court is satisfied that it 9 possesses jurisdiction: There appears to be an actual controversy between Plaintiff and 10 Defendant, even if Plaintiff has done business under various English names. So long as the 11 various names refer to the same corporate entity, there does not seem to be a jurisdictional 12 issue.” Dkt. # 45 at 4.

13 Defendant argues that reconsideration is appropriate in light of new facts that contradict 14 Plaintiff’s asserted basis for jurisdiction. Dkt. # 53 at 5 (“[Defendant] continues to accumulate 15 new facts supporting that Plaintiff has not been forthright about its corporate structure and that 16 this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action.”). 17 The Court is, as always, interested in ensuring that it possesses jurisdiction over the 18 proceeding. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an 19 independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”). But while 20 some of the facts raised by Defendants are troubling, they do not alter the Court’s conclusion that 21 “at this stage, the Court is satisfied that it possesses jurisdiction.” Dkt. # 43 at 4 (emphasis 22 added). If Defendant believes the Court lacks jurisdiction, it may argue as such in a proper

23 24 1 motion of its own alleging lack of jurisdiction.! See A.V. by Varela v. Panama-Buena Vista 2 Union Sch. Dist., 292 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“[L]ack of subject matter 3 ||Jurisdiction may be raised by either party at any point during the litigation, through a motion to 4 dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”). 5 Il 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration. Dkt. # 53. 8 Dated this 13th day of June, 2023. 9 ok □□ Chua

1 John H. Chun United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ' Such a motion would also create a briefing schedule that allows for a response by Plaintiff.