Sheila Fernandez v. County of Los Angeles

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJanuary 21, 2026
Docket2:23-cv-08627
StatusUnknown

This text of Sheila Fernandez v. County of Los Angeles (Sheila Fernandez v. County of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheila Fernandez v. County of Los Angeles, (C.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

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4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 10 SHEILA FERNANDEZ, Case No. 2:23-cv-08627-FMO-MAR 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, JUDGE 14 Defendants. 15 16 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Complaint, the 17 relevant records on file, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States 18 Magistrate Judge. The Court has engaged in de novo review of those portions of the 19 Report to which Plaintiff has objected. 20 The Complaint alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights by terminating 21 her employment despite her firmly held religious beliefs, which she claims prevented 22 her from taking the COVID-19 vaccine. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Report recommends the 23 grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of collateral 24 estoppel. (Dkt. No. 65.) Plaintiff’s objections to the Report (Dkt. No. 66) do not 25 merit any change to the Report’s findings or recommendations. 26 Plaintiff objects that collateral estoppel does not apply because the issues from 27 this lawsuit are not identical to the issues that previously were decided by the Civil 1 (Dkt. No. 66 at 2-3.) As the Report found, however, “[w]hen collateral estoppel 2 applies, the prior determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the 3 parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” (Dkt. No. 65 at 10) (emphasis added) 4 (citing Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, the Hearing Officer 5 for the Civil Service Commission made a prior determination that Plaintiff’s 6 termination from employment was “appropriate” discipline because it was 7 “unrebutted” that Plaintiff had violated her employer’s vaccine mandate and because 8 Plaintiff had not proffered “any expert testimony to support an affirmative defense 9 that she established her religious beliefs met the requirements of sincerely held 10 beliefs.” (Dkt. No. 57-1 at 100-03.) That prior determination is conclusive in this 11 lawsuit because “all of Plaintiff’s causes of action here arise from the underlying claim 12 that her termination was wrongful.” (Dkt. No. 65 at 9.) “If the Hearing Officer had 13 determined that Defendant had violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, they could 14 not have found that Plaintiff’s discharge was appropriate.” (Id. at 19.) 15 Plaintiff objects that her civil rights claims were not actually litigated or 16 necessary decided in the administrative proceeding before the Civil Service 17 Commission, “because it was legally incapable of doing so.” (Dkt. No. 66 at 3.) As 18 the Report found, however, “the Civil Service Commission’s procedural rules did not 19 place any limits on the defenses or contentions a petitioner may raise[.]” (Dkt. No. 65 20 at 18) (citing Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 796 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). 21 “Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that she could not have raised her civil rights 22 claims before the Commission or that she was prevented from raising a defense. In 23 fact, it appears Plaintiff could have requested certification of the discrimination issue, 24 but did not do so.” (Dkt. No. 65 at 18-19 (citing Castillo v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal. 25 App. 4th 477, 482 (2001) (finding issue of discrimination was actually litigated where 26 “[Defendant] has not shown that he was prevented from introducing admissible 27 evidence relevant to that issue”)). 1 Plaintiff objects that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate 2 before the Civil Service Commission. (Dkt. No. 66 at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff 3 allegedly “was interrupted during her presentation and prohibited from arguing the 4 applicable civil-rights standards.” (Id.) But Plaintiff fails to cite the record to support 5 this allegation, and no support is apparent from the record. As the Report found, 6 “the Hearing Officer was open to and admitted evidence relevant to Plaintiff’s claim 7 of discrimination and ultimately made a determination that Plaintiff failed to provide 8 sufficient evidence that her religious beliefs met the requirements for a sincerely held 9 religious belief such that her termination violated her constitutional rights.” (Dkt. No. 10 65 at 18 (citing Dkt. No. 57-1 at 101)). “[A]lthough the discrimination claim was not 11 ‘certified as an issue’ for the Hearing, Plaintiff nevertheless had the ‘opportunity and 12 incentive’ to certify the discrimination issue and to present evidence of an affirmative 13 defense that she had established her religious beliefs met the requirements of a 14 sincerely held belief.” (Dkt. No. 65 at 18.) 15 The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment be entered dismissing this 17 action with prejudice and without leave to amend.

18 Dated: January 21, 2026 19 /s/ 20 HONORABLE FERNANDO M. OLGUIN United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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Related

Mark Eilrich v. Bernard J. Remas
839 F.2d 630 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Miller v. County of Santa Cruz
796 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. California, 1992)
Janin v. London & San Francisco Bank
14 L.R.A. 320 (California Supreme Court, 1891)

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Bluebook (online)
Sheila Fernandez v. County of Los Angeles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheila-fernandez-v-county-of-los-angeles-cacd-2026.