Shelby's executors v. Shelby's

40 Ky. 266
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMay 13, 1841
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 40 Ky. 266 (Shelby's executors v. Shelby's) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shelby's executors v. Shelby's, 40 Ky. 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1841).

Opinion

Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Isaac Shelby, by his last will, admitted to record in the Lincoln County Court, in the year 1826, devised to his surviving wife, Susannah, his homestead tract of land, (‘■‘Traveller’s Rest,”) and sundry slaves and articles of [267]*267personalty, during her life, remainder to his youngest son, Alfred, who having, shortly after his father’s death, intermarried with Virginia Hart, continued to reside with his mother and chiefly superintended the estate thus devised to her for life and to himself in remainder, she controlling the household affairs, and he managing the farm, and buying, grazing, and selling, as his own, mules and other live stock, until the 2nd day of December, 1832, when he died, leaving three children, Isaac, Susan, and Alfred, and his wife ensiente with a fourth, bom after his death and named Sarah, and leaving also a will, published when he had only two children and wholly protermitting his two last, Alfred and Sarah.

Alfred Shelby’s will. Susannah Shelby’s will.

By this last will, which has been regularly proved and recorded, the testator, Alfred, gave, 1st, to his widow, during her widowhood and his son Isaac’s minority, his whole estate, excepting only his “mules on hand and (his) money in possession;” 2ndly, to his son Isaac, on his attaining 21 years of age, “ Traveller’s Rest, with all the lands appertaining to it,” “six of the choice of (his) negroes, and one equal half of all the others under fifty years of ago, also those over fifty years of age,” and also “ $1000 to purchase slock for his farm;” 3dly, to his daughter Susan, $10,000, and one half of his slaves after deducting the six to be first chosen by Isaac and those also over 50 years of age, ‘ ‘upon her marrying with the approbation of her mother;” and 4thly, to his widow and children, “the residue of (his) money on hand” and of the proceeds of his . mules, to be distributed among them when his son Isaac should become 21 years old, until which time his executors were directed to loan that aggregate fund at six per cent, annual interest. And James, Evan, and Isaac Shelby, brothers of the testator, were nominated his executors and declared to be “the legal, as they were the natural guardians of (his) family.”

Alfred Shelby’s widow and children continued, after his death, to reside at “ Traveller’s Rest” with his mother, who died in June, 1833, leaving a will, also duly recorded, whereby, with the exception of some small specific legacies, she gave to them her whole estate, to be distributed at such time and in such proportions as' her executors [268]*268might deem expedient; and her sons James, Evan, and Isaac, were nominated and qualified as her executors, as well as the excutors of the testator, Alfred.

Bill by Virginia Shelby, widow of Alfred. Last decree of Circuit Court. principles of the former opinion recognized. See 6 Vana, 60. Pretsrmiltedand posthumous children are entitled and succeed to the same interest in testator’s estate as if he had died intestate, & to raise portions for such, each devisee and legatee should, contribute proportionally, and each devisee and legatee then be permitted to enjoy, under the ■will, their respective devises and legacies, lessened by the contributions made to raise such portions.— The will is to be disregarded only so_ far as pretermitted child or children are concerned, and then carried into execution.

[268]*268Mrs. Virginia Shelby, claiming rights under her deceased husband’s will to which his executors did not acknowledge her title, brought this suit in chancery against them, for adjusting her interests and those of her four children, whom she also made defendants: and during the progress of the case in the Circuit Court the posthumous child, Sarah, died intestate of course.

The Circuit Judge has rendered three successive decrees in the case — the first was reversed by a summary opinion, reported in 6 Dana, 60; the second was also reversed by an unreported opinion; and the third and last is now to be revised upon a writ of error, prosocuted by the executors and others, and cross errors assigned by Mrs. V. Shelby.

By the last decree, now sought to be reversed, the Circuit Judge approved an able and elaborate report by auditors appointed to make partition of the land and slaves, and decreed against the executors, in favor of Mrs. Shelby, $6,625 37 in her own right, and $9,378 94 as the statutory guardian of her son Alfred.

The general principles indicated in 6th Dana, supra, and now to be more explicitly defined as those which should determine the immediate and ultimate rights of the parties are the following:

1st. Alfred Shelbifs will should be understood as intending to give to his widow, during her widowhood and the minority of her son Isaac, and no longer, the testator’s whole estate, excepting the mules and money “on hand” at his death; and consequently she is legatee, during her widowhood and Isaac’s minority, of all the testator’s dioses in action and perishable personalty, the said mules only excepted.

2ndly. According to the statutory provision of 1797, (Stat. Law, 1540,) in favor of pretermitted and posthumous children, and the interpretation of that enactment, established in the cases of Armistead vs Dangerfield, 3 Munford’s Va. Rep. 22, and of Haskins et al. vs Spiller, 1 Dana, 170, the testator’s two children, Alfred and Su[269]*269san, should be considered as pretermitted by his will, in the statutory sense; and consequently, in virtue of the statute, they “succeeded” to the same intersts in their deceased father’s estate as those to which they would have been respectively entitled in the event of his total intestacy; and, in alloting each of their legal portions, as his heirs and distributees, each devisee and legatee should contribute proportionally, that is, for example, assuming that each of those portions was one-fourth of two-thirds, (deducting one-third as the widow’s legal portion,) then each devisee of land or of slaves should contribute, to each of those heirs, the devised interest in one-fourth of two-thirds, (or 2-12,) and each legatee of personalty should contribute to each of those distributees the bequeathed interest in one-fourth of two-thirds, (or 2-12,) of the property bequeathed to such legatee. The one-third of each kind of property, to be deducted for ascertaining the immediate legal portions of the pretermitted children, remains to each devisee and legatee, whose interests, under the will, will be curtailed only to the extent of their respective contributions on account of those portions.

A devisee cannot succeed to the enjoymentof any property specifically devised to another by the same will, tho’ he may to a distributive share of property which, under the Stat. is taken from specific) devises, and set apart fox a pretermitted child that had died intestate.

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40 Ky. 266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shelbys-executors-v-shelbys-kyctapp-1841.