Sheida Hukman v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 26, 2026
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01279
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 SHEIDA HUKMAN, 4 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:21-cv-1279-ART-MDC 5 v. ORDER 6 TERRIBLE HERBST, INC.,

7 Defendant.

8 This is a civil rights action brought by pro se plaintiff Sheida Hukman, 9 alleging various claims of employment discrimination against her former 10 employer, Terrible Herbst Inc. (“Terrible’s”). On March 7, 2025, the Court entered 11 summary judgment in favor of Terrible’s. (ECF No. 96.) Ms. Hukman moves for 12 reconsideration. (ECF No. 102.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Ms. 13 Hukman’s motion for reconsideration. 14 I. LEGAL STANDARD 15 “If a motion for relief from an order or judgment is filed within the time 16 provided for by Rule 59(e), it should be considered a motion for reconsideration 17 pursuant to Rule 59(e). Otherwise, the motion is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion 18 for relief from a judgment or order.” Leonard v. Diaz, No. 1:22-CV-00381-KES- 19 GSA, 2025 WL 1159063, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (citing Am. Ironworks & 20 Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2001)). 21 Motions to Alter or Amend a Judgment under Rule 59(e) “must be filed no later 22 than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 23 Ms. Hukman’s motion will be construed as a Rule 59(e) motion. Two days 24 after the entry of judgment in Terrible’s favor, Ms. Hukman filed a motion to 25 extend time to file a motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 98.) The motion was 26 granted, and Ms. Hukman timely filed a motion for reconsideration about a 27 month and four days after the entry of judgment. (ECF No. 102.) Although Ms. 28 1 Hukman did not specify in her motion to extend time or her motion for 2 reconsideration whether she was moving under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 59(e) or 60, the Court infers that the motion arises under Rule 59(e). There would 4 not have been a need for Ms. Hukman to move for an extension of time if she 5 intended to bring her motion under Rule 60, which only requires that motions be 6 made “within a reasonable time” or no more than a year after the entry of 7 judgment, depending on the basis for reconsideration asserted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 60(c). 9 Although district courts have considerable discretion to decide Rule 59(e) 10 motions, amending a judgment after its entry remains “an extraordinary remedy 11 which should be used sparingly.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 12 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n. 1 (9th 13 Cir.1999)). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented 14 with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision 15 was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” 16 Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013); see also LR 59- 17 1(a). Clear error occurs when “the reviewing court on the entire record is left with 18 the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United 19 States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Under unusual 20 circumstances, an amendment for other reasons may be appropriate. Allstate Ins. 21 Co., 634 F.3d at 1111. 22 A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used “to raise arguments or present 23 evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment” Exxon 24 Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008); Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of 25 Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the district court did not 26 abuse its discretion when it denied a Rule 59(e) motion on the basis that a movant 27 had opportunities to bring its choice-of-law argument prior to entry of judgment). 28 Neither may it “be used to relitigate old matters.” Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 1 486 n.5; see also LR 59-1(b) (A movant “must not repeat arguments already 2 presented unless (and only to the extent) necessary to explain controlling, 3 intervening law or to argue new facts.”). 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 Ms. Hukman’s motion for reconsideration contains two types of arguments. 6 First, she argues that much of the evidence that Terrible’s presented in support 7 of summary judgment, and on which the Court relied, is inadmissible. Second, 8 she repeats arguments from her case in chief, some with slight modifications that 9 are responsive to the Court’s order granting summary judgment. Neither line of 10 reasoning is sufficient for Ms. Hukman to obtain reconsideration, because they 11 could have been or actually were raised prior to entry of judgment. 12 Ms. Hukman’s arguments going to the admissibility of Terrible’s evidence are 13 improper because they could have been brought before the entry of judgment. 14 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 486 n.5; Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. Ms. 15 Hukman argues that Terrible relies on time-barred evidence, on a video-audio 16 recording taken without her consent in circumstances that amounted to criminal 17 wiretapping, forged or perjured statements, and documents that she never 18 received, and unsworn statements. Ms. Hukman responded to Terrible’s motion 19 without making these objections. Her present motion for reconsideration does not 20 allege any change in law, newly discovered fact, or other circumstance that would 21 explain why she did not make these objections until now. 22 Where Ms. Hukman’s motion for reconsideration repeats the same arguments 23 that she has previously presented before the court, it is not proper. Exxon 24 Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008). Neither is it persuasive, as 25 the Court already considered and rejected these arguments. See Edwards v. Juan 26 Martinez, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00570-JAD-EJY, 2021 WL 12295881, at *1 (D. Nev. 27 Sept. 15, 2021). Ms. Hukman claims that she was paid less than male employees 28 who were performing the same duties; that she was told to quit or transfer to a 1 || different location, denied a pay bonus to which she was entitled for speaking 2 || fluent Spanish, and denied promotions because of unlawful discrimination; that 3 || she was retaliated against for filing a Title VII complaint. Insofar as these are the 4 || same positions that she took in her response to summary judgment, they are not 5 || taken into account on reconsideration. 6 Some of Ms. Hukman’s arguments relating to her case in chief have been 7 || slightly modified in her motion for reconsideration, but these too are improper 8 || because she has not explained why she did not bring these modified arguments 9 || in the first instance. For example, in her response to Terrible’s motion for 10 || summary judgment, Ms. Hukman said that while other cashiers were given lunch 11 || and rest breaks, she “was not directed to take any breaks.” (ECF No. 85.) In her 12 || motion for reconsideration, she now says that she “was directed not to take any 13 || breaks.” (ECF No. 102.) Like Ms. Hukman’s arguments going to the propriety of 14 || Terrible’s evidence, this is a position that she could have taken in response to the 15 |} motion for summary judgment and did not. Controlling precedent requires 16 || dismissing arguments that “could have been raised prior to the entry of 17 || judgment” and were not. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 486 n.5; Kona Enters., 18 || Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. 19 III. CONCLUSION 20 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 21 || 102) is DENIED. The case remains closed. 22 Dated this 26th day of February, 2026. 23 oan : Pes Naated 25 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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