Sheltrown v. Michigan Central Railroad

222 N.W. 163, 245 Mich. 58, 1928 Mich. LEXIS 1077
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 4, 1928
DocketDocket No. 112, Calendar No. 33,999.
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 222 N.W. 163 (Sheltrown v. Michigan Central Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheltrown v. Michigan Central Railroad, 222 N.W. 163, 245 Mich. 58, 1928 Mich. LEXIS 1077 (Mich. 1928).

Opinion

Sharpe, J.

This action is brought to recover the damages sustained by plaintiff, due to a personal injury while in the employ of defendant. He had verdict for $7,000. The record discloses that a judgment was entered thereon on the following day. The court, however, afterwards, on defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, set aside the verdict and the judgment and entered one fox; *60 the defendant. Plaintiff seeks review by writ of error.

1. It is insisted that the motion for a directed] verdict had npt been reserved by the court and that the judgment first entered is a bar to the after proceeding. It appears in the record that at the conclusion of the proofs one of defendant’s counsel said to the court:

“We move the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant now at the close of plaintiff’s testimony, for the reason that the plaintiff in this case assumed the risk, he being in charge and having selected his own tools to do the work in question in this case.”

After argument the court said:

“In regard to the motion, the court is somewhat impressed with defendant’s contention, but the disposal of it will be deferred, and, if necessary, counsel may submit a brief, and the case will be submitted to the jury.”

While the court did not say, in the language of the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14568), that he reserved decision upon the motion, he clearly gave counsel to understand that he did so. The judgment thereafter was inadvertently entered. It does not appear that plaintiff’s counsel objected to the consideration of the motion for this reason. The court had the power to set it aside as he did, and enter judgment on the motion. Kintz v. Galvin, 219 Mich. 48; Stanaback v. McFadden, 225 Mich. 452.

2. Negligence of Defendmt. Plaintiff entered the employ of the defendant at Bay City, a junction point on defendant’s road, on August 25, 1922. He was engaged in inspecting and repairing cars and “all kinds of different work around the yards,” He *61 occasionally used jacks for raising ears while there. About a year later he was transferred to Owosso. He had no superior officer at that place. His duty was to inspect and make repairs on cars passing through that station or received by the defendant from the other railroads which cross defendant’s line at that point.. He was provided with a tool house in which to store the tools and appliances needed in his work. The key to the lock on this building was in his possession. His work was done under the supervision of the foreman at the Bay City yards, who was seldom, however, at Owosso. He would make .requisition for such tools as he needed in his work. He recalled sending two jacks to Bay City for repairs. He had three jacks in his tool house ' at the time of his injury.

On November 23, 1925, he received an order to go to Bennington to put a new brass into a car which had been placed on a side track. He put such tools and brasses as he thought he would need, including the jack in question, on a motor car provided for his use, and went there and was engaged in this work when he was injured. Plaintiff testified that he raised the car by placing a jack under the journal box on both sides of it, and put the new brass in and started to lower the jack; that it “slipped and broke and struck me on the hand and knee. It came out with a force around out this way, the entire jack and handle;” that he then discovered—

“there was an old crack, about two-thirds across. Eight from the top of the stem and cap, across on a slant. About two-thirds of the cap was broken off. It was an old break — the other third was just a kind of corner out all the way along, and broke right out, gave out with the other two-thirds, kind of ragged like. All the way I could determine that would be *62 an old break, would be black and rusty, and a new break would be kind of a white or silver color. About two-thirds of it was an old break.
“ Q. Now, was that crack one that you could see without a minute inspection?
“A. Well, it might with a close inspection, but not the — I have never had any orders for inspection on that.”

The “jack” is thus described:

“The jack is about 14 inches in height, has a base of about 8 inches across the bottom, is about 3% or 4 inches across the top of the stem, and works on a screw arrangement on the inside of the jack at the base of the jack. This screw is worked by the ratchet being pumped up and down with a handle that is inserted into the socket of the jack.”

The nature of this tool and the manner in which it is operated is so well known, as it is part of the standard equipment of automobiles, that further explanation is unnecessary.

The negligence of which plaintiff complains is a lack of inspection of the broken jack on the part of the defendant.

It is elementary that the duty devolves upon the master, not only to furnish his servant with reasonably safe machinery and appliances with which to perform the work required of him, but he must also, by inspection from time to time, and by ordinary care and diligence in making repairs, keep them in a safe condition. Anderson v. Railroad Co., 107 Mich. 591. To this rule there is an exception in the case of simple tools.

“Where the tool is simple in construction, so that defects therein can be discovered without special skill or knowledge and without intricate inspection, the servant is as well qualified as anyone else to do *63 teet defects and to judge of the probable danger of using such tool while defective; and, the tool being in the possession of the servant, his opportunity for inspection is better than that of the master.” 18 R. C. L. p. 563.
“And so, also, a master is under no obligation to his servants to inspect during their use those common tools and appliances with which everyone is familiar; nor is it the master’s duty to repair defects arising in the daily use of an appliance, for which proper and suitable materials are supplied, and which may easily be remedied by the workmen.” 39 C. J. p. 419.

In Wachsmuth v. Electric Crane Co., 118 Mich. 275, 279, it was said:

“We have decisions sustaining the doctrine that a master must provide safe appliances, and that he must use reasonable diligence in keeping them in repair.

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Bluebook (online)
222 N.W. 163, 245 Mich. 58, 1928 Mich. LEXIS 1077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheltrown-v-michigan-central-railroad-mich-1928.