Shelley Walker v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 17, 2014
Docket12-12-00379-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Shelley Walker v. State (Shelley Walker v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shelley Walker v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

NO. 12-12-00379-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

SHELLEY WALKER, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Shelley Walker appeals her conviction for injury to a child. She raises three issues on appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND Appellant and her husband, Kenneth Neal Walker, are the biological grandparents of B.W., N.W., and T.W., whom they adopted in December 2010. B.W. is the youngest of the three children. On February 28, 2012, she sustained second degree burns to the top and bottom of her feet that required medical treatment and hospitalization. Thereafter, a Smith County grand jury indicted the Walkers for the offense of injury to a child. The Walkers pleaded not guilty to the charge, and a joint jury trial was held. The jury found them both guilty of the offense, made an affirmative deadly weapon finding, and assessed punishment at twenty-five years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.1

1 Appellant requested that counsel be appointed to represent her on appeal because she was indigent. The trial court appointed the same attorney to represent Appellant and Kenneth in each appeal. Appellate counsel explained in court that he was not aware of any conflict of interest in representing both of the Walkers. The trial court judge then asked Appellant whether she was “agreeable” to having the same appellate counsel represent her that will also be representing her husband on appeal and whether she waived any conflict of interest arising from the appointment. Appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Appellant’s first two issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. In her first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict. In her second issue, she contends that the evidence is insufficient “to support the jury verdict that this was serious bodily injury.” Standard of Review When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The reviewing court defers to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight of their testimony. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. A jury is permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id. A “presumption” is a legal inference that a fact exists if the facts giving rise to the presumption are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 16. An “inference” is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them. Id. “Speculation” is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. Id. A conclusion reached by speculation may not be completely unreasonable, but it is not sufficiently based on facts or evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Inference stacking is impermissible; thus, when we apply the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that determination. Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 687 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; 99 S. Ct. at 2793).

2 The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the state’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. As set forth by the indictment in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about February 28, 2012, in Smith County, Texas, Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to [B.W.], a child 14 years of age or younger, by holding [B.W.] in hot liquid thereby causing burns to [B.W.’s] feet and legs.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014).

INTENT TO COMMIT INJURY TO A CHILD In her first issue, Appellant argues that the controverted testimony presented at trial makes the evidence legally insufficient to establish each element of the offense, specifically, the intent to commit injury to a child. The State contends that the cumulative force of the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to prove that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused injury to B.W. Applicable Law Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct, but to the result of that conduct. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Thus, the question is not whether Appellant’s conduct was intentional or knowing, but whether the result of that conduct, B.W.’s injury, was intentional or knowing. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750; Zuniga v. State, 393 S.W.3d 404, 412 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d). Under the penal code, (a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of [her] conduct or to a result of [her] conduct when it is [her] conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of [her] conduct or to circumstances surrounding [her] conduct when [s]he is aware of the nature of [her] conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of [her] conduct when [s]he is aware that [her] conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

3 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a), (b) (West 2011). Knowledge and intent may be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Kelley v. State, 968 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, no pet.); Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Hooper v. State
214 S.W.3d 9 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Williams v. State
235 S.W.3d 742 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Clayton v. State
235 S.W.3d 772 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Collins v. State
548 S.W.2d 368 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1976)
Malik v. State
953 S.W.2d 234 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Kelley v. State
968 S.W.2d 395 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Wilson v. State
71 S.W.3d 346 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Hernandez v. State
819 S.W.2d 806 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Brooks v. State
323 S.W.3d 893 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Stuhler v. State
218 S.W.3d 706 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Alvarado v. State
704 S.W.2d 36 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Martinez v. State
844 S.W.2d 279 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Darty v. State
709 S.W.2d 652 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1986)
Garcia, Aima Lorena
367 S.W.3d 683 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2012)
Carlos Zuniga v. State
393 S.W.3d 404 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2012)

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Shelley Walker v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shelley-walker-v-state-texapp-2014.