[Cite as Sheffield Village Parkside Condominium Assn. v. 5225 Parkhurst, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-129.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
SHEFFIELD VILLAGE PARKSIDE C.A. No. 16CA010930 CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION
Appellee APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT v. ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 5225 PARKHURST, L.L.C., et al. COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 15CV185601 Appellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 17, 2017
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, 5225 Parkhurst, L.L.C. (“5225 Parkhurst”) appeals the
judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to Plaintiff-
Appellee, Sheffield Village Parkside Condominium Association (“Association”). We reverse
and remand.
I.
{¶2} This matter arises out of a foreclosure action whereby the Association sought to
foreclose on a lien it had recorded against 5225 Parkhurst’s real property, a condominium unit
located within the Sheffield Village Parkside Condominium complex. The Association is an
existing nonprofit corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Ohio.
The Association’s purpose is to provide a corporate entity for the operation and administration of
the Association and to act on behalf of its members. The Association levied the lien in order to
recover condominium assessments and fees 5225 Parkhurst owed to the Association pursuant to 2
the condominium association’s governing documents. Subsequently, the Association filed a
complaint seeking personal judgment against 5225 Parkhurst and foreclosure of the lien. 5225
Parkhurst filed an answer denying the allegations set forth in the Association’s complaint and the
matter proceeded through the pretrial process.
{¶3} The Association ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment on the
Association’s claim for foreclosure of the lien and for money damages. In its response to the
Association’s motion, 5225 Parkhurst did not dispute that the Association was entitled to
payment of the assessment fees. However, 5225 Parkhurst did dispute the Association’s
contention that it was entitled to recover attorney fees and collection costs. Ultimately, the trial
court granted the Association’s motion and entered a judgment of foreclosure and a monetary
judgment in favor of the Association and against 5225 Parkhurst, which included attorney fees
and costs.
{¶4} 5225 Parkhurst filed this timely appeal, raising one assignment of error for our
review.
II.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in awarding the Plaintiff-Appellee attorney fees and litigation expenses which are not necessary and reasonable.
{¶5} In its sole assignment of error, 5225 Parkhurst contends that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment since the attorney fees and litigation costs were not necessary and
reasonable. We agree to the extent that the trial court failed to make a specific finding that the
attorney fees were fair, just and reasonable.
{¶6} A review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is considered de novo.
Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Accordingly, we apply the same 3
standard as the trial court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and resolving any doubt in the favor of the non-moving party. Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13
Ohio App.3d 7, 12 (6th Dist.1983). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate
when:
(1)[no] genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). Summary judgment consists of a
burden-shifting framework. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of
genuine issues of material fact concerning the essential elements of the nonmoving party’s case.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the
non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 293. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
moving party’s pleadings. Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶7} In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association
on the basis that there were no issues of material fact and that the Association had shown it was
entitled to recovery of its attorney fees. However, the trial court did not make a specific finding
as to whether the attorney fees were fair, just, or reasonable.
{¶8} Generally, Ohio courts have “adhered to the ‘American rule’ with respect to
recovery of attorney fees: a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees as
part of the costs of litigation.” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 548, 2009-Ohio-
306, ¶ 7, citing Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Darby, 33 Ohio St.3d 32, 33-34 (1987),
and State ex rel. Beebe v. Cowley, 116 Ohio St. 377, 382 (1927). “However, there are exceptions 4
to this rule. Attorney fees may be awarded when a statute or an enforceable contract specifically
provides for the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s attorney fees.” Wilborn at ¶ 7, citing
Nottingdale at 34. Additionally, with regard to recovery of attorney fees in an action on unpaid
common assessments, the Supreme Court of Ohio has specifically held the following:
[p]rovisions contained within a declaration of condominium ownership and/or condominium by-laws requiring that a defaulting unit owner be responsible for the payment of attorney fees incurred by the unit owners’ association in either a collection action or a foreclosure action against the defaulting unit owner for unpaid common assessments are enforceable and not void as against public policy so long as the fees awarded are fair, just and reasonable as determined by the trial court upon full consideration of all of the circumstances of the case.
(Emphasis added.) Nottingdale at syllabus. “This Court has held that a ‘trial court maintains
discretion to make the determination as to what [attorney] fee award is reasonable in light of all
the facts and circumstances of the case.’” Mauger v. Inner Circle Condominium Owners Assn.,
9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0046-M, 2011-Ohio-1533, ¶ 26 quoting Jerels v. Begue, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 24700, 2010-Ohio-1964, ¶ 13.
{¶9} In this case, the trial court determined that that the Association had demonstrated
that it was entitled to recovery of its attorney fees and costs. However, the trial court failed to
explain on what basis the Association was entitled to said attorney fees, nor did the trial court
make a determination as to whether the amount awarded was fair, just, and reasonable under the
circumstances of this case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding attorney
fees in its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Association. As such, we remand
this matter to the trial court and instruct it to determine in the first instance whether the attorney
fees sought by the Association are fair, just, and reasonable after fully considering the
circumstances in this case. See Klein v.
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[Cite as Sheffield Village Parkside Condominium Assn. v. 5225 Parkhurst, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-129.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
SHEFFIELD VILLAGE PARKSIDE C.A. No. 16CA010930 CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION
Appellee APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT v. ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 5225 PARKHURST, L.L.C., et al. COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 15CV185601 Appellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: January 17, 2017
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, 5225 Parkhurst, L.L.C. (“5225 Parkhurst”) appeals the
judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to Plaintiff-
Appellee, Sheffield Village Parkside Condominium Association (“Association”). We reverse
and remand.
I.
{¶2} This matter arises out of a foreclosure action whereby the Association sought to
foreclose on a lien it had recorded against 5225 Parkhurst’s real property, a condominium unit
located within the Sheffield Village Parkside Condominium complex. The Association is an
existing nonprofit corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Ohio.
The Association’s purpose is to provide a corporate entity for the operation and administration of
the Association and to act on behalf of its members. The Association levied the lien in order to
recover condominium assessments and fees 5225 Parkhurst owed to the Association pursuant to 2
the condominium association’s governing documents. Subsequently, the Association filed a
complaint seeking personal judgment against 5225 Parkhurst and foreclosure of the lien. 5225
Parkhurst filed an answer denying the allegations set forth in the Association’s complaint and the
matter proceeded through the pretrial process.
{¶3} The Association ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment on the
Association’s claim for foreclosure of the lien and for money damages. In its response to the
Association’s motion, 5225 Parkhurst did not dispute that the Association was entitled to
payment of the assessment fees. However, 5225 Parkhurst did dispute the Association’s
contention that it was entitled to recover attorney fees and collection costs. Ultimately, the trial
court granted the Association’s motion and entered a judgment of foreclosure and a monetary
judgment in favor of the Association and against 5225 Parkhurst, which included attorney fees
and costs.
{¶4} 5225 Parkhurst filed this timely appeal, raising one assignment of error for our
review.
II.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in awarding the Plaintiff-Appellee attorney fees and litigation expenses which are not necessary and reasonable.
{¶5} In its sole assignment of error, 5225 Parkhurst contends that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment since the attorney fees and litigation costs were not necessary and
reasonable. We agree to the extent that the trial court failed to make a specific finding that the
attorney fees were fair, just and reasonable.
{¶6} A review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is considered de novo.
Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Accordingly, we apply the same 3
standard as the trial court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and resolving any doubt in the favor of the non-moving party. Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13
Ohio App.3d 7, 12 (6th Dist.1983). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate
when:
(1)[no] genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). Summary judgment consists of a
burden-shifting framework. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of
genuine issues of material fact concerning the essential elements of the nonmoving party’s case.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the
non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 293. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
moving party’s pleadings. Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶7} In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association
on the basis that there were no issues of material fact and that the Association had shown it was
entitled to recovery of its attorney fees. However, the trial court did not make a specific finding
as to whether the attorney fees were fair, just, or reasonable.
{¶8} Generally, Ohio courts have “adhered to the ‘American rule’ with respect to
recovery of attorney fees: a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees as
part of the costs of litigation.” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 548, 2009-Ohio-
306, ¶ 7, citing Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Darby, 33 Ohio St.3d 32, 33-34 (1987),
and State ex rel. Beebe v. Cowley, 116 Ohio St. 377, 382 (1927). “However, there are exceptions 4
to this rule. Attorney fees may be awarded when a statute or an enforceable contract specifically
provides for the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s attorney fees.” Wilborn at ¶ 7, citing
Nottingdale at 34. Additionally, with regard to recovery of attorney fees in an action on unpaid
common assessments, the Supreme Court of Ohio has specifically held the following:
[p]rovisions contained within a declaration of condominium ownership and/or condominium by-laws requiring that a defaulting unit owner be responsible for the payment of attorney fees incurred by the unit owners’ association in either a collection action or a foreclosure action against the defaulting unit owner for unpaid common assessments are enforceable and not void as against public policy so long as the fees awarded are fair, just and reasonable as determined by the trial court upon full consideration of all of the circumstances of the case.
(Emphasis added.) Nottingdale at syllabus. “This Court has held that a ‘trial court maintains
discretion to make the determination as to what [attorney] fee award is reasonable in light of all
the facts and circumstances of the case.’” Mauger v. Inner Circle Condominium Owners Assn.,
9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0046-M, 2011-Ohio-1533, ¶ 26 quoting Jerels v. Begue, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 24700, 2010-Ohio-1964, ¶ 13.
{¶9} In this case, the trial court determined that that the Association had demonstrated
that it was entitled to recovery of its attorney fees and costs. However, the trial court failed to
explain on what basis the Association was entitled to said attorney fees, nor did the trial court
make a determination as to whether the amount awarded was fair, just, and reasonable under the
circumstances of this case. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding attorney
fees in its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Association. As such, we remand
this matter to the trial court and instruct it to determine in the first instance whether the attorney
fees sought by the Association are fair, just, and reasonable after fully considering the
circumstances in this case. See Klein v. Moutz, 118 Ohio St.3d 256, 2008-Ohio-2329, ¶ 13 (“The
trial court is in a better position to determine a fee award, for it may hold a hearing, take 5
testimony, create a record, and otherwise evaluate the numerous factors associated with
calculating an attorney-fee award.”).
{¶10} Accordingly, 5225 Parkhurst’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶11} As we have sustained 5225 Parkhurst’s sole assignment of error, the judgment of
the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgement reversed and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
JULIE A. SCHAFER FOR THE COURT 6
WHITMORE, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SCOTT J. ORILLE and BRIAN P. SCHERF, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
DARCY MEHLING GOOD and SHANNON M. MCCORMICK, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.