Sheila Tovar, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. LGCY Power, LLC, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedDecember 5, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-02627
StatusUnknown

This text of Sheila Tovar, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. LGCY Power, LLC, et al. (Sheila Tovar, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. LGCY Power, LLC, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheila Tovar, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. LGCY Power, LLC, et al., (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 SHEILA TOVAR, on behalf of herself Case No.: 25-cv-02627-AJB-MSB and others similarly situated, 14 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S Plaintiff, 15 MOTION TO COMPEL v. INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION 16

LGCY POWER, LLC, et al., 17 (Doc. No. 3) Defendants. 18

20 Before the Court is Defendant LGCY Power, LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion to 21 compel individual arbitration and stay all proceedings.1 (Doc. No. 3.) For the reasons set 22 forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, DISMISSES 23 without prejudice Plaintiff’s class claims, and STAYS the action pending completion of 24 arbitration. 25 26 27 1 Pursuant to the Local Civil Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California (“Local Rules”), the Court deems this motion suitable for determination on the 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On October 20, 2024, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement with Defendant. 4 (Doc. No. 3-2.) The arbitration agreement includes the following provisions: 5 1. Scope Any and all Covered Claims (as defined below) between the Individual and the Company shall be submitted to and resolved exclusively 6 by final and binding individual arbitration in accordance with this Agreement 7 to the maximum extent permitted by law. 8 2. Covered Claims The term Covered Claims includes any and all claims, 9 causes of action, or other disputes of any kind, whether or not arising out of any employment relationship that may exist between the Individual and the 10 Company, that the Company may have against the Individual, or that the 11 Individual may have against the Company or against its directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents. However, the term Covered Claims does 12 not include those claims set forth below in Paragraph 3 of this Agreement. 13 Covered Claims include, but are not limited to, any claim, cause of action, or dispute of any nature relating to the Individual’s employment with Company, 14 . . . failure to pay wages, bonuses or any other form of compensation, failure 15 to provide rest or meal periods, failure to pay on time, wage statement or pay stub violations, failure to provide or compensate for vacation time, paid time 16 off, or sick leave, [and] tortious acts[.] Covered Claims shall include any and 17 all procedural, substantive and gateway issues, including, without limitation, any dispute between the Parties relating to the scope of the arbitrator’s powers, 18 the interpretation or enforceability of this Agreement or any part thereof, or 19 the arbitrability of any dispute. 20 (Id. ¶¶ 1–2.) 21 Claims excluded from the Arbitration Agreement include: 22 a) any dispute regarding the meaning, interpretation or enforceability of Paragraph 5, below; 23 b) any claim for state workers’ compensation, state or federal 24 disability insurance benefits, or state unemployment insurance 25 benefits or other health or welfare benefits under government- administered programs, except that any claim alleging retaliation 26 by the Company related to the Individual's pursuit of such 27 benefits shall be subject to individual arbitration under this Agreement; 28 1 c) any claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 2 1974 (ERISA), but only until the administrative procedures 3 stated in the employee benefit plan have been exhausted, at which point any further appeal shall be a Covered Claim under 4 this Agreement; 5 d) any administrative claim or charge with the Equal 6 Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and/or any similar state or local agency to investigate alleged violations of 7 laws enforced by the EEOC or those agencies. 8 e) any administrative charges for unfair labor practices or 9 other complaints or proceedings brought before the National Labor Relations Board; 10 f) any disputes as to whether a claim or dispute falls within 11 the definition of excluded claims as set forth in this Paragraph 3, which must be decided only by a court of competent jurisdiction 12 located in Utah County, Utah; and 13 g) any other claim that is not subject to arbitration by 14 operation of law. 15 (Id. ¶ 3.) 16 Additionally, “[a]ll Covered Claims under this Agreement shall be submitted and 17 arbitrated on an individual basis only,” and that “[t]he Parties expressly waive any right to 18 submit, initiate, assert, or participate in any class . . . action involving any other person[.]” 19 (Id. ¶ 5.) The parties agreed the Arbitration Agreement is to be governed primarily by the 20 Federal Arbitration Act and secondarily by the laws of the State of Utah, if the FAA is 21 deemed or construed to not apply for any reason. (Id. ¶ 4.) 22 B. Procedural Background 23 On August 21, 2025, Plaintiff, an allegedly non-exempt employee of Defendant, 24 filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint in the Superior Court of the State of 25 California for the County of San Diego, Case No. 25CU044343C, on behalf of herself and 26 other similarly situated hourly non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked in 27 California as “independent contractors” from the four years prior to the filing of complaint. 28 (See Doc. No. 1-2 at 4–30, Complaint. (“Compl.”).) Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action: 1 (1) Declaratory Relief; (2) Willful Misclassification; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; 2 (4) Failure to Authorize or Permit Meal Periods; (5) Failure to Authorize or Permit 3 Required Rest Periods; (6) Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Wage Statements; 4 and (7) Unfair Business Practices. (Id.) 5 On October 3, 2025, Defendant removed this action from the San Diego Superior 6 Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. (Doc. No. 1.) A week later, 7 Defendant filed the instant motion to compel individual arbitration and stay all 8 proceedings. (Doc. No. 3.) On October 15, 2025, the Court issued a briefing schedule, 9 setting October 29, 2025, as Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the motion. (Doc. No. 4.) 10 On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff brought a motion to remand (Doc. No. 7), which the 11 Court denied on December 4, 2025 (Doc. No. 17). Since the filing of Defendant’s motion, 12 Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or otherwise addressed the instant motion to compel 13 arbitration. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to contracts “evidencing a transaction 16 involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 17 2015). The Supreme Court has enunciated a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.” 18 AT&T Mobility LLC v., 344 (2011) (“The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure 19 the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 20 streamlined proceedings.”). The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by the 21 district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to 22 arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter 23 Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). 24 Accordingly, under the FAA, the Court must, as a general matter, determine “two 25 ‘gateway’ issues: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and 26 (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.” Brennan, 796 F.3d at 1130. If the two 27 factors are met, the Court must enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its 28 precise terms. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947

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Sheila Tovar, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. LGCY Power, LLC, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheila-tovar-on-behalf-of-herself-and-others-similarly-situated-v-lgcy-casd-2025.