J-A25020-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
SHALINI SHENOY, INDIVIDUALLY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE : PENNSYLVANIA OF VIJENDRA SHENOY : : Appellant : : v. : : ALAN U. GLAZER, M.D., AKUMIN : A/K/A AKUMIN, INC., AKUMIN : CORP., AKUMIN HOLDINGS CORP., : JEANES RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, : LLC, (JEANES RADIOLOGY : ASSOCIATES, P.C.), TRI-STATE : IMAGING CONSULTANTS (TRI-STATE : IMAGING CONSULTANTS, LLC, TRI- : STATE IMAGING GROUP, LP, TRI- : STATE IMAGING PARTNERS, LP, TRI- : STATE IMAGING PR, LLC, TRI STATE : IMAGING PARTNERS GP, LLC, TRI- : STATE IMAGING PA HOLDINGS, LLC, : TRI-STATE IMAGING INVESTMENTS : LP, TRI-STATE IMAGING : INVESTMENTS GP, LLC, TRI-STATE : No. 3120 EDA 2024 IMAGING SOLUTIONS, LLC) :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 31, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-02498
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2026
Shalini Shenoy (“Plaintiff”), individually and as executrix of the estate
of Vijendra Shenoy (“Decedent”), appeals from the judgment entered against
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A25020-25
her and in favor of Alan U. Glazer, M.D., upon a jury verdict in this action for
medical malpractice.1 We affirm.
The underlying facts are as follows. Decedent received a prescription
from his oral surgeon for a CT scan “due to complaints of jaw pain and
swelling.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/25, at 1. Dr. Glazer was the radiologist
who read the scan, which consisted of hundreds of images that captured not
only Decedent’s mouth and jaw area, but also parts of his head, neck, and
upper chest. See N.T. Trial (Vol. IV), 8/8/24, at 34-43.2 While he reported
observing a nodule “representing a prominent lymph node” in portions of the
1 Plaintiff also sued various business entities (hereafter “Corporate Defendants”), alleging that they were vicariously liable through respondeat superior for Dr. Glazer’s purported negligence. The jury’s determination that Dr. Glazer was not negligent thus resolved her claims against the Corporate Defendants. See, e.g., Mamalis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 560 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1989) (“[T]ermination of the claim against the agent extinguishes the derivative claim against the principal. A claim of vicarious liability is inseparable from the claim against the agent since any cause of action is based on the acts of only one tortfeasor.”).
2 There are irregularities in the identification of the trial transcripts. From the parties’ briefs, we have determined that Volume III contains the notes of testimony from August 7, 2024, although it purports to be an additional volume for August 6. Also, the transcript for the August 8, 2024 proceedings is not included in the certified record, but an excerpt of it containing Dr. Glazer’s testimony is included in the reproduced record as Volume V. Meanwhile, the certified record contains notes of testimony from August 12, 2024, also labeled as Volume V. We refer to Volume III as reporting the August 7 proceedings, and deem the August 8 excerpt to be Volume IV, accepting the copy included in the reproduced record since there is no apparent dispute as to its accuracy. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, Note.
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soft-tissue images of Decedent’s chest, Dr. Glazer did not note any lesions
there in his September 2017 report. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/25, at 1.
In 2019, upon seeking medical attention for chest pain, Decedent was
diagnosed with a chondrosarcoma in his chest wall. 3 He sued Dr. Glazer for
negligence, alleging that a suspicious 2.4 centimeter lesion had been visible
on the 2017 CT scan and Dr. Glazer failed to report it. Decedent passed away
while the litigation was pending, and Plaintiff amended the complaint to state
survival and wrongful death claims, averring that the delayed diagnosis
caused Decedent’s demise.
Plaintiff’s liability expert at trial was Marc Glickstein, M.D. Dr. Glickstein
opined that the standard of care for a radiologist is to review every image
included in the CT study in various types of windows, i.e. densities. See N.T.
Trial (Vol. II), 8/6/24, at 29. While the radiologist should “look at the area
that would be of interest for the scan,” which in this instance was the parotid
gland that produces saliva for the mouth, he should “also go back and look at
all of the images again for other findings that may be present in different parts
of the examination that was not the main focus of the study.” Id. Dr.
3 As one of Plaintiff’s witnesses explained at trial, “chondrosarcomas are tumors [that] generally originate from the cartilage and tend to grow in areas that have heavy cartilage or bone.” N.T. Trial, 8/6/24 (Vol. II), at 80. Further, “chondrosarcomas, like most sarcomas, are not really sensitive to chemotherapy and radiation.” Id. Rather, “the only way to treat sarcomas in general and chondrosarcomas specifically for a good, long-term result is to completely remove it. So the earlier it is detected, the more likely you are to be able to remove it.” Id. at 80-81.
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Glickstein discerned that Dr. Glazer had done so, as he noted a nodule that
was in the chest at the same level as the tumor which was ultimately
discovered in 2019. Dr. Glickstein indicated that the “fairly large lesion” was
visible on the 2017 images and was “not . . . particularly subtle[.]” Id. at 40.
As such, he believed Dr. Glazer should have reported the lesion, and his failure
to do so constituted negligence. Id. at 43-44.
On cross-examination, Dr. Glickstein conceded that the failure to
appreciate or perceive an abnormality does not necessarily indicate a
deviation from the standard of care. Id. at 45. He also acknowledged the
existence of: (1) framing bias, which can make a doctor more alert to discern
something he otherwise might not appreciate based upon who presented the
study to him; and (2) hindsight bias, which may cause a radiologist to note
something on imaging that he expects it to be present, knowing the patient’s
outcome. Id. at 45-46, 48. Dr. Glickstein recognized that practice
parameters promulgated by the American College of Radiology, of which he
was a member, suggested than an “expert witness should make every effort
to avoid being influenced by hindsight and framing biases.” Id. at 54. In that
vein, the practice guidelines provide: “The expert witness should strive to
minimize all potential sources of conscious and subconscious bias when
reviewing case materials. Images and other relevant material presented in a
blinded fashion to the expert in a malpractice lawsuit strengthens the
credibility of the opinion rendered by the expert.” Id. at 56.
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Dr. Glickstein agreed that one way to avoid these biases is to employ
blinding techniques, such as having a lawyer send multiple CT studies rather
than the one at issue, or embedding the studies within the expert’s clinical
work so he is unaware that he is conducting a legal review. Id. at 49. Yet,
while he had done blinded reviews in other cases, in the case sub judice he
received Decedent’s file “in a totally unblinded fashion.” Id. at 50.
Consequently, he (1) knew that a review of Decedent’s CT images had been
requested by an attorney, (2) reviewed the materials with access to
information about the case that was unavailable to Dr. Glazer in 2017, and
(3) authored a report that “focused on something [he] knew to be present
based on . . . information derived after the fact[.]” Id. at 60.
Dr. Glazer was called to testify both in Plaintiff’s case in chief and in his
own defense. Overall, he agreed with Dr. Glickstein’s testimony about the
standard of care, but he maintained that he had satisfied it in reviewing
Decedent’s 2017 study. Specifically, Dr. Glazer attested that he possessed
the knowledge and skill required of radiologists and kept current with
developments within his specialty. See N.T. Trial (Vol. IV), 8/8/24, at 52-53.
In reviewing Decedent’s CT scans, Dr. Glazer went through every image of the
study in its entirety in various windows, spending more time examining the
images than was typical for him. Id. at 50; N.T. Trial (Vol. III), 8/7/24, at
42, 47. While he was retrospectively able to point out at trial part of a lesion
visible at the bottom of the scan in the soft-tissue window, given the
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information of Decedent’s later imaging studies, Dr. Glazer simply did not
appreciate the abnormality in 2017. See N.T. Trial (Vol. IV), 8/8/24, at 44-
45. He suggested that the same framing bias that made the lesion so obvious
to Dr. Glickstein in reviewing the study for Plaintiff’s attorneys may account
for his own failure to discern it when he examined the images for Decedent’s
oral surgeon:
Well, the framing for this whole report and for the review of the study was for a right cheek lesion and a right cheek enlargement swelling. So[,] in my mind’s eye, that’s what I’m geared towards. So[,] although I reviewed the studies, the images, I didn’t appreciate it at the time. I don’t deny that it’s there in retrospect.
Id. at 45.
In addition to offering the above testimony, both radiologists utilized the
2017 CT study in front of the jury at trial. As such, the jury was able to view
the images and perceive how subtle or obvious the lesion appeared. The jury
further heard causation and damages evidence from various expert and lay
witnesses.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that Dr. Glazer was not
negligent, obviating the need for it to make findings as to causation, damages,
or the vicarious liability of the Corporate Defendants.
Plaintiff filed a post-trial motion seeking a new trial on the basis that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff further contended
that an investigation into possible juror improprieties was warranted based
upon the following allegation:
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[A] juror, who identified herself as a nurse[,] purportedly advised her fellow jurors that that she did not believe she would have seen the abnormality in the imaging study either (just as Dr. Glazer. . . missed it) and therefore his missing the abnormality in the study was not negligent, but rather just an acceptable mistake.
Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 8/22/24, at 3. After entertaining briefing by the
parties and oral argument, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion without a
hearing.
This timely appeal followed the entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict.
The trial court ordered Plaintiff to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and she
timely complied.4 The trial court authored a responsive opinion in accordance
with Rule 1925(a). Plaintiff presents two questions for our consideration:
1. Whether it was abuse of discretion to deny [Plaintiff]’s motion for a new trial where the jury’s verdict was inadequate and manifestly against the weight of the evidence given that: it was uncontroverted that [Dr. Glazer] failed to identify a 2.4 cm tumor on a CT scan which continued to grow undetected for two years and ultimately led to [D]ecedent’s death; [Plaintiff]’s experts testified that [Dr. Glazer] breached the standard of care by failing to note the tumor; [Dr. Glazer’s] evidence to refute this was completely inadequate and no expert testimony regarding liability was produced at trial by the defense; and the jury’s determination that [Dr. Glazer] was not negligent was so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice.
2. Whether it was abuse of discretion to deny [Plaintiff]’s motion to consider juror misconduct where there was a showing of improper influence on the jurors which caused them to fail to follow the trial court’s instructions, to fail to apply the facts to the law, and to fail to be impartial. This showing was sufficient
4 We remind the trial court that all Rule 1925(b) orders must indicate the addresses to which the statement may be mailed and served by hand-delivery. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii).
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to trigger a hearing to evaluate the alleged misconduct and to determine whether it likely prejudiced [Plaintiff].
Plaintiff’s brief at 4-5.
We begin with the legal principles which govern Plaintiff’s weight claim.
“A verdict is against the weight of the evidence where certain facts are so
clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with
all the facts is to deny justice.” Heffelfinger v. Shen, 342 A.3d 711, 725
(Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up). “[I]n reviewing a challenge to the weight of
the evidence, a verdict will be overturned only if it is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. (cleaned up).
It is well-settled that “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for a new
trial based upon a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. (cleaned up). The trial
court’s rejection of a weight challenge “is one of the least assailable reasons
for denying a new trial.” Id. (cleaned up). This Court’s standard of review is
not to evaluate the underlying weight claim, but to assess the trial court’s
exercise of discretion, and we “may not overturn the trial court’s decision
unless the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight
claim.” Id. (cleaned up). In this vein:
The term discretion imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not merely an error of
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judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
In re M.B., 228 A.3d 555, 567 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).
In the instant case, the trial court addressed Plaintiff’s weight challenge
by revisiting the testimony of Drs. Glickstein and Glazer and concluding that
it presented the jury with an adequate basis to find for either side. Citing Dr.
Glickstein’s concessions that “the standard of care for a radiologist does not
require perfection and the fact that an abnormality was not appreciated or
perceived by a radiologist does not necessarily mean the radiologist was
negligent[,]” the court opined that “[t]he jury was not required to accept Dr.
Glickstein’s opinion that Dr. Glazer violated the standard of care.” Trial Court
Opinion, 1/8/25, at 6-7 (cleaned up). Since the jury thus could have
reasonably rejected Dr. Glickstein’s opinion as to negligence, and instead
embraced Dr. Glazer’s testimony that he conducted a competent review, the
court’s conscience was not shocked by the verdict. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff argues that her evidence compellingly demonstrated, and the
defense failed to controvert, that Dr. Glazer breached his duty of care to
Decedent by not identifying and reporting the lesion in 2017. She contends
that Dr. Glazer’s self-serving testimony, plus the specter of possible framing
or hindsight bias on the part of Dr. Glickstein, “was so vague, nebulous[,] and
deficient” a defense “that it ‘shocks the conscience’ to receive a verdict that
found Dr. Glazer not negligent.” Plaintiff’s brief at 45.
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Plaintiff posits that this Court’s decision in Vallone v. Creech, 820 A.2d
760 (Pa.Super. 2003), illustrates her right to relief. In that case, a cancer
patient who had a breast lumpectomy in 1991 presented to the defendant
doctor in October 1996, complaining of pain and changes in the shape of her
breast. The doctor informed her that the changes were most likely due to
radiation therapy and advised her to follow up every three months. By the
time the doctor ordered a biopsy and confirmed the recurrence of the cancer
fourteen months later, the patient had to have a double mastectomy and
undergo chemotherapy to treat it, drastically decreasing her chance of
surviving more than five years.
The patient’s experts opined that the failure to order a biopsy when the
patient first presented fell below the standard of care, given her history of
cancer and the changes in her breast. The defense expert testified that the
doctor complied with the standard of care because there was no need to order
a biopsy at that point. However, the defendant doctor admitted in his trial
testimony that, at the time the patient first presented, “he believed there was
a 20% chance the cancer had recurred, yet he did nothing to confirm that
suspicion until approximately [fourteen] months later.” Id. at 763 (emphasis
omitted).
The jury nonetheless returned a verdict for the doctor, and the patient
moved for a new trial. The trial court granted the motion, having deemed the
defense verdict shocking to its conscience. It explained:
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[I]t is clear beyond reasonable dispute that failure of [the doctor] to order a biopsy of [the patient’s] right breast for approximately fifteen months after first noting changes in it that he admitted could have been cancerous substantially increased [her] risk of harm, and decreased her chances of surviving five more years (the standard definition of cancer cure) from perhaps 90% to zero.
Id. at 764 (cleaned up). Given the doctor’s conscious decision not to act upon
a perceived substantial chance that the patient’s cancer had returned, the trial
court concluded that “there was no rational explanation for the jury verdict in
this case.” Id. at 762 (cleaned up). The doctor appealed the trial court’s
exercise of discretion in awarding the new trial, but we declined to grant relief,
deeming the court’s assessment of the evidence to be apt.
Dr. Glazer argues that the facts of Vallone are materially
distinguishable from the circumstances of the instant appeal. He explains:
Here, unlike [in] Vallone, no evidence was presented at trial that Dr. Glazer appreciated the lesion on the CT and disregarded it in 2017 when he originally reviewed the images. On the contrary, Dr. Glazer testified he did not appreciate the lesion at that time despite performing a thorough review of the CT films, and spending adequate time reviewing the films. Plaintiff’s own expert admitted that the fact that an abnormality was not appreciated or perceived by a radiologist does not necessarily mean the radiologist was negligent.
Dr. Glazer’s brief at 31. We agree.
Critically, the Vallone Court was presented with an appeal from the trial
court’s decision to grant, not deny, a new trial upon finding merit in the weight
claim. The doctor-appellant in that case failed to meet his considerable burden
of convincing us that the ruling was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion,
and we therefore affirmed the trial court’s ruling. In asking us to reverse the
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trial court’s ruling in the instant case, Plaintiff’s invocation of Vallone
unsuitably speaks to the underlying question of whether the verdict was
shocking, rather than whether the trial court’s exercise of discretion was
founded upon “reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice
or arbitrary actions.” In re M.B., 228 A.3d at 567 (cleaned up).
We find no such defect in the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for
a new trial in this case. First, we note that there was no suggestion that Dr.
Glazer lacked the training and experience necessary to review Decedent’s CT
images, employed inappropriate techniques in doing so, or chose not to report
any abnormality that he in fact had observed. Instead, as our recitation above
indicates, Plaintiff’s case wholly rested upon the jury accepting Dr. Glickstein’s
opinion that the appearance of the lesion was so obvious that Dr. Glazer’s
failure to recognize it amounted to negligence.
To counter that theory, the defense elicited testimony that, while the
abnormality may have been obvious when viewed through hindsight and
framing biases, it was subtle enough that Dr. Glazer’s failure to observe and
report it was not a deviation from the standard of care. The jury hence had a
rational basis to discredit Dr. Glickstein’s opinion that the failure to appreciate
and communicate it amounted to negligence, concluding instead that Dr.
Glazer had not been perfect, but had operated within the bounds of reasonable
care.
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Consequently, the trial court’s conclusion that the verdict was not
conscience-shocking because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
for either side was founded upon reason and supported by the record, and
thus, was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Plaintiff’s weight claim merits
no relief. See Heffelfinger, 342 A.3d at 725 (“An appellate court may not
overturn the trial court’s decision unless the trial court palpably abused its
discretion in ruling on the weight claim.” (cleaned up)).
Plaintiff’s remaining question involves the trial court’s refusal to hold a
hearing on her allegations of juror misconduct, namely that “the foreperson
and other nurse juror provided ‘expert-like’ opinions to the jury.” Plaintiff’s
brief at 61. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff had no right to develop her claim
at a hearing because “it was based solely on evidence of interactions among
the jurors themselves and not by exposure to any extraneous or outside
information.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/25, at 10.
Plaintiff again presents us with an issue subject to review for an abuse
of discretion. See Pratt v. St. Christopher’s Hosp., 866 A.2d 313, 324 (Pa.
2005) (“The procedure for development of such claims and their ultimate
disposition remain vested, in the first instance, within the sound discretion of
the trial courts.”).
The competency of a juror to testify as a witness during an inquiry into
the validity of a verdict is governed by Pa.R.E. 606, which in pertinent part
states:
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(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
(A) prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.
Pa.R.E. 606(b). The official comment to the rule elucidates that exception
(2)(A) “is directed at evidence brought before the jury which was not
presented during the trial, and which was not tested by the processes of the
adversary system and subjected to judicial screening for a determination of
admissibility.” Pa.R.E. 606, Comment. “The qualification of ‘common
knowledge and experience’ is a recognition that all jurors bring with them
some common facts of life.” Id.
This Court recently reiterated that, “under the exceptions to the no-
impeachment rule, a juror may testify only as to the existence of the
extraneous information or outside influence, but not as to the effect this may
have had on deliberations. Under no circumstances may jurors testify about
their subjective reasoning processes.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 345 A.3d
332, 336 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up). Rather, upon proof that the jury
was exposed to outside information or influence, the court applies an objective
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test to ascertain whether it prejudiced the verdict. See Pratt, 866 A.2d at
322 (“Since inquiry into the actual, subjective mental processes of the jurors
is not permitted, the limited-scope, objective inquiry furnishes the most
reasonable methodology for evaluating the impact of extraneous information
and outside influence.”).
For example, Pratt was a medical malpractice action founded upon a
doctor’s failure to timely diagnose an infection, with the plaintiffs asserting
that a CAT scan should have been ordered by the doctor earlier. Two weeks
after the jury reached a defense verdict, one of the jurors sent a letter to the
trial judge “indicating that, during deliberations, she had learned from several
other jurors that they had discussed the case with outside medical
professionals, who were friends, relatives and/or personal physicians.” Id. at
314–15. The court provided the letter to counsel, and the plaintiffs sought
post-trial relief nunc pro tunc raising the question of “whether a hearing
and/or a new trial was warranted on account of the allegation of taint relative
to the jury deliberations.” Id. at 315. The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that, while the juror was not foreclosed from testifying about
extraneous information brought to bear on deliberations, her “letter did not
contain a sufficient indication of prejudice to warrant a hearing or new trial.”
Id. at 316.
This Court reversed and remanded for a hearing, and our Supreme Court
affirmed that order:
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As the Superior Court concluded, the circumstances of the present case squarely implicate the extraneous-information exception, since [the plaintiffs] alleged inappropriate contact with outside medical professionals. Furthermore, it is not controverted that the asserted, improper communications pertained to a central, disputed issue in the case, namely, the applicable medical standard of care and, more specifically, whether a CAT scan was implicated at an early stage of the medical evaluation of [the plaintiffs’] son. The Superior Court therefore correctly held that juror testimony was not foreclosed concerning whether or not the alleged communications occurred, regarding their range and content, and as to whether they were in fact injected into the jury deliberations.
Id. at 321 (citations omitted).
Our High Court further agreed that the trial court abused its discretion
in declining “to hear juror testimony and evaluate it according to the objective
test for prejudice[,]” observing that the trial court’s rationale “essentially
would put verdicts beyond effective reach, even in instances in which jury
deliberations are alleged to have been tainted by outside sources. Such
irregularities, however, are verifiable without undue inquiry into the actual
deliberative processes of jurors.” Id. at 321-22. Therefore, the case went
back to the trial court for it to conduct a hearing regarding the accuracy of the
juror’s allegations, “the character and extent of any information conveyed,
and whether recipients were majority or minority jurors[.]” Id. at 324.
Hence, Pratt establishes that an evidentiary hearing is warranted in the
face of allegations that jury deliberations may have been influenced by outside
information, beyond common knowledge or experience, on a central issue in
the case. Accord Commonwealth v. Jeter, 296 A.3d 1187 (Pa.Super. 2023)
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(holding trial court abused its discretion in denying a request for an evidentiary
hearing where a party alleged that one of the jurors had talked about the case
with her father during jury deliberations because she was having difficulty
deciding how to vote, and she ultimately voted guilty as a result of the
discussions).
On the other hand, this Court affirmed the denial of an evidentiary
hearing in Hall.5 There, Hall was convicted of repeatedly raping his daughter
in the house where they lived with Hall’s wife and two other children. He did
not testify in his defense or offer other family members as fact or character
witnesses. He sought a post-trial “evidentiary hearing predicated on a proffer
that, at his trial, the jury foreperson made statements during the deliberation
process to other jurors that purportedly indicated [that Hall] had a prior
criminal record.” Hall, 345 A.3d at 334. More particularly, the foreperson,
who was an attorney, allegedly “either suggested or implied that if someone
doesn’t call a character witness in their defense in a jury trial, that means they
have prior criminal convictions.” Id. at 337 (cleaned up). Significantly, “Hall’s
counsel did not suggest that the jury violated the sequestration rules by doing
outside research, but rather utilized external information outside the realm of
what is typically possessed by a layperson.” Id. (cleaned up).
5 The Hall decision was published after the parties filed their briefs. Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental briefing to address Hall, but withdrew her request before we ruled upon it.
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While Hall maintained that these circumstances were akin to those that
warranted a hearing in Pratt, we disagreed:
Pratt is eminently distinguishable to the present matter because it involved jurors, while empaneled in a medical malpractice case, having discussions with outside medical professionals, who were friends, relatives, and/or personal physicians. More recently, in Jeter, a decision where this Court found a partial abuse of discretion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, there had been an allegation that, during jury deliberations, one of the jurors, inter alia, was having a difficult time deciding what to do and discussed the case with her father, resulting in an ultimate decision to vote guilty. We determined that the prejudice threshold had been met to warrant further investigation to determine whether that juror’s father provided the juror with prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience or improperly brought to bear an outside influence on her.
Here, juxtaposed against his concession that none of the jurors performed outside research prior to reaching their collective verdict, Hall’s argument necessarily stems from the preexisting knowledge or supposition of an attorney juror. Despite this contention, even assuming that there was a communication from the foreperson to at least one other juror that resembles Hall’s proffer, he has failed to provide any indication, or citation to authority, that the juror’s statement was anything more than speculation on that juror’s behalf. Without anything to corroborate the juror’s effective hunch that the absence of character witnesses suggested a prior criminal record, there was no prejudicial information or outside influence within their respective evidentiary meanings.
Hall, 345 A.3d at 337-38 (cleaned up).
Furthermore, we held that Hall failed to establish that the alleged
extraneous information was beyond common knowledge and experience, since
Hall “presented no authority to establish that the inclusion or omission of
character witnesses, and the attendant effects of those decisions, falls
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squarely within the exclusive domain of an attorney’s capacity for
understanding, and falls outside the ken of laypersons and/or lay jurors.” Id.
at 338 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Hall Court ruled “that the proffered testimony merely
delved into the deliberative process, which may not be reached.” Id.
Moreover, “although the attorney foreperson may have conveyed to one or
more jurors that Hall’s trial strategy was possibly purposeful based on a
potential criminal record, it was not predicated on objective, outside
information that was beyond common knowledge and experience.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court’s decision.
In the instant case, Plaintiff maintains that “all the factors needed to
trigger a hearing to investigate jury improprieties are present here.” Plaintiff’s
brief at 62. She asserts that the alleged improper statements related to a
central issue in the case. While she acknowledges that there is no indication
that any independent research was conducted, she argues:
[T]he scenario presented in this case is more prejudicial than the one presented in Pratt where the jurors spoke with outside friends and family who were involved in the medical profession: here, the information came from within the jury room from jurors who were themselves involved in the medical profession. Thus, the source of the extraneous information was sitting and arguing in the jury room, unlike with the Pratt jurors. Practically speaking, it would be very hard for a juror who was not a medical professional to argue against the foreperson who said she, as a nurse, would not have seen the tumor on a CT scan and therefore Dr. Glazer’s failure to see it was not negligence. The influence on the jury on a crucial component of the negligence claim—whether Dr. Glazer’s failure to see the tumor was a breach of the standard
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of care—from an overly confident medical professional on the jury likely tainted the jury’s deliberations.
Id. at 62-63.
If Plaintiff had alleged that a juror consulted with other doctors or
authorities that indicated Dr. Glazer’s failure to notice Decedent’s lesion had
been an acceptable error within the standard of care, we would agree that she
was entitled to a hearing in accordance with Pratt and the cases from other
jurisdictions upon which she relies. See Plaintiff’s brief at 58-61 (citing cases
in which jurors did independent research to inform their decisions). 6 Yet, that
is not the scenario presented in this appeal.
What is before this Court is far more analogous to the situation in Hall.
Here, as in Hall, a juror offered an opinion on the evidence that was grounded
in the juror’s professional experience. The alleged statement reflected the
juror’s personal assessment of the trial record, not “objective, outside
information that was beyond common knowledge and experience.” Hall,
345 A.3d at 338 (emphasis in original). Just as each Hall juror may have
notions as to the reason for the defense’s decision not to call character
witnesses, here each member of the jury saw Decedent’s CT images during
6 Plaintiff additionally cites a case involving a prospective juror’s expertise on
an issue in the case rather than outside research. See Plaintiff’s brief at 60- 61 (citing Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1997)). However, that case involved whether the court should have granted a mistrial based upon the potential taint of the jury pool who overheard the voir dire of the prospective juror conducted on the record in court, not an intrusion into jury deliberations that is governed by Pa.R.E. 606.
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trial and could ponder whether he or she would have noticed it. The statement
of one juror that she would not have seen it does not constitute prejudicial
outside information beyond the ken of laypersons improperly brought to the
jury’s attention, such that the juror could testify about it in accordance with
Pa.R.E. 606(b)(2). Rather, the evidence proffered by Plaintiff concerns the
juror’s opinion of the trial evidence and her “mental processes concerning the
verdict.”7 Pa.R.E. 606(b)(1). Rule 606(b)(1) precludes Plaintiff from calling
the juror to testify about the statements. Hence, the trial court did not err in
denying her request for a hearing.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to persuade us that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her post-trial relief on either of her issues.
Therefore, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
Date: 2/10/2026
7 To the extent that other jurors may have been more inclined to be persuaded
by this juror because she was a medical professional, that concern was addressable during the jury selection process through for-cause or peremptory challenges. Accord Hall, at 345 A.3d at 338 n.3 (observing that “a possible way of staving off complaints associated with jurors” whose training may impact the deliberations process is to not put them on the jury in the first place).
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