Shelby Sadler, V. Michael Devaney

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 87506-0
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

SHELBY LYNN SADLER, No. 87506-0-I

Respondent, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MICHAEL DE VANEY,

Appellant.

FELDMAN, J. — Michael De Vaney appeals an anti-harassment protection

order (AHPO) protecting his nephew’s former spouse, Shelby Lynn Sadler.

Because reversal of the AHPO would not provide effective relief to De Vaney, we

dismiss the appeal as moot. We also grant Sadler’s request for costs because she

substantially prevailed on appeal but deny her request for attorney fees because

we are unable to conclude De Vaney’s appeal was frivolous.

Sadler was previously married to De Vaney’s nephew, Gabriel Boley.

Sadler and Boley had a child together. Following dissolution proceedings, they

entered into a temporary parenting plan that included visitation provisions. Boley

subsequently enlisted De Vaney to attend and record the visitation exchanges.

Sadler asked De Vaney to stop, and De Vaney refused. Thereafter, Sadler filed a

petition for an AHPO, which a superior court commissioner granted. De Vaney No. 87506-0-1

subsequently filed a motion for revision, which a superior court judge determined

was untimely. He also filed a notice of appeal, which designates the AHPO as the

decision he wants reviewed under RAP 5.3.

Sadler argues the appeal is moot because the AHPO has expired and will

not be renewed. We agree. “A case is moot if a court can no longer provide

effective relief.” Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn. App. 715, 719, 230 P.3d 233

(2010). The AHPO at issue here expired on November 1, 2025. The record on

Sadler’s motion to dismiss also shows that the superior court denied her motion to

renew the AHPO on November 17, 2025 and ruled that no additional hearings will

be held in the trial court matter. The appeal period for the order of non-renewal

expired on December 17, 2025. RAP 5.2. Because the AHPO has expired, it no

longer restricts De Vaney’s conduct. Consequently, this court can no longer

provide effective relief. The appeal is therefore moot.

“We normally dismiss a case that involves only moot questions, unless that

case presents issues that are of substantial and continuing interest.” Blackmon,

155 Wn. App. at 720. “We consider three factors in deciding whether a case

presents issues of continuing and substantial interest: (1) whether the issue is of

a public or private nature, (2) whether an authoritative determination is desirable

to provide future guidance of public officers, and (3) whether the issue is likely to

recur.” Id. Here, the visitation exchanges are governed by a parenting plan

between Sadler and Boley, and whether to permit recording of these exchanges is

an issue of a private nature. Nor is this matter an appropriate vehicle to provide

guidance to public officers regarding the proper implementation of the parenting

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plan. See In re Marriage of Barone, 100 Wn. App. 241, 247, 996 P.2d 654 (2000)

(protection orders may not function as de facto modifications of parenting plans).

And finally, nothing herein suggests the issue is likely to recur.

De Vaney does not squarely address any of the above factors. Instead,

he states:

[I]if the bogus anti-harassment order were to remain on Appellant De Vaney’s public record, it could have an adverse effect on his state- funded housing allowance, rendering both Mr. and Mrs. De Vaney homeless. Forcing two disabled people out of their homes, is in fact a substantial issue of public importance, as it would then require the ADA’s involvement, reopen this case to seek due process and legal restitution against Respondent Sadler.

When De Vaney raised this issue below, the commissioner responded, “This is not

a criminal charge. It’s a civil matter.” While De Vaney appears to take issue with

that response, we decline to consider his argument because it is unsupported by

factual or legal citations. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d

801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (“the three grounds argued are not supported by

any reference to the record nor by any citation of authority; we do not consider

them”). We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Lastly, Sadler requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to RAP

14.2, RAP 18.l, RAP 18.9, RCW 4.84.185, and CR 11. Sadler substantially

prevailed on appeal and is thus entitled to costs under RAP 14.2 subject to

compliance with RAP 14.4. Regarding attorney fees, RAP 18.9(a) permits an

award of appellate fees as a sanction for filing a frivolous appeal. “An appeal is

frivolous if there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ

and is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.”

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In re Custody of A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d 156, 171, 451 P.3d 1132 (2019). “All doubts

as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant.”

Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514

(2013)). While De Vaney unnecessarily prolonged this appeal after the AHPO

expired, our commissioner’s decision to deny without prejudice Sadler’s motion to

dismiss the appeal as moot and permit Sadler to include a similar motion in her

brief of respondent gave De Vaney reason to believe his assignments of error

might remain viable. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that his appeal was

frivolous and therefore deny Sadler’s request for attorney fees on appeal.

Appeal dismissed as moot.

WE CONCUR:

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