Shefsky v. Mansew Corp.
Opinion
The impleading order of February 10, 1948, bringing in CRA as a party, was ex parte. Whether a motion to dismiss a counterclaim would ordinarily be the proper method to raise the question of the validity of such an order, we need not decide, for here the affidavit attached to the motion sufficiently raised that question. True, in that affidavit CRA urged that the order was erroneous under Rule 14, 28 U.S.C.A., whereas obviously the pertinent rule is Rule 13(h); however, the note printed on the summons might well have misled CRA. Consequently, we think the motion to dismiss the counterclaim should be considered as a motion to vacate the impleading order as improper under Rule 13(h).1
That rule allows impleader only where “ * * * the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim. * * * ”2 Here, when defendant sought impleader, its only basis was the supporting affidavit of defendant’s lawyer. We may assume, arguendo, that that affidavit would have sustained the order if it had stated merely (a) that the counterclaim would allege that plaintiffs had violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts, IS U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., and (b) that CRA had joined in the violations to such an extent that it was a necessary party if defendants were to obtain “complete relief” under the proposed counterclaim. But the affidavit went further. It thus said too much and, in so doing, said too little. For it alleged detailed facts which, so the affidavit asserted, “demonstrated” that the anti-trust laws had been violated. Those alleged facts fell far [949] short of anything like such a showing.3 The district court should therefore not have made the order joining CRA. as a party.
Affirmed.
Footnotes
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
177 F.2d 946 (Shefsky v. Mansew Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.