Shenonovich Sore Lyonsscott v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 10, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00290-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00290-CR ___________________________

SHENONOVICH SORE LYONSSCOTT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1577986

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Shenonovich Sore Lyonsscott appeals from the trial court’s

judgment revoking his community supervision. In two points, he contends that the

fine and restitution assessed in the judgment should be deleted because they were not

orally pronounced by the trial court at the revocation hearing. Because the record

reflects that the fine and restitution obligation were imposed at Lyonsscott’s original

plea proceeding, we will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In February 2019, Lyonsscott was indicted for the third-degree felony offense

of driving while intoxicated, third or more. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.09(b)(2).

In March 2019, he pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and was placed on

community supervision for a period of ten years.1 As part of the plea bargain, the

judgment of conviction imposed a $1,000.00 fine and a $550.00 restitution obligation.

In July 2023, the State filed its Second Amended Petition to Revoke

Community Supervision in which it alleged that Lyonsscott had violated the terms of

his community supervision by (1) committing another felony driving-while-intoxicated

offense in July 2023, (2) failing to successfully complete the Substance Abuse Felony

1 The judgment reflected that Lyonsscott was sentenced to ten years’ confinement but that this sentence was suspended and that he would instead be placed on community supervision for this ten-year period as long as he did not violate the applicable terms and conditions.

2 Punishment Facility (SAFPF) aftercare program, and (3) failing to successfully

complete the SAFPF re-entry court program.

In August 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke

Lyonsscott’s community supervision. Lyonsscott pleaded “true” to all three

allegations. Based on these pleas, the trial court found the allegations to be true and

sentenced Lyonsscott to eight years’ confinement. The judgment revoking

Lyonscott’s community supervision ordered him to pay a fine of $847.20 and

restitution in the amount of $220.00.2 This appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

In two points, Lyonsscott contends that the fine and restitution assessed in the

judgment revoking his community supervision should be deleted because they were

not orally pronounced by the trial court at the revocation hearing. We disagree.

Restitution and fines are punitive in nature and therefore must be included in

the oral pronouncement of a defendant’s sentence. See Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d 511,

516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366–67 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (providing that

“sentence shall be pronounced in the defendant’s presence”). When there is a conflict

2 As discussed below, the fine and restitution obligation were not probated, and Lyonsscott’s community-supervision conditions required him to make payments towards these obligations. The fine and restitution amounts reflected in the judgment revoking his community supervision appear to be the outstanding balances Lyonsscott owed after crediting the amounts that he had paid during his community-supervision period.

3 between the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the written judgment, the oral

pronouncement controls. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

But in the probation-revocation context, the trial court need not orally

pronounce a fine at the revocation hearing if it was originally imposed in the

defendant’s presence when he pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. See Coffey

v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, if the record

demonstrates that a fine was imposed (and not probated) when the trial court assessed

punishment at a defendant’s plea proceeding, then that fine may be appropriately

included in the written judgment revoking probation even if the trial court did not

orally pronounce it at the revocation hearing.3 See id.

Here, the 2019 judgment of conviction imposed both a $1,000.00 fine and a

$555.00 restitution payment and explicitly stated that the fine was “[n]ot [s]uspended.”

The plea agreement, which was signed by Lyonsscott and his attorney, reflected the

$1,000.00 fine and the $550.00 restitution obligation. And the community-supervision

conditions, which Lyonsscott also signed, required him to pay the restitution

3 We note that this rule applies only to cases (like this one) involving “straight” or “regular” probation—i.e., cases in which the trial court adjudicates the defendant guilty and imposes a sentence but suspends it—not to cases involving deferred- adjudication probation. See Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502; January v. State, No. 13-23- 00247-CR, 2024 WL 1451223, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 4, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “[W]hen a defendant is placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision which is later revoked, any fine assessed at the original plea hearing must be re-pronounced at the time of adjudication.” January, 2024 WL 1451223, at *3; see Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502; McCoy v. State, 81 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d).

4 obligation at the rate of $10.00 per month and to pay the $1,000.00 fine pursuant to a

“[p]ayment schedule to be determined by the District Clerk of Tarrant County,

Texas.”

Because the record reflects that the non-probated fine and restitution

obligation were imposed at Lyonsscott’s original plea proceeding, the trial court

properly included their remaining balances in its judgment revoking his community

supervision even though it did not orally re-pronounce them at the revocation

hearing. See Coffey, 979 S.W.2d at 329; January, 2024 WL 1451223, at *3; Jones v. State,

No. 06-21-00048-CR, 2021 WL 4780221, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 14, 2021,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Accordingly, we overrule both of Lyonsscott’s points.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Lyonsscott’s points, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment revoking his community supervision.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 10, 2025