Sheharyar Alam v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 25, 2025
DocketDC-315H-24-0413-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sheharyar Alam v. Department of the Air Force (Sheharyar Alam v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheharyar Alam v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SHEHARYAR ALAM, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-315H-24-0413-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: February 25, 2025 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Sheharyar Alam , Baltimore, Maryland, pro se.

Christine Austin , Esquire, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify that the appellant is not an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1), and thus lacks Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On petition for review, the appellant does not contest the administrative judge’s determinations that he did not have a statutory right of appeal and did not make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction over his probationary termination appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b). Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7, Initial Decision at 3. Though we agree with the administrative judge’s latter determination, we find his statement that probationary employees lack a statutory right of Board appeal is imprecise. Id. Therefore, we supplement his analysis herein to clarify this issue. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, subchapter II, an individual who meets the definition of “employee” at 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) generally has the right to challenge his removal from Federal service by filing an appeal with the Board. Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 9 (2011). To qualify as an “employee,” an individual in a competitive-service position, such as the appellant, must show either that he is 3

not serving a probationary period, 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i), or that he has completed 1 year of current, continuous service under an appointment other than a temporary one limited to a year or less, 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii). An individual may establish that he is a competitive-service “employee” under either of these alternative definitions. See McCormick v. Department of the Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The record shows, and the appellant does not dispute, that, on June 5, 2023, he was appointed to a competitive-service position, subject to a 1-year probationary period, and that the agency terminated him in February 2024. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-2, 6, Tab 5 at 11, 14-17, 31-32, 45-46. He has not alleged any prior Federal civilian service. Thus, the record shows that, at the time of his termination, he had not completed his initial probationary period and had less than 9 months of Federal civilian service. He has not made any allegation to the contrary. Therefore, we find that he does not satisfy either prong of the definition of “employee” set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A), and we conclude that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). We modify the initial decision accordingly. The appellant has provided no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s conclusion that he failed to establish jurisdiction pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.806, and he has not alleged any other basis for Board jurisdiction. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. Absent jurisdiction, we cannot consider the appellant’s arguments regarding the merits of his termination.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Boards final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

2 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 4

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements.

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Related

Ann M. McCormick v. Department of the Air Force
307 F.3d 1339 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Sheharyar Alam v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheharyar-alam-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2025.