Shellye Qrewanda Hall v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 30, 2024
• Docket: 02-24-00011-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00010-CR No. 02-24-00011-CR No. 02-24-00012-CR No. 02-24-00013-CR No. 02-24-00014-CR No. 02-24-00015-CR No. 02-24-00016-CR No. 02-24-00017-CR No. 02-24-00018-CR No. 02-24-00019-CR No. 02-24-00020-CR No. 02-24-00021-CR No. 02-24-00022-CR No. 02-24-00023-CR No. 02-24-00024-CR ___________________________

SHELLYE QREWANDA HALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 1640717, 1695342, 1718559, 1765668, 1766019, 1766528, 1766531, 1766785, 1770925, 1771122, 1771482, 1771633, 1773183, 1765666, 1765786

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

2 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Shellye Qrewanda Hall pleaded guilty, without the benefit of a plea bargain, to

16 separate offenses: three robberies––each a second-degree felony; one burglary of a

habitation––a second-degree felony; one theft of items valued at $2,500 or more but

less than $10,000––a state-jail felony; eight theft of items valued at less than $2,500––

each a state-jail felony (because she had two prior theft convictions); one fraudulent

use or possession of identifying information––a state-jail felony; one failure to identify

as a fugitive––a class A misdemeanor; and one criminal trespass––a class B

misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.02, 30.02(a)(1), (c)(2), 30.05(a)(1),

(d)(1), 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A), (e)(4)(D), 32.51(b)(1), (c)(1), 38.02(b), (d)(2). Following a

punishment hearing, the trial court assessed Hall’s punishment at 15 years’

confinement for each of the robberies and the burglary, one year of confinement for

each of the theft offenses and for the fraudulent-use-or-possession offense, and 30

days’ confinement for the failure to identify and for the criminal trespass. The trial

court sentenced her accordingly and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Hall

timely filed one notice of appeal from all 16 judgments.

After reviewing the records and concluding that no arguable grounds for the

appeals exist, Hall’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the

requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the entire record

3 demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See id., 87 S. Ct. at 1400.

Counsel also complied with the requirements set forth in Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d

313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding that appointed counsel must provide his

client with copies of motion to withdraw and Anders brief, inform her of the right to

file a pro se response and to review the appellate record, take concrete measures to

facilitate the client’s access to the appellate record, and inform his client of the right to

seek discretionary review pro se if the court of appeals determines the appeal is

frivolous).

Although given the opportunity to do so, Hall has not filed a response to the

Anders brief on her own behalf. Likewise, the State declined to file a response.

We have independently examined the appellate records, as is our duty upon the

filing of an Anders brief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.);

see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). After carefully

reviewing the records and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that––but for a

minor modification to the costs assessed in the judgment for trial court cause number

1765666 (one of the trial court’s two misdemeanor judgments)––these appeals are

wholly frivolous and without merit.

Each of the trial court’s misdemeanor judgments impose $270 in court costs

and a $5 reimbursement fee. But “[i]n a single criminal action in which a defendant is

convicted of two or more offenses or of multiple counts of the same offense, the

4 court may assess each court cost or fee only once against the defendant.” Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.073(a); Johnson v. State, Nos. 02-23-00090-CR, 02-23-00091-

CR, 02-23-00092-CR, 02-23-00093-CR, 2024 WL 1318238, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Mar. 28, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, we

will delete the erroneously assessed court costs and reimbursement fee in the

judgment for cause number 1765666, the class B misdemeanor criminal trespass. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.073(b) (“In a criminal action described by

Subsection (a), each court cost or fee . . . must be assessed using the highest category

of offense that is possible based on the defendant’s convictions.”); Santoro v. State,

Nos. 02-18-00039-CR, 02-18-00040-CR, 2018 WL 3153564, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Aside from this minor correction, our independent review of the records

reveals nothing that might arguably support the appeals. See Bledsoe v. State, 178

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685

n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, modify the judgment in cause number

1765666 to delete the $270 court costs and $5 reimbursement fee, affirm that

judgment as modified, and affirm the remainder of the trial court judgments.

5 /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 30, 2024