Shelton, Bethany v/ Hobbs Enterprise, LLC

2020 TN WC 53
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJune 5, 2020
Docket2017-06-2203
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 53 (Shelton, Bethany v/ Hobbs Enterprise, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shelton, Bethany v/ Hobbs Enterprise, LLC, 2020 TN WC 53 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE BETHANY SHELTON, ) Docket No. 2017-06-2203 Employee, ) V. ) HOBBS ENTERPRISES, LLC, ) State File No. 72450-2017 Employer, ) And ) NORGUARD INSURANCE ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker COMPANY, ) Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER

The Court held a compensation hearing on June 2, 2020, to determine if Ms. Shelton is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for a shoulder injury she allegedly suffered while emptying a trash can at work. For the reasons below, the Court concludes she is not entitled to benefits, denies her request for relief, and dismisses her claim with prejudice.

Claim History

This case concerned a claim for a shoulder injury. Ms. Shelton worked for Hobbs, a company owning several gas stations, as a cashier and assistant-manager trainee at the company’s station on McGavock Pike near the Opryland Hotel. Her duties as a cashier and trainee included assisting customers, keeping the store clean, stocking the cooler and emptying trash. It was this last duty that resulted in this claim.

On August 26, 2017, while emptying an outdoor trash can near the gas pumps, Ms. Shelton said she “felt something, a sharp pain,” in her right shoulder while removing the trash from the can. She told her coworker, another assistant-manager trainee, about the incident, and also told the district manager that she “pulled something.” She did not ask for treatment at that time. About a month before the work accident, Ms. Shelton suffered a car accident that caused her some pain, and she began seeing Dr. Trung Nguyen. Dr. Nguyen noted a little over a week before the work accident that Ms. Shelton complained of “right shoulder pain starting about a month ago.” When asked about this complaint, Ms. Shelton testified she was having muscle spasms in her shoulder and denied it was related to her workplace accident.

Less than a week after the alleged injury, Ms. Shelton returned to Dr. Nguyen, still complaining about her shoulder. She had an MRI, and after reading the results, Dr. Nguyen suggested Ms. Shelton see a specialist, Dr. Sean Kaminsky.

Ms. Shelton took the MRI report and recommendation to Mary Leedy, her direct supervisor. Ms. Leedy completed paperwork to report the claim to Hobbs’s management. She also agreed to alter Ms. Shelton’s schedule and reduce the amount of heavy lifting she had to do on the job.

After Hobbs received notice of the claim, Deanna Nelson, Hobbs’s office manager, reported the claim to the insurance company, and Ms. Shelton received a panel of physicians. Ms. Shelton said she tried to see one of the panel doctors three times but was declined treatment. About a month after Ms. Shelton received the physician panel, Hobbs fired her.

After her termination, Ms. Shelton went to see Dr. Kaminsky, who diagnosed her with several conditions: osteoarthritis, complete rotator-cuff tear, degenerative labrum tear, and “bicipital tendinitis.” Dr. Kaminsky surgically repaired her shoulder and released her with a five-percent impairment rating to the body as a whole.

Dr. Kaminsky gave the only expert testimony on causation, and both parties relied on his opinion to support their positions. On direct examination, Dr. Kaminsky stated that Ms. Shelton’s lifting incident “may have exacerbated some underlying shoulder abnormalities” and further agreed that the history of her injury was “consistent” with his diagnosis.

On cross-examination, defense counsel presented Dr. Kaminsky with medical records showing Ms. Shelton complained of shoulder pain that began one month before the alleged injury. When asked how this information impacted his opinion on what caused Ms. Shelton to need shoulder surgery, Dr. Kaminsky said:

She-in her notes she told me she had an injury on August 26th that initiated her pain. I do see some information to the contrary, that she was having some shoulder pain that preceded that. It may be contributions from both pre-existing and/or those findings. It’s a little bit difficult to say. She definitely had some chronicity to both the arthroscopic and imaging findings of her shoulder.

Redirect examination failed to clarify the issue, as Dr. Kaminsky said only that “it’s possible” when asked whether lifting a bag of trash exacerbated an underlying shoulder condition so that it required surgery.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Ms. Shelton requested temporary and permanent-partial disability benefits as well as continuing medical care for her shoulder. While both parties provided proof conceming the claim’s history and circumstances of Ms. Shelton’s termination, the threshold requirement is that she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her shoulder injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment to receive any benefits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2019); Panzarella v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 244, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel, May 16, 2018). She failed to carry this burden.

An injury arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment only if the employee shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the injury, considering all causes. To prove this, Ms. Shelton must show by “a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the employment contributed more than fifty percent” to the cause of her injury. “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty means that, in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(B)-(D). The “speculation or possibility” portion of the statute is key in this claim.

Dr. Kaminsky provided the only cauation opinion, and his opinion was far from concrete. On examination from Ms. Shelton’s counsel, Dr. Kaminsky said that the history Ms. Shelton described was consistent with his diagnosis. However, he went on to say only that the workplace accident “may have exacerbated some underlying shoulder abnormalities.” On redirect, he stayed the course by stating “it’s possible” that lifting the bag of trash exacerbated an underlying shoulder problem. And on cross-examination, when presented the medical records from Dr. Nguyen showing prior shoulder complaints, he stated “it’s a little bit difficult to say” whether the degenerative, preexisting condition or the work accident caused the need for surgery.

The Tennessee Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Panel has considered several cases with similar medical testimony and denied relief, deeming the testimony speculative or uncertain. Most similar to Ms. Shelton’s case, in Willis v. All Staff, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 455, at *14 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 22, 2017), the Panel held that the doctor’s testimony stating that work acitivies “could have,”

3 “possibly,” or “in theory” caused the employee’s knee injury was “insufficient” to satisfy the preoponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

As the Panel ruled in Willis, the Court will also rule here. The Court finds that Dr. Kaminsky’s testimony is insufficient to satisfy the perponderance standard. Because Ms. Shelton bore the burden of proof and failed to satisfy it, the Court denies her request for relief and dismisses her claim with prejudice to its refiling.

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. The Court denies Ms. Shelton’s request for relief and dismisses her claim with prejudice to its refiling.

2. This order shall become final thirty days after entry absent an appeal.

3.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)(B)
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(c)(6)

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Bluebook (online)
2020 TN WC 53, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shelton-bethany-v-hobbs-enterprise-llc-tennworkcompcl-2020.