Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng'g Co. v. United States

2017 CIT 163
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedDecember 11, 2017
DocketConsol. 14-00106
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 CIT 163 (Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng'g Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng'g Co. v. United States, 2017 CIT 163 (cit 2017).

Opinion

Slip Op. 17-163

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SHENYANG YUANDA ALUMINUM INDUSTRY ENGINEERING CO., YUANDA USA CORP., JANGHO CURTAIN WALL AMERICAS CO., PERMASTEELISA NORTH AMERICA CORP., PERMASTEELISA SOUTH CHINA FACTORY, AND PERMASTEELISA HONG Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge KONG LTD., Consol. Court No. 14-00106 Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

OPINION

[Remand results sustained.]

Dated: December 11, 2017

James R. Cannon, Jr., Cassidy Levy Kent (USA) LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for Plaintiffs Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Industry Engineering Co. and Yuanda USA Corporation. With him on the brief was Thomas M. Beline.

Kristen S. Smith, Arthur K. Purcell, and Michelle L. Mejia, Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A., of Washington, DC, for Consolidated Plaintiff Jangho Curtain Wall Americas Co., Ltd.

William E. Perry and Emily Lawson, Harris Bricken McVay LLP, of Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Intervenors Permasteelisa North America Corp., Permasteelisa South China Factory, and Permasteelisa Hong Kong Limited.

Douglas G. Edelschick, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for the Defendant United States. With him on the brief were Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel was Scott D. McBride, Assistant Chief Counsel for Trade Consol. Court No. 14-00106 Page 2

Enforcement and Compliance, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.

David M. Spooner, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for Defendant-Intervenors Walters & Wolf, Architectural Glass & Aluminum Company, and Bagatelos Architectural Glass Systems, Inc. With him on the brief was Christine J. Sohar Henter.

Gordon, Judge: This action involves a challenge to a U.S. Department of

Commerce (“Commerce”) scope determination for the antidumping and countervailing

duty orders (together, “Orders”) on aluminum extrusions from the People’s Republic of

China (“PRC”). See Aluminum Extrusions from the PRC, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Dep’t of

Commerce May 26, 2011) (antidumping duty order) (“AD Order”); Aluminum Extrusions

from the PRC, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011) (countervailing

duty order) (“CVD Order”); see also Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping and

Countervailing Duties Against Aluminum Extrusions from the PRC, PD 841 (Mar. 31,

2010), ECF No. 33 (“Petition”).

Consolidated Plaintiffs Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Industry Engineering

Company and Yuanda USA Corporation (together, “Yuanda”); Permasteelisa North

America Corp., Permasteelisa South China Factory, and Permasteelisa Hong Kong

Limited (together, “Permasteelisa”); and Jangho Curtain Wall Americas Company, Ltd.

(“Jangho,” and collectively with Permasteelisa and Yuanda, “Plaintiffs”), challenge a

scope ruling in which Commerce determined that Yuanda’s unitized curtain wall, i.e.,

a complete curtain wall, unitized and imported in phases pursuant to a sales contract

1 “PD” refers to the public administrative record, and “CD” refers to the confidential administrative record. Consol. Court No. 14-00106 Page 3

(“subject merchandise”), was within the scope of the Orders. Aluminum Extrusions from

the PRC, A-570-967 & C-570-968 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 27, 2014) (final scope ruling

on curtain wall units that are produced and imported pursuant to a contract to supply

curtain wall), ECF No. 34-1 (“Yuanda Scope Ruling”).

Before the court are Commerce’s Final Results of Third Redetermination,

ECF No. 133 (“Third Remand Results”), issued pursuant to Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum

Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 40 CIT ___, 181 F. Supp. 3d 1348 (2016). Plaintiffs

challenge the Third Remand Results. See Consolidated Pls.’ Joint Comments on

Commerce’s Third Remand Redetermination (Feb. 16, 2017), ECF No. 138

(“Pls.’ Comments”); see also Def.’s Resp. to Comments Regarding Third Remand

Redetermination (Apr. 3, 2017), ECF No. 143 (“Def.’s Resp.”); Defendant-Intervenors’

Response Comments to Pls.’ Comments on Commerce’s Third Results of Remand

Redetermination (Apr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 150 (“Def.-Intervenors’ Comments”).

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(vi) of the Tariff Act of

1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2012),2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)

(2012).

I. Standard of Review and Legal Framework

The court sustains Commerce’s “determinations, findings, or conclusions” unless

they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). More specifically, when reviewing

2 Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition. Consol. Court No. 14-00106 Page 4

agency determinations, findings, or conclusions for substantial evidence, the court

assesses whether the agency action is reasonable given the record as a whole. Nippon

Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (“The substantiality of evidence must

take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.”) Substantial

evidence has been described as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” DuPont Teijin Films USA v. United States,

407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.

197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence has also been described as “something less than

the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions

from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being

supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620

(1966). Fundamentally, though, “substantial evidence” is best understood as a word

formula connoting reasonableness review. 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and

Practice § 9.24[1] (3d ed. 2017). Therefore, when addressing a substantial evidence issue

raised by a party, the court analyzes whether the challenged agency action

“was reasonable given the circumstances presented by the whole record.” 8A West’s Fed.

Forms, National Courts § 3.6 (5th ed. 2017).

The language of the order is the “cornerstone” of a scope analysis and “a predicate

for the interpretive process.” Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1097

(Fed. Cir. 2002). Commerce first considers the scope language of the order itself,

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