Sheila Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 16, 2016
• Docket: 51A04-1509-CR-1376
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED May 16 2016, 9:42 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals regarded as precedent or cited before any and Tax Court

court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Steven Ripstra Gregory F. Zoeller Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana Jasper, Indiana Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sheila Taylor, May 16, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 51A04-1509-CR-1376 v. Appeal from the Martin Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Lynne Ellis, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No. 51C01-1501-F4-12

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary [1] Sheila Taylor appeals her six year sentence for conspiracy to commit dealing in

methamphetamines.1 We affirm.

Issues [2] Taylor presents two issues for review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing; and

II. Whether Taylor’s six year sentence is inappropriate.

Facts and Procedural History [3] Taylor pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit dealing in

methamphetamines, a Level 4 felony. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Taylor’s

sentence was capped at the advisory sentence of six years.2 At the sentencing

hearing, Taylor offered her own unsworn statement and testimony from five

witnesses to emphasize her efforts toward rehabilitation and also the effect

incarceration would have on her nine-year-old son. The trial court found

1 Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1, 35-41-5-2. 2 I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016 Page 2 of 6 Taylor’s history and commission of crime while on probation to be aggravating

factors, and imposed the advisory sentence. Taylor appealed.

Discussion and Decision Abuse of Discretion [4] In the sentencing hearing, Taylor’s counsel argued for leniency because of

Taylor’s cooperation with court orders and being “on track for rehabilitation,”

as well as the effect Taylor’s incarceration would have upon her son. (Tr. 81-

82.) Taylor now claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

specifically recognize these circumstances and her guilty plea as mitigators.

[5] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and

are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), decision clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218. Abuse of

discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual

deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. Where the court has imposed an

advisory sentence, the defendant has a “particularly heavy burden” to prove

such an abuse of discretion. Golden v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2007), trans. denied. One way a court can abuse its discretion is to omit a

mitigating factor advanced by the defense when the mitigating factor is both

significant and clearly supported by the record. Crawley v. State, 677 N.E.2d 520,

523 (Ind. 1997); Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91. However, the trial court is

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016 Page 3 of 6 not required to explain why it has declined to recognize a particular factor as

mitigating. Id. at 493.

[6] Taylor did not establish that the effect of her incarceration on her son would be

disproportionate in comparison to children of other incarcerated parents. Thus

the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to find hardship to Taylor’s son

to be a significant mitigating circumstance. See Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d

1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

[7] As for Taylor’s compliance with court orders and post-arrest rehabilitation

efforts, the evidence was conflicting. While Taylor participated in some

treatment programs after her arrest, she did not complete the mandatory relapse

prevention classes.

[8] Taylor pled guilty, for which she received a significant benefit. Two other

charges were dismissed and her sentence was capped at the advisory sentence.

Taylor’s decision to plead guilty may properly be considered a pragmatic

decision as opposed to a mitigating factor. See Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 220-

21.

[9] The sentence imposed was neither unlawful nor outside of the statutory range,

and the trial court did not refuse to recognize a clearly advanced and significant

mitigating circumstance. We do not find any abuse of discretion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016 Page 4 of 6 Inappropriateness of Sentence [10] Taylor asserts that her six year sentence is inappropriate and deserves revision.

We disagree.

[11] The authority granted to this Court by Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution

permitting appellate review and revision of criminal sentences was implemented

by the Indiana Supreme Court through Appellate Rule 7(B). We may “revise a

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s

decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature

of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).

The primary purpose in this type of review is to “leaven the outliers” and focus

on the aggregate sentence for the crime(s) committed. Caldwell v. State, 895

N.E.2d 1219, 1125 (Ind. 2008). The appellant bears the burden of

“persuad[ing] the appellate court that his or her sentence has met this

inappropriateness standard of review.” Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 630

(Ind. 2012) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)).

[12] The nature of the offense is that Taylor conspired to deal methamphetamine, in

an amount of one to five grams. There are no significant facts in the record that

would lead us to depart from the advisory sentence.

[13] As to Taylor’s character, she has eight criminal convictions and one juvenile

adjudication. Her record includes convictions for: criminal mischief, drunk

driving, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, intimidation, and conversion.

She was also convicted of forgery, a class C felony, in January 2013. One year

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016 Page 5 of 6 of this forgery sentence was suspended and Taylor was ordered to serve the

balance through an adult day reporting program. Despite this leniency,

however, Taylor committed the present offense while serving her day reporting

sentence. Taylor’s charges and convictions show an escalating pattern of

criminal behavior. Taylor’s advisory sentence is not inappropriate in light of

the nature of the offense and her character.

Conclusion [14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion and the sentence is not inappropriate.

[15] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 51A04-1509-CR-1376 | May 16, 2016 Page 6 of 6