Sheldon v. Cole

2 Ohio N.P. 307
CourtCuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1895
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Ohio N.P. 307 (Sheldon v. Cole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheldon v. Cole, 2 Ohio N.P. 307 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1895).

Opinion

HUTCHINS, J.

(orally).

The plaintiff and the defendant own adjoining pieces of land in the township of Euclid in his county, which have been put in a state of grape culture, and they have carried on for some years what is known as a vineyard. The issue raised in this case is as to the surface water, and the question to be determined is whether or not, as charged in the petition, in a state of nature the surface water flows from the land of the plaintiff over onto the land of the defendant in a westerly or northwesterly direction; and whether that natural flow in a state of nature has been impeded and interrupted by the erection by the defendant of a dam or embankment along the defendant’s east line, the effect of which would be to force back the water upon the property of the plaintiff, to her injury and damage. ....

.... Without stopping at this time to read the petition, which is somewhat voluminous, I will say that it claims that the plaintiff was at the time of the grievances complained of in said petition, the owner of the piece of land described -in said petition, which land has been, as before stated, subjected to grape culture; and that in a state of nature the water flows westerly or northwesterly from the land of the plaintiff onto and over the land of the defendant, Hiram Cole, which lies west of plaintiff’s land; and that condition prevailed in a state of nature till the defendant obstructed this flow by the erection along the defendant’s east line of an embankment or dam of sufficient height to keep the water from flowing in that direction, and forcing it back upon the land of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that by reason of these conditions her property has been greatly damaged by thus setting back the water by means of this obstruction or dam, said damage amounting to the srim of $2500, as claimed; and that also a portion of her land lying northerly of what is called the ‘ ‘ Ridge’ ’ that is said to run across the Sheldon land, was overflowed by reason of the water being forced through and over this ridge, which plaintiff claims to be a natural obstruction, resulting in great damage and carrying away earth on the northern side of this ridge.

The defendant in his answer admits that he owns the land adjoining plaintiff described in the petition, and denies everything else in the petition; and by way of second defense and cross-petition he claims that by reason of the way in which the Sheldon vineyard is cultivated, the water was forced back over onto his land to his damage and injury, which was contrary to the natural flow of the surface water by nature.

The plaintiff in her repty to the cause of action set up in defendant’s answer and cross-petition denies these allegations.

The questions raised in this case are exceedingly interesting, and are not ordinarily met with; and in fact, it would seem that these questions have not been as fairly and fully met and discussed in the courts of Ohio as in some of our sister states. The following are the conclusions to which I have come as the law of the case:

According to the common law each land owner must care for his own surface water. According to the civil law, the lower land must receive the [309]*309«surface water which flows from the higher land in a state of nature, and the rule of the civil law seems to prevail in Ohio rather than the rule of the common law. A thorough examination of the authorities convinces i me that this application of the civil law rule is not uniform throughout the states in this country; many states in New England at least, and eastern states,and some southern states have adopted the common law rule, while in most of the western states the rule of the civil law prevails, which is a reversal of the common law.

Two or three cases in Ohio maybe referred to at this time. I firstrefer to the case in the 16 Ohio St. 335, Butler v. Peck. The syllabus of that case is as follows: “Where, upon the lands of B. there is a marshy basin from which, in times of high water, a portion of the water contained in the basin overflows its rim and naturally finds its way through a swale to and upon the lands of P., while the remaining portion of the water of the basin has no outlet, and is dissipated by evaporation, B. can not rightfully, by an artificial drain, conduct the water that has no natural outlet, from the basin and along said swale, so as to cause them to flow upon the lands of P. to his damage.” The Judge in his decision, quoting from the charge of the court below, says: While each party may avail himself of the natural position and capabilities of his own land, he cannot insist upon compelling the other to change places with him; and if you find in this case the facts to be, that there was a pond or basin upon defendant’s land which had not an outlet, and in which the waters aecummulating remained until evaporated, or that the waters of such pond or basin passed off through another channel, and in a different direction, and in either case the defendant, by the construction of his ditch, has conveyed onto the land of the plaintiff water which Avould either have remained on the defendant’s land until evaporated, or which would have, but for the ditch, passed off by a different channel or Avater Course, the defendant is liable; for he has no right, by the construction of new channeis, to throw onto the plaintiff water that would have gone there Avithout. Unless all of the water Avhich now passes through the natural channels on to the plaintiff’s land Avould have passed through the natural channels from the defendandt’s land on to that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. If you should find that the natural outlet of this basin is as the defendant claims, or if yoii should find that the Avater did pass out of it in a northAvesterly direction, but that it immediately came back upon land of the plaintiff, at the point Avhere it noAV does, or substantially so, you will find for the defendant; but if you find that after natural outlets had ceased to carry off the Avater, there still remained a basin covering several acres on Avhich Avater stood in the depth of mie, two or three inches or more, Avhich Avould not have passed upon the land of the plaintiff but for this improved channel, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.”

Another interesting case Avhere this question is discussed as to the application of this civil law rule is in the22d Ohio St. 247, Tootle v. Clifton. 'The syllabus is as folloivs: “The erection of an embankment upon ona’s OAvn land, whereby the surface water on the adjoining land of another is prevented from floAving in its natural course, and eausjd to íIoav off in a different direction over the land of the latter, is a nuisance for Avhich an action may be maintained without showing any actual damage, and foi~ Avhich nominal damages at least maybe recovered.” In his opinion in this case the court said: “It isnotdenied that the period of prescription, in cases of easements and incorporeal rights, is tweny-one years in Ohio; and it is admitted that the period begins to run Avhen a right of action accrues. The single question argued is, Avhether in a case like the present, hypothetically put by .the court in its charge, there isa right of action. [310]

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Bluebook (online)
2 Ohio N.P. 307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheldon-v-cole-ohctcomplcuyaho-1895.