Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-12889 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00123-KD-B
SHEILA ZINNERMAN,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant–Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, BRANCH and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Sheila Zinnerman appeals the summary judgment against her complaint that
Worthington Industries, Inc., failed to hire her for its technical support team
because she was an African-American woman, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Zinnerman argues that the reasons
proffered by Worthington for filling its two available positions with Caucasian
men were pretextual and that its decisionmaker, Julia Yontz, was a mere conduit
for the discriminatory animus of Matthew Seeds, who Worthington retained after
purchasing Zinnerman’s former employer, Taylor-Wharton Cryogenics, LLC. We
affirm.
We review de novo a summary judgment. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694
F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences from that
evidence in her favor, but inferences based on speculation are not reasonable.
Kernel Records, 694 F.3d at 1301.
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any person with
respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
“because of” her race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under the burden shifting
approach articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
2 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 3 of 6
Zinnerman established a prima facie case of discrimination, so we consider
whether the reasons proffered to deny her a job were pretexts for discrimination.
See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).
Zinnerman had to prove that the reasons Worthington gave for its employment
decision were “false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). If the reasons Worthington gave
“might motivate a reasonable employer, [Zinnerman had to] meet [those] reason[s]
head on and rebut [them] . . . .” See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265–66 (quoting
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)) (alteration
adopted).
Worthington presented evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for hiring Marvin Brown and Joe Kuntz to perform inside sales and
technical support functions instead of Zinnerman. Testimony from Yontz and
Seeds established that Brown and Kuntz had more experience with technical
customer support than Zinnerman. Brown worked for Taylor-Wharton for thirty-
four years, during which he became familiar with its product line, accumulated
experience in international sales, and served in part as its manager of customer
service. Kuntz had a shorter history with Taylor-Wharton, yet he managed the
repair shop and oversaw all products returned, and he used his engineering
background and skills as a draftsman to contribute to the design and functionality
3 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 4 of 6
of Taylor-Wharton products. Zinnerman worked for Taylor-Wharton for nineteen
years, but her first three years were spent in accounting, followed by nine years in
customer service, and then four years in inside sales and customer service. And
Yontz testified that hiring Zinnerman would result in workplace redundancy.
Yontz explained that the duties Zinnerman performed in customer service and
inside sales were being assumed by Worthington employees in Ohio, and that its
Alabama facility would house a team that provided domestic and international
customers with technical assistance.
Zinnerman failed to create a genuine factual dispute about the legitimacy of
the reasons proffered by Worthington. Zinnerman provided no evidence that the
decision by Worthington to hire men with more technical experience was a pretext
for racial and gender discrimination. See Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.
Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007). Zinnerman argues that she “was
not seriously considered for the [two] positions [Worthington] was seeking to fill”
and likens herself to the applicant who decisionmakers failed to consider in Joshi
v. Florida State University Health Center, 763 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985). But
Yontz testified that Zinnerman failed during her interview to “demonstrate a great
deal of technical knowledge about the cryoscience product lines, and certainly not
as much technical knowledge as . . . Brown and Kuntz, . . . [which] was an
important quality Worthington was seeking in the new hires.” Zinnerman argues
4 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 5 of 6
that the company shifted its explanation for its employment decision by requiring
candidates to have experience in technical support when the original job posting
required experience only in inside sales and customer support, but the record
establishes, at most, that the weight given to certain criteria might have changed,
which does not prove pretext. See Tidwell v. Carter Prod., 135 F.3d 1422, 1428
(11th Cir. 1998); Zaben v. Air Products & Chem., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1458–59
(11th Cir. 1997). The job posting sought applicants with “Plant training” and
“Excellent problem solving skills,” and the posting stated that “Basic steel
processing and product knowledge [was] not needed, but [was] preferred . . . .”
Zinnerman failed, as required to prove pretext, that there were “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the . . .
proffered legitimate reasons [given by Worthington] . . . that a reasonable
factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265
(quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-12889 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00123-KD-B
SHEILA ZINNERMAN,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant–Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, BRANCH and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Sheila Zinnerman appeals the summary judgment against her complaint that
Worthington Industries, Inc., failed to hire her for its technical support team
because she was an African-American woman, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Zinnerman argues that the reasons
proffered by Worthington for filling its two available positions with Caucasian
men were pretextual and that its decisionmaker, Julia Yontz, was a mere conduit
for the discriminatory animus of Matthew Seeds, who Worthington retained after
purchasing Zinnerman’s former employer, Taylor-Wharton Cryogenics, LLC. We
affirm.
We review de novo a summary judgment. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694
F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences from that
evidence in her favor, but inferences based on speculation are not reasonable.
Kernel Records, 694 F.3d at 1301.
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any person with
respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
“because of” her race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under the burden shifting
approach articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
2 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 3 of 6
Zinnerman established a prima facie case of discrimination, so we consider
whether the reasons proffered to deny her a job were pretexts for discrimination.
See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).
Zinnerman had to prove that the reasons Worthington gave for its employment
decision were “false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). If the reasons Worthington gave
“might motivate a reasonable employer, [Zinnerman had to] meet [those] reason[s]
head on and rebut [them] . . . .” See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265–66 (quoting
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)) (alteration
adopted).
Worthington presented evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for hiring Marvin Brown and Joe Kuntz to perform inside sales and
technical support functions instead of Zinnerman. Testimony from Yontz and
Seeds established that Brown and Kuntz had more experience with technical
customer support than Zinnerman. Brown worked for Taylor-Wharton for thirty-
four years, during which he became familiar with its product line, accumulated
experience in international sales, and served in part as its manager of customer
service. Kuntz had a shorter history with Taylor-Wharton, yet he managed the
repair shop and oversaw all products returned, and he used his engineering
background and skills as a draftsman to contribute to the design and functionality
3 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 4 of 6
of Taylor-Wharton products. Zinnerman worked for Taylor-Wharton for nineteen
years, but her first three years were spent in accounting, followed by nine years in
customer service, and then four years in inside sales and customer service. And
Yontz testified that hiring Zinnerman would result in workplace redundancy.
Yontz explained that the duties Zinnerman performed in customer service and
inside sales were being assumed by Worthington employees in Ohio, and that its
Alabama facility would house a team that provided domestic and international
customers with technical assistance.
Zinnerman failed to create a genuine factual dispute about the legitimacy of
the reasons proffered by Worthington. Zinnerman provided no evidence that the
decision by Worthington to hire men with more technical experience was a pretext
for racial and gender discrimination. See Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt.
Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007). Zinnerman argues that she “was
not seriously considered for the [two] positions [Worthington] was seeking to fill”
and likens herself to the applicant who decisionmakers failed to consider in Joshi
v. Florida State University Health Center, 763 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985). But
Yontz testified that Zinnerman failed during her interview to “demonstrate a great
deal of technical knowledge about the cryoscience product lines, and certainly not
as much technical knowledge as . . . Brown and Kuntz, . . . [which] was an
important quality Worthington was seeking in the new hires.” Zinnerman argues
4 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 5 of 6
that the company shifted its explanation for its employment decision by requiring
candidates to have experience in technical support when the original job posting
required experience only in inside sales and customer support, but the record
establishes, at most, that the weight given to certain criteria might have changed,
which does not prove pretext. See Tidwell v. Carter Prod., 135 F.3d 1422, 1428
(11th Cir. 1998); Zaben v. Air Products & Chem., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1458–59
(11th Cir. 1997). The job posting sought applicants with “Plant training” and
“Excellent problem solving skills,” and the posting stated that “Basic steel
processing and product knowledge [was] not needed, but [was] preferred . . . .”
Zinnerman failed, as required to prove pretext, that there were “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the . . .
proffered legitimate reasons [given by Worthington] . . . that a reasonable
factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265
(quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Zinnerman also argues that Worthington is liable under a “cat’s paw” theory
because Yontz’s decision was influenced by Seeds’s discriminatory animus, but
Zinnerman’s argument fails. Yontz testified, without dispute, that she considered
Seeds’s opinions, but she decided who to hire based on her interviews and
independent assessments of the applicants’ experience and education. And
Zinnerman presented no evidence of discrimination by Seeds. Seeds referred to
5 Case: 18-12889 Date Filed: 04/05/2019 Page: 6 of 6
Zinnerman as the “odd man (woman!) out” in an email discussing the right to
annual leave based on seniority and allegedly kicked Zinnerman one time and
kicked her chair on two other occasions, but aside from Zinnerman’s speculation,
she identifies no facts from which to infer that Seeds harbored any race or gender-
based animus. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[M]ere
conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion.”). The evidence negated Zinnerman’s theory that
Yontz was a conduit for unlawful discrimination.
The district court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of
Worthington and against Zinnerman’s complaint of discrimination based on her
race and gender. Zinnerman failed to present evidence that the reasons proffered by
Worthington were pretextual. The evidence did not establish a genuine factual
dispute about whether the reasons Worthington did not hire Zinnerman were
nondiscriminatory or legitimate.
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Worthington.