Shelley Barnes and Cameron Barnes v. CDM Rentals, LLC

CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMay 12, 2023
Docket21-0854
StatusPublished

This text of Shelley Barnes and Cameron Barnes v. CDM Rentals, LLC (Shelley Barnes and Cameron Barnes v. CDM Rentals, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Shelley Barnes and Cameron Barnes v. CDM Rentals, LLC, (iowa 2023).

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–0854

Submitted November 17, 2022—Filed May 12, 2023

SHELLEY BARNES and CAMERON BARNES,

Appellants,

vs.

CDM RENTALS, LLC,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty,

Judge.

Tenants appeal the district court’s summary judgment ruling concluding

a condominium owner-landlord owed no duty of care with respect to a

downspout that discharged water directly onto a shared driveway. DECISION

OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT

AFFIRMED.

Per curiam. McDermott and May, JJ., took no part in the consideration or

decision of the case.

Steve Hamilton (argued) and Molly M. Hamilton of Hamilton Law Firm,

P.C., Clive, for appellants.

Scott K. Green (argued) and Kelly W. Otto (until withdrawal), Madison,

Wisconsin, for appellee. 2

PER CURIAM.

In 2003, Brook Run, L.C., developed a neighborhood of condominiums

near Brook Run Park in Des Moines. The condominiums are subject to a

horizontal property regime pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 499B (2021). That

regime, in turn, is governed by a document called the declaration. See id.

§§ 499B.3–.4. A company called CDM Rentals, LLC, purchased a condominium

in Brook Run Park. On September 17, 2015, CDM began leasing the

condominium to Shelley and Cameron Barnes.

The Barneses’ unit, number 107, had a garage that let out onto a shared

driveway. A rain gutter ran along the roof above the shared driveway. The rain

gutter downspout came down the front of the condominium such that it was

positioned on the line dividing the Barneses’ unit from the neighboring unit,

number 106. Because it was placed in this manner, the downspout let out

directly onto the middle of the shared driveway rather than letting out onto grass

or bare ground on the side of the unit. A picture of the downspout situated

between units 106 and 107 appears below: 3

During the winter in early 2019, water from the building’s roof drained out

the downspout onto the shared driveway. Cold temperatures caused the water

to freeze. On February 19, 2019, Ms. Barnes slipped and fell on the resulting ice.

On January 8, 2021, the Barneses filed a negligence lawsuit against CDM.

Their petition alleged Ms. Barnes suffered severe and permanent injuries,

incurred medical costs, and experienced pain and loss of body function. The

petition also alleged Cameron was deprived of Ms. Barnes’s companionship. The

homeowners’ association (HOA) was not named as a defendant. CDM answered,

denying liability. It claimed it could not be liable as a matter of law because it

does not own the property where the injury allegedly occurred.

On April 19, CDM filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court

heard argument on the summary judgment motion during a hearing on June 2.

Then, on June 15, the district court granted CDM’s motion. The court framed

the legal issue as whether CDM had control over the common areas. It reasoned

that control was a prerequisite for liability under both the common law and

Iowa’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), Iowa Code

ch. 562A. CDM lacked control over the common areas because the declaration

expressly reserved the responsibilities of maintenance, repairs, and

replacements for the HOA and forbade unit owners from doing those things.

The Barneses filed a timely appeal, which we transferred to the court of

appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court on three grounds. First,

the court of appeals agreed CDM had no common law duty to keep the driveway

clear because it had no control over the driveway. Second, the court of appeals 4

concluded CDM owed no contractual duty to keep the driveway clear because

the lease did not require it to clear the driveway of ice or snow. Last, the court of

appeals determined the Barneses failed to show CDM owed a statutory duty

under the URLTA because they did not cite duty-creating language in the URLTA.

The Barneses applied for further review. We granted their application, and

we now vacate the court of appeals opinion and affirm the district court.

Regarding premises liability, we agree with both the district court and the

court of appeals. The declaration forbids CDM from maintaining, repairing, or

replacing the driveway or the downspout, and that fact strongly suggests CDM

lacked control over the driveway. The Barneses did not adduce enough evidence

or present sufficient arguments to convince us otherwise. The plain fact is that

at common law liability is premised on control, and CDM lacked control of the

driveway and downspout under the declaration. See Allison v. Page, 545 N.W.2d

281, 283 (Iowa 1996) (explaining, for premises liability purposes, landlords’

“liability is premised upon control”).

As to duties of care arising under contract law, we decline to consider the

question. It was never decided by the district court. As a result, it was not

preserved for appellate review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa

2002).

Concerning duties under the URLTA, we do not disturb the district court’s

conclusion. It concluded the URLTA requires landlords to maintain common

areas but only to the extent the landlord has control over those areas. The

advocacy from the Barneses was not sufficient to persuade us the district court 5

was wrong on that point. We have not explicitly held that landlords’ section

562A.15 obligations constitute duties of care for purposes of negligence, and the

Barneses’ brief does not clearly make such an argument. See also Ripperger v.

Iowa Pub. Info. Bd., 967 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Iowa 2021) (declining to consider an

argument, in part, because it was “thinly briefed”). In fact, the Barneses never

cited the section of the URLTA that imposes duties on landlords. See Iowa Code

§ 562A.15(1)(a); see also Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“In

a case of this complexity, we will not speculate on the arguments [the appellant]

might have made and then search for legal authority and comb the record for

facts to support such arguments.”).

For these reasons, we vacate the court of appeals opinion and affirm the

district court’s judgment.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

McDermott and May, JJ., take no part.

This opinion shall not be published.

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Related

Allison Ex Rel. Fox v. Page
545 N.W.2d 281 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1996)
Meier v. SENECAUT III
641 N.W.2d 532 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2002)
Hyler v. Garner
548 N.W.2d 864 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1996)

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