IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1315 Filed October 1, 2025
SHELBY NICOLE BOOK and DYLAN JAMES BOOK, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JOHN BURGER, FAITH LUTHERAN CHURCH OF ADEL, IOWA, and IOWA DISTRICT WEST OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, Defendants-Appellees. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Michael Jacobsen
(judgment and directed verdict motion) and Brad McCall (summary judgment
ruling), Judges.
A husband and wife appeal summary judgment rulings, raise claims
concerning several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and allege the district
court erred in granting a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages.
AFFIRMED.
Billy J. Mallory (argued) and Trevor A. Jordison of Mallory Law, Urbandale,
for appellants.
Stephen E. Doohen (argued) of Whitfield & Eddy, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellee John Burger.
Patrick L. Sealey (argued) and Zack A. Martin, Heidman Law Firm, PLLC,
Sioux City, for appellee Faith Lutheran Church of Adel, Iowa. 2
Deborah M. Tharnish and Katie E. Gral (argued) of Dentons Davis Brown
PC, Des Moines, for appellee Iowa District West of The Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod.
Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and
Langholz, JJ. 3
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Shelby and Dylan Book appeal the following district court rulings: (1) a grant
of partial summary judgment for defendant Faith Lutheran Church (Faith Lutheran),
dismissing the Books’ negligent-hiring claim; (2) a grant of summary judgment
dismissing the Books’ negligent-hiring and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-
distress claims based on respondeat superior against defendant Iowa District West
of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (District West); (3) an evidentiary ruling
excluding causation testimony of an expert witness; (4) an evidentiary ruling
excluding the testimony of two witnesses, one due to lack of relevance and the
other because of prejudice; (5) the denial of the Books’ claim for punitive damages.
We affirm the grant of partial summary judgment to Faith Lutheran and the
grant of summary judgment to District West. We determine no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s evidentiary rulings. And we find no error in the district court’s
directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Shelby and Dylan Book began dating in 2014 and attended Faith Lutheran
Church of Adel, Iowa. Before they married, Dylan and Shelby agreed to an “open
marriage.” The Books participated in premarital counseling at Faith Lutheran and
married in 2017, with then-pastor John Burger (Burger) performing the ceremony.
By 2019, the couple began experiencing difficulties in their marriage.
Shelby testified that she and Dylan were not communicating often, and when they
did, it did not go well. On one occasion, Dylan came home to discover Shelby
having sexual relations with another man. Shelby and Dylan argued, and the next
day Shelby contacted Faith Lutheran for assistance with her marriage. 4
Shelby met with Burger at Faith Lutheran where they discussed the Books’
marriage difficulties. They traveled to Dylan’s workplace to bring him into the
conversation. It was during this conversation that Burger first learned of the Books’
open marriage.
While Dylan was on vacation, Shelby stayed behind in Iowa with the
couple’s child due to the previous argument. Before Dylan left, Burger asked Dylan
if he could continue to counsel Shelby without Dylan present. Dylan agreed.
Shelby and Burger agreed to meet at Burger’s home.
Conflicting testimony was given as to what occurred during the initial
session. Shelby testified that Burger requested Shelby be his “accountability
partner” where she would allow herself to be contacted by him so she could prevent
Burger from masturbating. Burger stated he merely referenced a previous
accountability partner and masturbation. Shelby testified that she became fearful
of Burger after this conversation.
Shelby called Dylan several hours later to tell him what happened. Dylan,
after conferring with others, suggested that Shelby call the Dallas County Sheriff’s
Office. The officers recommended that Shelby set up another meeting with Burger
at her home while deputies were present but hidden, and she would wear a
recording device. Shelby agreed.
Burger arrived at the Books’ residence and had another conversation with
Shelby. Burger was not aware the conversation was being recorded, nor was he
aware of the presence of deputies within the house. During the conversation,
Burger and Shelby discussed her marriage issues, the potential uses of hypnosis
therapy on Dylan, Burger’s previous experiences with an accountability or 5
“chastity” partner, and sexual “fasting.” Burger talked about his own marriage
issues. Then Burger indirectly requested Shelby be his accountability coach, and
when Shelby asked if this “coaching” just involved words, Burger replied, “It will be
whatever is right for our trust within the bounds of my marriage.” Burger also
stated, if Shelby became his accountability coach, “if you’re doing this with me, I
don’t want you around off with other guys, I don’t.” After Burger left the home, with
the recording still running, Shelby stated, “Holy shit. That worked. I first thought,
like, ‘[g]reat, this isn’t going anywhere, the way I wanted it to,’ and then it did . . . .”
The Dallas County Sheriff later determined Burger’s conduct, although “different
or weird,” was not criminal in nature.
Burger self-reported this incident to Dr. Turner (Turner), District West’s
president, and provided him with an apology letter that Burger wrote to the Books,
which Turner found confusing. Pastor Gerkin, a former pastor at Faith Lutheran
and former staff member at District West, made an accusation that the one-on-one
meetings between Burger and Shelby amounted to sexual misconduct. At this
point, Turner began investigating the claims.
A group from District West, which included Turner and Gerkin, met with the
Books and then met with Burger to obtain more information. Thereafter, Turner
placed Burger on “restricted status.” Turner later emailed Burger suggesting he
resign as pastor at Faith Lutheran. On the same date, Turner sent a letter to
Burger stating District West would begin a formal investigation. The newly formed
investigative committee interviewed Burger and again requested that he resign.
District West terminated Burger’s membership in the Missouri Synod but had no
power to remove him as pastor from Faith Lutheran. Afterward, District West 6
presented recommendations to Faith Lutheran, which Faith Lutheran could choose
to adopt or not adopt. Two weeks later, Burger resigned from Faith Lutheran.
The Books filed a petition and jury demand in Dallas County alleging the
following: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
professional negligence, and negligence against Burger; (2) negligence,
respondeat superior, negligent hiring, and negligent infliction of emotional distress
against Faith Lutheran; and (3) respondeat superior, negligent hiring, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress against District West. The Books sought
compensatory and punitive damages.
Before the case proceeded to jury trial, the district court held a hearing on
District West’s and Faith Lutheran’s motions for summary judgment. District West
was “seek[ing] summary dismissal of all the claims asserted against it.” Faith
Lutheran was “seek[ing] dismissal of the claims based on negligent hiring,
supervision and retention and negligent infliction of emotional distress.” The
district court dismissed all claims against District West based on a lack of an
employer-employee relationship with Burger. As to Faith Lutheran, the district
court dismissed the negligent-hiring claim because of lack of foreseeable harm
arising from hiring, supervising, and retaining Burger as an employee.
During trial, the court did not allow an expert treating witness, Kiel, to testify
on behalf of the Books as to the cause of Shelby’s alleged injuries, as the court
found there was no notice of causation testimony within the expert disclosure. The
court also found testimony from another of Books’ witnesses, Iowa Lutheran
Services counselor Pritzel, was not relevant, and she lacked personal knowledge
of conversations between Shelby and Burger. On the same day of trial, an offer 7
of proof regarding the testimony of a witness, M.D., took place to determine the
probative value of the anticipated testimony for the Books. M.D. was involved in
counseling sessions with Burger seven years prior and testified she was touched
inappropriately by Burger. The court found the offer of proof testimony to be too
remote, not probative, and “highly prejudicial.”
After the close of the Books’ evidence and again at the close of the
defendants’ evidence, but before the case was submitted to the jury, the
defendants moved for a directed verdict regarding the claim for punitive damages.
The claim for punitive damages related only to the claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty. The court granted the motion,
finding under Iowa Code section 688A.1 (2023) that Burger’s actions “were [not]
done with willful and wanton disregard of Shelby Book’s rights.” Nor did the court
find Burger acted with “malice or legal malice.”
The case was submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict finding only
against Burger and awarded damages of $5000 to the Books. The Books appeal.
II. Discussion
(A) Summary Judgment for Negligent Hiring against Faith Lutheran
The Books allege, in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to them,
that sufficient facts existed to defeat summary judgment on the negligent-hiring
claim against Faith Lutheran. The Books argue Faith Lutheran failed to properly
supervise Burger’s improper employee actions.
We review grants “of summary judgment for correction of errors at law.”
Rieder v. Segal, 959 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 2021). “Summary judgment is
appropriate when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 8
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Dumont v. Quincy Place
Holdings, No. 20-1054, 2021 WL 4593184, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021)
(quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). A material fact is one which “might affect the
outcome of the claim.” Id.
The burden of demonstrating “the nonexistence of a material fact question”
falls on the moving party. Susie v. Fam. Health Care of Siouxland, P.L.C., 942
N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 2020). But, if “the nonmoving party cannot generate a
prima facie case in the summary judgment record, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 336–37. We review “the summary judgment
record in the ‘light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Rieder, 959 N.W.2d
at 426 (quoting Hedlund v. State, 930 N.W.2d 707, 715 (Iowa 2019)).
A negligent hiring claim also includes negligent supervision and retention
claims. Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 1999). To succeed on a
negligent hiring claim, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) That the employer knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of its employee’s unfitness at the time of hiring; (2) that through the negligent hiring of the employee, the employee’s incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous characteristics proximately caused the resulting injuries; and (3) that there is some employment or agency relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant employer.
Id. The major consideration in a negligent hiring claim is the foreseeability of
negligent or reckless behavior by the employee. Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed
Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 42 (Iowa 2018). In the context of an agency relationship
between an employee and employer, “[c]onduct that results in harm to a third
person is not negligent or reckless unless there is a foreseeable likelihood that
harm will result from the conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). 9
We agree with the district court’s determination that there existed no
genuine issue of material fact concerning the negligent hiring claim against Faith
Lutheran. The Books presented no evidence demonstrating a foreseeable
possibility that harm could result from Burger interacting with Faith Lutheran
members. See id.; see also Humphries v. Trs. of the Methodist Episcopal Church
of Cresco, Iowa, 566 N.W.2d 869, 872–73 (Iowa 1997) (to properly resist a motion
for summary judgment “[the party] must set forth specific facts constituting
competent evidence to support a prima facie claim.” (citation omitted)). As the
district court pointed out, Burger has no criminal record and had never been
terminated from another church because of similar behavior. Also, none of the
witnesses who testified were aware of any previous improper behavior by Burger.
The Books argue that because Burger engaged in hypnosis in counseling
sessions and counseled with Shelby alone, Faith Lutheran failed to properly
supervise him. But, as stated above, there is no evidence that Faith Lutheran was
aware of Burger’s usage of hypnosis techniques or that he counseled Shelby, or
anyone alone, before the incident with Shelby. See Humphries, 566 N.W.2d
at 872. The Books have failed to provide evidence indicating any foreseeable
misconduct by Burger either at the time of his hiring or after, so there is no genuine
issue of material fact relating to the negligent hiring claim. See id.; see also
Dumont, 2021 WL 4593184, at *1. We affirm the district court’s entry of summary
judgment on this issue.
(B) Summary Judgment Regarding Vicarious Liability for District West
The Books claim the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
District West on the issue of vicarious liability, with the court finding that there was 10
not an employer-employee relationship between District West and Burger. The
Books assert that because District West investigated the allegations, placed
Burger on “restricted status,” suspended him from the Synod, and requested he
resign, they practiced a level of control indicating an employer-employee
relationship.
Claims of vicarious liability based on respondeat superior require “two
elements: proof of an employer/employee relationship . . . and proof that the injury
occurred within the scope of that relationship.” Walderbach v. Archdiocese of
Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 2007). Normally, “the question of
whether an employment relationship exists is one of fact that should be decided
by the trier of fact.” Heinz v. Heinz, 653 N.W.2d 334, 344 (Iowa 2002). But when
there is insufficient evidence to show an employer-employee relationship, a court
may issue summary judgment. See id.
When determining whether an employee-employer relationship exists, a
court weighs several factors, and the analysis is “not determined by one particular
fact or circumstance.” Id. at 343. “In making this determination, we look foremost
to the intention of the parties.” Id.; Teen Challenge Intern. USA v. Pauler,
No. 08-1801, 2009 WL 2424656, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009). We may also
look at several other factors, with no single factor being necessarily conclusive:
(1) the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the worker’s performance; (2) the kind of occupation-supervised or unsupervised; (3) skill; (4) who furnishes the equipment and workplace; (5) the length of time in which the individual has worked; (6) the method of payment; (7) the manner of termination of the work relationship; (8) whether there is annual leave; (9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the “employer”; (10) whether the worker accrues retirement benefits; 11
(11) whether the “employer” pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of the parties.
30 C.J.S. Employer—Employee § 6 (2025); Heinz, 653 N.W.2d at 343.
Within the context of District West’s relationship with Burger, the above
factors weigh against the existence of an employee-employer relationship. District
West did not control the manner of Burger’s work performance, did not pay his
salary, had no ability to terminate employment, and had no control over the way
Burger performed his employment duties.
According to testimony from the regional ecclesiastical supervisor and
district president, Turner, the only involvement in Burger’s hiring was District West
providing a list of candidates to Faith Lutheran. While District West had the right
to suspend Burger from the “Synod roster,” Faith Lutheran had the definitive
authority to terminate his employment or keep him as an employee. The extent of
District West’s involvement in Burger’s employment with Faith Lutheran was simply
to make recommendations, not ultimate decision-making. The relationship
between Burger and District West was not that of an employer-employee. See
Heinz, 653 N.W.2d at 343.
The district court appropriately determined that no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Burger was employed by District West, and we conclude the
grant of summary judgment regarding respondeat superior and vicarious liability
was not in error. See Susie, 942 N.W.2d at 336.
(C) Exclusion of Causation Testimony
The Books argue that their treating expert witness, Kiel, was improperly
limited in his testimony. The district court found that there was no notice filed 12
showing he would testify to causation within the expert disclosure. The Books
assert that “Iowa law does not require that a party serve a document captioned
‘Expert Disclosure,’” but the requirements are “satisfied when the expert was
identified in the designation and their facts and opinions disclosed elsewhere.”
We review the district court’s decision on the admission of expert testimony
for abuse of discretion. Mengwasser v. Comito, 970 N.W.2d 875, 881 (Iowa 2022).
“But when the question is one of interpretation of a rule of civil procedure, such as
rule 1.500(2), we review for errors at law.” Id.
The Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.500(2)(b) and (c) lay out expert
disclosure requirements, delineating which experts must provide a written report
and those who do not. Treating physicians1 who are designated as experts fall
under rule 1.500(2)(c), which states witnesses do not need to provide a written
report but must still provide a disclosure describing “(1) The subject matter on
which the witness is expected to present evidence . . . [and] (2) [a] summary of the
facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.” Mengwasser, 970
N.W.2d at 881–82. The “disclosure” need not be a document labeled as such; it
merely needs to conform to rule 1.500(2)(c). See id. at 882. Concerning the
rule 1.500(2)(c)(2) summary requirement:
[T]he summary of facts and opinions under rule 1.500(2)(c)(2) does not require a high level of specificity, [but] there must be some summary of the actual facts and opinions to which the witness is
1 Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(2)(b), a physician is not considered to
be “retained for litigation purposes” purely by virtue of their status as the plaintiff’s treating physician. Mengwasser, 970 N.W.2d at 882. 13
expected to testify. A mere list of topics or subject areas does not meet the requirements of the rule.
McGrew v. Otoadese, 969 N.W.2d 311, 324 (Iowa 2022).
Also, incorporation by reference within a disclosure to other evidence, such
as medical records or deposition testimony satisfies the summary requirement of
rule 1.500(2)(c)(2). Id. If the disclosure or incorporated evidence lacks certain
expert opinions, such as causation opinions, then a court may, in its discretion,
refuse to allow testimony on that subject. Id. at 325.
Here, the Books’ supplemental initial disclosures which designated Kiel as
a testifying expert stated his testimony would include “information regarding
injuries suffered as a result of the incident, and damages.” This disclosure satisfied
the first part of rule 1.500(2)(c), as it identified “the subject matter on which the
witness is expected to present evidence.” See id. at 324 (cleaned up).
As for the rule 1.500(2)(c)(2) requirement, contrary to the Books’ assertion,
the disclosure failed to provide a summary of opinions or facts to which Kiel would
testify. See Mengwasser, 970 N.W.2d at 882. The disclosure also failed to
incorporate by reference either deposition testimony, medical records, or any other
evidence as a basis for the causation opinion. See McGrew, 969 N.W.2d at 324.
More significantly, even if Kiel’s medical records had been referenced on the issue
of causation, the admitted record contains no opinions as to Burger causing
Shelby’s depression. See id. at 325.
The Books’ brief references a single page of Kiel’s records in which Shelby
allegedly discusses that her depression resulted from Burger’s actions. This page
was not admitted into evidence, and the Books do not argue it should have been 14
admitted. Further, the admitted medical records of Kiel discuss several other
potential causes of Shelby’s depression that do not reference Burger.
Because the Books failed to include any summary or reference to Kiel’s
causation opinion as required by rule 1.500(2)(c)(2), and since there is no
causation opinion within Kiel’s admitted records, we affirm the district court’s denial
of Kiel’s causation testimony. See id.; see also Bailey v. Grimes, No. 24-0740,
2025 WL 2057938, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025).
(D) Exclusion of Testimony of Pritzel & M.D.
The Books claim the district court erred in excluding the testimony of two
witnesses, Pritzel and M.D. Pritzel’s testimony was excluded because the court
deemed it not relevant, and the Books argue it was relevant to show breach of
fiduciary duty “to establish the duty owed by a counselor to a client.” M.D’s
testimony was excluded because it was found to be more prejudicial than probative
and remote. The Books argue M.D.’s testimony was probative to demonstrate
“that Burger intended to use the counseling sessions with [Shelby] Book to satisfy
his own sexual proclivities” and to show lack of mistake on the part of the Books.
We review the district court’s determination on whether to exclude or admit
evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560
(Iowa 2009). “Rulings on the relevance of evidence are entrusted to the discretion
of the trial court and warrant reversal only when the court has abused its
discretion.” State v. Munn, No. 13-1216, 2014 WL 3747729, at *6 (Iowa Ct.
App. July 30, 2014).
To determine whether evidence is relevant, the court analyzes whether it
has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 15
determination of the action “more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Iowa. R. Evid. 5.401. “The test is whether a reasonable
person might believe the probability of the truth of the consequential fact to be
different if the person knew of the proffered evidence.” McClure v. Walgreen Co.,
613 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Iowa 2000) (cleaned up). If an evidentiary ruling is
erroneous, “[w]e reverse only if the . . . ruling affects the substantial rights of the
complaining party.” Id. Even if evidence is relevant, a trial court has discretion to
exclude evidence when its “probative value [is] substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of issues.” Id.
i. Pritzel’s Testimony
Pritzel, a licensed counselor with Lutheran Family Service2 was a member
of the investigative committee which was tasked with reviewing the incidents
involving Burger and Shelby. The district court found, after reviewing deposition
testimony, that Pritzel’s testimony was not relevant because she lacked knowledge
of what Burger stated in his meetings with Shelby and the rest of the testimony
was not relevant. The Books assert Pritzel’s testimony would have “establish[ed]
the duty for negligence, that Burger had a duty to conduct himself in a professional
manner,” fiduciary duties, and that “her investigation revealed a breach of those
duties.”
Pritzel’s deposition shows that neither she nor anyone else in the
investigative committee had actual personal knowledge of what Burger said to
Shelby. The only evidence relied on by the committee was a letter of apology from
2 Lutheran Family Service is an independent organization separate from Faith
Lutheran and District West. 16
Burger to the Books, and one meeting with Burger where Pritzel thought he was
“evasive.” Pritzel did not obtain any notes from other investigators. None of the
investigators obtained or listened to the recorded conversation between Burger
and Shelby. Pritzel was not present when other investigators met with the Books.
It appears the only possible relevant information from the deposition were Pritzel’s
opinions as a licensed counselor, in which she stated Burger’s actions were “not
appropriate” as a religious counselor.
Pritzel’s testimony, based on the deposition, would not have convinced a
reasonable person to “believe the probability of the truth of the consequential fact
to be different if the person knew of the proffered evidence.” See id. Pritzel’s
knowledge of the incident was second-hand. And there was already opinion
testimony from other witnesses, including Pastor Turner, that Burger’s actions
were not appropriate.
The only testimony of Pritzel, which may have established the breach of
duties outlined by the Books, was opinion testimony based on her specialized
knowledge as a licensed counselor. But Pritzel was not designated as an expert
witness. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.701.3 As we afford deference to decisions of the
district court concerning relevancy of evidence, we find the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying testimony from Pritzel due to lack of personal
3 That rule states:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: a. Rationally based on the witness’s perception; b. Helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and c. Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of rule 5.702. 17
knowledge. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.602; see also Graen’s Mens Wear, Inc. v. Stille-
Pierce Agency, 329 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Iowa 1983).
ii. M.D.’s Testimony
M.D. was a former member of Faith Lutheran who had allegedly
experienced sexual abuse by Burger during a counseling session when she was
a minor. The Books offered M.D.’s testimony “to show that lack of mistake or
understanding on the part of the Books, . . . to show motivation, and . . . to show
opportunity.” The district court disallowed M.D.’s testimony after an offer of proof
because of lack of similarity, remoteness, absence of proof of motive and
opportunity, and that it was “more prejudicial than probative to any issue in this
case.”
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Concerning
relevant prior bad acts evidence, trial courts “must decide if the evidence’s
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” In
re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 456 (Iowa 2001). When evidence “has a
minimum of probative quality but is highly prejudicial [it] generally must be
excluded.” State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Iowa 1983). Trial courts also have
discretion to exclude relevant evidence because of remoteness if “the elapsed time
is great enough to negative any logical connection between the evidence and the
fact sought to be established by it.” Freeman v. Hy-Vee Inc., No. 99-1297, 2000 18
WL 1587764, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000) (quoting Godbersen v. Miller, 439
N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa 1989)).
During the offer of proof, M.D. testified that seven years earlier, when she
was fourteen years old, she participated in several grief counseling sessions with
Burger outside of Faith Lutheran. She alleged that during one session, Burger
asked her and her mother to lay down on their backs with their eyes closed. Burger
allegedly “graze[d]” M.D.’s chest and crotch areas over her clothing with his hands.
Although the trial court made no determination relating to relevancy,
assuming the testimony was probative, the court properly exercised its discretion
in excluding the testimony. See Williams, 628 N.W.2d at 456.
First, the court stated the events were “very dissimilar,” as Shelby never
accused Burger of inappropriately touching her. See State v. Thoren, 970
N.W.2d 611, 631 (Iowa 2022) (“To permit the inference that similar acts establish
the same person committed both acts, we have required that the other acts must
be ‘strikingly similar’ or of a ‘unique nature.’” (quoting In re J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d 748,
753 (Iowa 2005))).
Second, the court found the events in the testimony were too remote in
relation to Shelby’s accusations against Burger, a decision within the courts “sound
discretion.” Freeman, 2000 WL 1587764, at *4. Lastly, the district court
determined within its discretion that the testimony was “more prejudicial than 19
probative to any issue in this case,” and so the court was required to exclude the
testimony. Brown, 341 N.W.2d at 16.
We determine the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this
testimony.
(E) Denial of Punitive Damages
The Books assert the district court erred in declining to submit to the jury
the punitive damages issue. They argue that there was substantial evidence of
Burger’s conduct being willful and wanton and committed with legal malice. The
district court ruled on a motion for a directed verdict after the close of evidence.
The district court found the actions of Burger did not rise to willful and wanton
conduct, nor did he act with actual malice or legal malice, precluding a claim for
punitive damages.4
We review rulings by the district court on motions for directed verdict for “the
correction of errors at law.” Godfrey v. State, 962 N.W.2d 84, 99 (Iowa 2021). The
party against whom a motion for directed verdict is filed must show there is
substantial evidence supporting the claim to defeat the motion. Godar, 588
N.W.2d at 705. “Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it
as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Id. When reviewing a district court’s ruling,
4 The Books’ argument on appeal concerning punitive damages are directed at
Burger and not at Faith Lutheran. But even if their argument encompasses Faith Lutheran, we find punitive damages were not supported against Faith Lutheran. 20
we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was directed.” Id.
The standard for awarding punitive damages is defined in Iowa Code
section 668A.1(a): “[w]hether, by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence, the conduct of the defendant from which the claim arose
constituted willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another.” Willful
and wanton conduct has been defined as “when the actor has intentionally done
an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was
so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is
usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences.” Miranda
v. Said, 836 N.W.2d 8, 34 (Iowa 2013) (cleaned up).
The purpose of punitive damages is to serve as deterrence and punishment
for egregious conduct. McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 230. Punitive damages are
appropriate “only when actual or legal malice is shown.” Id. at 231. “Actual malice
is characterized by such factors as personal spite, hatred, or ill will.” Id. “Legal
malice is shown by wrongful conduct committed or continued with a willful or
reckless disregard for another’s rights.” Id. Merely objectionable or negligent
conduct is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Cawthorn v.
Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp., 743 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2007).
There is not substantial evidence to show Burger, in any of the meetings
with Shelby or the one including Dylan, acted “in disregard of a known or obvious
risk” in which it was “highly probable that harm would follow,” accompanied by
conscious indifference. See Miranda, 836 N.W.2d at 34 (citation omitted). Neither
was it shown that Burger acted with actual malice, as there is no evidence 21
demonstrating “spite, hatred, or ill will.” McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 230. The
evidence also does not substantially support Burger committing legal malice, as it
does not appear Burger acted “with a willful or reckless disregard for another’s
rights.” Id. at 231.
At the meetings between Burger and Shelby at Burger’s home and
subsequently at Shelby’s home, the evidence shows that Burger discussed his
own experiences with marriage counseling. The conversations included topics
such as faith, accountability coaches, masturbation, chastity, “and methods to
direct his sexual energy to his wife.” At the meeting at the Books’ residence,
Burger also implied that Shelby could be his accountability coach, and requested
that if she agreed, he would not want her to pursue sexual relations with another
person. The evidence does not show that Burger ever requested sex from Shelby.
The only physical contact between the two in the record was a consensual hug
after the meeting at Shelby’s house. As stated above, objectionable conduct does
not support a claim for punitive damages. See Cawthorn, 743 N.W.2d at 529–30.
We conclude the district court did not err in granting the motion for directed verdict
as to the punitive damages claim.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that summary judgment rulings were appropriate and
determine the district court committed no abuse of discretion in its evidentiary
rulings. And the district court committed no legal error in its directed verdict on
punitive damages. Accordingly, we affirm.