FIRST DIVISION ELLINGTON, C. J., PHIPPS, P. J., and DILLARD, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. (Court of Appeals Rule 4 (b) and Rule 37 (b), February 21, 2008) http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
June 7, 2012
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A12A0713. BROWN v. THE STATE.
DILLARD, Judge.
Following trial, a jury convicted Sheneka Brown on one count of cruelty to
children in the first degree based on her failure to seek medical treatment for her 22-
month-old son after her boyfriend beat the child. Brown appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in denying her motions in limine to redact portions of a recording of her
interview by police and to exclude evidence that she continued her relationship with
her boyfriend after the incident. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict,1 the evidence
shows that on July 31, 2009, Brown and her 22-month-old son, L. B., were staying
1 See, e.g., Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga. App. 330, 330-31 (682 SE2d 671) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). with Brown’s boyfriend, Quinton Smith, at a home that Smith shared with his mother.
At some point that afternoon, Smith came into the bedroom where Brown had been
sleeping and where L. B. was currently playing on the floor and told Brown that he
had a headache and wanted to sleep. Subsequently, Smith told L. B. to be quiet, but
when L. B. continued to play, Smith grabbed the child by his right arm, carried him
over his shoulder into the kitchen, and began striking L. B. with a belt. Although she
could hear Smith yelling at L. B. and striking him as the child cried, Brown did not
intervene but instead asked Smith’s mother to do so. A moment or so later, Brown
could hear that L. B. had stopped crying. Assuming that L. B. was okay, Brown went
back to sleep without checking on him.
A few hours later, Brown woke up, walked into the kitchen, and found that L.
B. was there by himself, standing in a corner. Brown then took L. B. back into the
bedroom where they both went back to sleep. But an hour or so later, Brown woke
up to the sound of L. B. crying as if he was hurt. After Brown asked L. B. what was
wrong, L. B. indicated that his arm hurt, and Brown noticed that he had welts on his
body. However, instead of seeking medical attention for L. B., Brown gave him a bath
and called a friend who often babysat L. B. to see if L. B. could stay at the friend’s
2 house for a little while. When the friend agreed, Brown dropped L. B. off at the
friend’s home and then returned to Smith’s residence.
A day and a half later, on August 2, 2009, Brown’s friend called Brown and
told her that L. B.’s arm was hurt and that he needed to go to the hospital. As a result,
Brown took L. B. to a local hospital where he was examined by an emergency-room
physician, who discovered that the child had significant bruises all over his back and
legs. The physician also noticed that L. B. had a limited range of motion in his right
shoulder and would cry in pain when that shoulder was touched. Although x-rays did
not indicate that he had any broken bones, the physician believed that L. B. may have
suffered soft tissue damage to his right shoulder. And based on the fact that L. B.’s
injuries were consistent with him having suffered physical abuse, the physician
contacted the police and the local Department of Family and Children Services
(“DFCS”).
Following a police interview, Brown was arrested and indicted on one count
of cruelty to children in the first degree.2 Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion in limine
to redact portions of her recorded interview by police and a motion to exclude
2 See OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) (“Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.”).
3 evidence that she had continued her relationship with her boyfriend. But after a
hearing on the issues and the trial court’s review of the interview recording, the court
denied both motions.
During Brown’s trial, the police officer who was called to the hospital testified
regarding his investigation of the matter and regarding his interview of Brown, in
which she admitted to being aware that Smith had beaten L. B. with a belt. The
unredacted, digitally recorded video of that interview was entered into evidence and
played for the jury. The State also called the DFCS caseworker as a witness, and the
case worker testified that she had established a safety plan for Brown and L. B.,
which required that Brown have no further contact with Smith, but that Brown had
refused to comply with that aspect of the plan. The emergency-room physician also
testified at trial regarding L. B.’s injuries and that those injuries were consistent with
him having suffered physical abuse. In addition, Smith’s mother testified concerning
Brown’s reactions to Smith’s abuse of L. B., and Brown’s friend and her sister
testified as to Brown’s eventual decision to seek medical treatment for L. B. Finally,
Brown testified in her own defense that although she heard Smith “whooping” L. B.,
she did not initially seek medical treatment for the child because she did not think that
4 he was seriously injured. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of her trial, the jury found
Brown guilty. This appeal follows.
1. Brown contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to
redact portions of the digital video recording of her interview by police. Specifically,
she argues that the coarse and inflammatory language directed toward her by the
interrogating office during the latter portion of the interview should have been
redacted because it was irrelevant and prejudicial. We disagree.
At the outset, we note that “[i]n reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, this
Court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s
findings and judgment, and we cannot reverse a trial court’s ruling absent an abuse
of discretion.”3 In this matter, during the latter part of the recording of Brown’s
interview by the investigating police officer, the officer, who was obviously
unsatisfied with Brown’s responses, began raising his voice and using profanity.
Specifically, the officer questioned Brown’s abilities as a mother and, at one point,
stated that he would likely find L. B.’s body in a dumpster one day if the child was
ever reunited with Brown.
3 Hood v. State, 291 Ga. App. 881, 882 (663 SE2d 297) (2008).
5 On appeal, Brown argues that the officer’s inflammatory remarks constituted
irrelevant opinions and were prejudicial. Once again, we disagree.
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that police officers’ comments during
interrogations do not constitute sworn witness testimony.4 Indeed, law-enforcement
interrogations are, “by their very nature, attempts to determine the ultimate issue and
the credibility of witnesses.”5 And comments made during the course of such an
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FIRST DIVISION ELLINGTON, C. J., PHIPPS, P. J., and DILLARD, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. (Court of Appeals Rule 4 (b) and Rule 37 (b), February 21, 2008) http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
June 7, 2012
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A12A0713. BROWN v. THE STATE.
DILLARD, Judge.
Following trial, a jury convicted Sheneka Brown on one count of cruelty to
children in the first degree based on her failure to seek medical treatment for her 22-
month-old son after her boyfriend beat the child. Brown appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in denying her motions in limine to redact portions of a recording of her
interview by police and to exclude evidence that she continued her relationship with
her boyfriend after the incident. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict,1 the evidence
shows that on July 31, 2009, Brown and her 22-month-old son, L. B., were staying
1 See, e.g., Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga. App. 330, 330-31 (682 SE2d 671) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). with Brown’s boyfriend, Quinton Smith, at a home that Smith shared with his mother.
At some point that afternoon, Smith came into the bedroom where Brown had been
sleeping and where L. B. was currently playing on the floor and told Brown that he
had a headache and wanted to sleep. Subsequently, Smith told L. B. to be quiet, but
when L. B. continued to play, Smith grabbed the child by his right arm, carried him
over his shoulder into the kitchen, and began striking L. B. with a belt. Although she
could hear Smith yelling at L. B. and striking him as the child cried, Brown did not
intervene but instead asked Smith’s mother to do so. A moment or so later, Brown
could hear that L. B. had stopped crying. Assuming that L. B. was okay, Brown went
back to sleep without checking on him.
A few hours later, Brown woke up, walked into the kitchen, and found that L.
B. was there by himself, standing in a corner. Brown then took L. B. back into the
bedroom where they both went back to sleep. But an hour or so later, Brown woke
up to the sound of L. B. crying as if he was hurt. After Brown asked L. B. what was
wrong, L. B. indicated that his arm hurt, and Brown noticed that he had welts on his
body. However, instead of seeking medical attention for L. B., Brown gave him a bath
and called a friend who often babysat L. B. to see if L. B. could stay at the friend’s
2 house for a little while. When the friend agreed, Brown dropped L. B. off at the
friend’s home and then returned to Smith’s residence.
A day and a half later, on August 2, 2009, Brown’s friend called Brown and
told her that L. B.’s arm was hurt and that he needed to go to the hospital. As a result,
Brown took L. B. to a local hospital where he was examined by an emergency-room
physician, who discovered that the child had significant bruises all over his back and
legs. The physician also noticed that L. B. had a limited range of motion in his right
shoulder and would cry in pain when that shoulder was touched. Although x-rays did
not indicate that he had any broken bones, the physician believed that L. B. may have
suffered soft tissue damage to his right shoulder. And based on the fact that L. B.’s
injuries were consistent with him having suffered physical abuse, the physician
contacted the police and the local Department of Family and Children Services
(“DFCS”).
Following a police interview, Brown was arrested and indicted on one count
of cruelty to children in the first degree.2 Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion in limine
to redact portions of her recorded interview by police and a motion to exclude
2 See OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) (“Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.”).
3 evidence that she had continued her relationship with her boyfriend. But after a
hearing on the issues and the trial court’s review of the interview recording, the court
denied both motions.
During Brown’s trial, the police officer who was called to the hospital testified
regarding his investigation of the matter and regarding his interview of Brown, in
which she admitted to being aware that Smith had beaten L. B. with a belt. The
unredacted, digitally recorded video of that interview was entered into evidence and
played for the jury. The State also called the DFCS caseworker as a witness, and the
case worker testified that she had established a safety plan for Brown and L. B.,
which required that Brown have no further contact with Smith, but that Brown had
refused to comply with that aspect of the plan. The emergency-room physician also
testified at trial regarding L. B.’s injuries and that those injuries were consistent with
him having suffered physical abuse. In addition, Smith’s mother testified concerning
Brown’s reactions to Smith’s abuse of L. B., and Brown’s friend and her sister
testified as to Brown’s eventual decision to seek medical treatment for L. B. Finally,
Brown testified in her own defense that although she heard Smith “whooping” L. B.,
she did not initially seek medical treatment for the child because she did not think that
4 he was seriously injured. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of her trial, the jury found
Brown guilty. This appeal follows.
1. Brown contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to
redact portions of the digital video recording of her interview by police. Specifically,
she argues that the coarse and inflammatory language directed toward her by the
interrogating office during the latter portion of the interview should have been
redacted because it was irrelevant and prejudicial. We disagree.
At the outset, we note that “[i]n reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, this
Court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s
findings and judgment, and we cannot reverse a trial court’s ruling absent an abuse
of discretion.”3 In this matter, during the latter part of the recording of Brown’s
interview by the investigating police officer, the officer, who was obviously
unsatisfied with Brown’s responses, began raising his voice and using profanity.
Specifically, the officer questioned Brown’s abilities as a mother and, at one point,
stated that he would likely find L. B.’s body in a dumpster one day if the child was
ever reunited with Brown.
3 Hood v. State, 291 Ga. App. 881, 882 (663 SE2d 297) (2008).
5 On appeal, Brown argues that the officer’s inflammatory remarks constituted
irrelevant opinions and were prejudicial. Once again, we disagree.
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that police officers’ comments during
interrogations do not constitute sworn witness testimony.4 Indeed, law-enforcement
interrogations are, “by their very nature, attempts to determine the ultimate issue and
the credibility of witnesses.”5 And comments made during the course of such an
interview “and designed to elicit a response from a suspect do not amount to opinion
testimony, even when a recording of the comments is admitted at trial.” 6 Furthermore,
such comments should only be excluded “if the probative value of the comments is
outweighed by their tendency to unduly arouse the jury’s emotions of prejudice,
hostility or sympathy.”7
And here, the inflammatory language about which Brown complains had
probative value. Indeed, after the officer began employing this caustic method of
4 See Hames v. State, 278 Ga. 182, 184 (3) (598 SE2d 459) (2004). 5 Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 723 (3) (642 SE2d 640) (2007); see Hames, 278 Ga. at 184 (3). 6 Roberts v. State, 313 Ga. App. 849, 851 (2) (723 SE2d 73) (2012). 7 Id. (punctuation omitted).
6 interrogation, Brown admitted that she had, in fact, heard Smith striking L. B. with
a belt and also heard the child crying but did not intervene. As we have previously
emphasized, “[a]ny evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or disprove
any material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving
to elucidate or throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant.”8 Moreover, the
prejudicial effect of admitting these remarks seems minimal. At the conclusion of the
interview, the investigating officer arrested Brown. Thus, it would hardly have been
surprising to the jury that the officer believed Brown committed an act of cruelty to
her child. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
unredacted recording of Brown’s interview.9
2. Brown also maintains that the trial court erred in denying her motion in
limine to exclude evidence that she continued her relationship with Smith even after
Smith’s abuse of L. B., arguing that such evidence impermissibly placed her character
into evidence. We find this argument unavailing.
8 Ward v State, 274 Ga. App. 511, 513 (3) (618 SE2d 154) (2005) (punctuation omitted). 9 See Roberts, 313 Ga. App. at 851-52 (2) (holding that police officer’s confrontational interview style, which included stating that he believed defendant raped the victim, was nevertheless more probative than prejudicial, and thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting unredacted interview of defendant).
7 It is well established that “Georgia law favors the admission of any relevant
evidence, no matter how slight its probative value, and even evidence of questionable
or doubtful relevancy or competency should be admitted and its weight left to the
jurors.”10 Furthermore, evidence which is relevant to an issue in a case “is not
rendered inadmissible by the fact that it incidentally puts the defendant’s character
in issue.”11 And here, the DFCS caseworker who investigated this matter testified that
Brown chose to continue living with Smith—the very person who had abused her
child—even though doing so defied the safety plan that the caseworker established
and, therefore, hurt Brown’s chances of being reunited with L. B. Although Brown
argues that this evidence was improperly admitted, the caseworker’s testimony was
relevant to show the State’s theory as to Brown’s state of mind close in time to the
incident of abuse—that is, that Brown valued her relationship with Smith more than
she valued the safety and well-being of her own child. Accordingly, the trial court did
10 Ward, 274 Ga. App. at 513-14 (3). 11 Butler v. State, 266 Ga. 537, 538 (1) (468 SE2d 369) (1996) (punctuation omitted).
8 not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion in limine to exclude such
evidence.12
Judgment affirmed. Ellington, C. J., and Phipps, P. J., concur.
12 See id. (holding that statements by witness that defendant had been considering robbery were relevant to show defendant’s state of mind close in time to charged crimes and were therefore admissible despite putting defendant’s character in issue).