Sheffield v. State of Nevada

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 10, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00584
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 TRAVIS SHEFFIELD, Case No.: 2:22-cv-00584-GMN-NJK

9 Petitioner Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss and Granting 10 v. Motion to Seal

11 JEREMY BEAN, et al., (ECF Nos. 44, 48)

12 Respondents.

13 In his second-amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Corpus Petition Travis 14 Sheffield seeks to challenge his first-degree murder conviction. (ECF No. 33.) He 15 claims three grounds for relief, including alleging the evidence was insufficient and 16 ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondents move to dismiss most grounds of the 17 petition as untimely, unexhausted, and/or procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 44.) The 18 Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. Ground 3 is dismissed as 19 procedurally barred. Grounds 2(D), 2(F), 2(G) and 2(H) are timely. A decision as to 20 whether Grounds 2(A), 2(B), 2(C), and 2(G) are procedurally barred from federal review 21 is deferred. 22

23 1 I. Background 2 3 In March 2018, a jury convicted Sheffield of First-Degree Murder with use of a 4 Deadly Weapon, Assault with a Deadly Weapon, and Offer or Attempt to Sell Controlled 5 Substance. (Exh. 56.)1 He was selling drugs to a man in Las Vegas, then tried to rob 6 him and ended up shooting and killing him. The state district court sentenced him to an 7 aggregate sentence of life with the possibility of parole after 392 months. (Exh. 63.) 8 Judgment of conviction was entered on May 30, 2018. (Exh. 64.) The Nevada Supreme 9 Court affirmed Sheffield’s convictions in July 2019, and the Nevada Court of Appeals 10 affirmed the denial of his state postconviction petition in March 2022. (Exhs. 93, 132.) 11 Sheffield initiated his federal habeas action in April 2022. (ECF No. 7.) The 12 Court granted his motion for counsel, and he ultimately filed a Second-Amended 13 Petition in December 2023. (ECF No. 33.) He sets forth three grounds for relief: 14 Ground 1: The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove Sheffield’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the death of 15 Jonathan Collins, and thus his judgment of conviction violates his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 16 Ground 2: Sheffield’s trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the 17 Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to:

18 (A) Test a pill bottle filled with bullets for fingerprints;

19 (B) Address four jury questions;

20 (C) Mention alibi witness JaVonique Sheffield during closing arguments; 21 (D) Obtain an expert on eyewitness identification; 22 (E) File a meritorious motion for a pretrial lineup; 23

1 Respondents’ exhibits are found at ECF Nos. 41, 43, 46, 47. 1 (F) Object to prosecutorial misconduct; 2 (G) Object to Dr. Jennifer Corneal’s testimony; and 3 (H) The cumulative effect of counsel’s errors prejudiced Sheffield. 4 Ground 3: Sheffield was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth 5 Amendment right to confrontation.

6 (ECF No. 33 at 10-34.) 7 Respondents now move to dismiss most grounds as untimely, unexhausted, 8 and/or procedurally barred. (ECF No. 44.) Sheffield opposed, and respondents replied. 9 (ECF No. 50, 56.) 10 II. Legal Standards & Analysis 11 a. Relation Back 12 Respondents argue that several sub-parts of the ineffective assistance of trial 13 counsel claim (Ground 2) in Sheffield’s Second-Amended Petition do not relate back to 14 a timely-filed petition and should thus be dismissed as untimely. (ECF No. 44 at 7-8; 15 ECF No. 56 at 2-4.) The parties do not dispute that Sheffield’s original and first- 16 amended petition were timely-filed and that the Second-Amended Petition was filed 17 after the expiration of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) 18 one-year limitation period. Thus, the claims in the Second-Amended Petition will be 19 timely only if the new claims relate back to claims in a timely-filed pleading under Rule 20 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis that the claim arises out of 21 “the same conduct, transaction or occurrence” as a claim in the timely pleading. Mayle 22 v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). In Mayle, the United States Supreme Court held that 23 habeas claims in an amended petition do not arise out of “the same conduct, 1 transaction or occurrence” as claims in the original petition merely because the claims 2 all challenge the same trial, conviction or sentence. 545 U.S. at 655-64. Rather, under 3 the construction of the rule approved in Mayle, Rule 15(c) permits relation back of 4 habeas claims asserted in an amended petition “only when the claims added by

5 amendment arise from the same core facts as the timely filed claims, and not when the 6 new claims depend upon events separate in ‘both time and type’ from the originally 7 raised episodes.” 545 U.S. at 657. In this regard, the reviewing court looks to “the 8 existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted 9 claims.” A claim that merely adds “a new legal theory tied to the same operative facts 10 as those initially alleged” will relate back and be timely. 545 U.S. at 659 and n.5; Ha Van 11 Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 2013). 12 b. Exhaustion 13 A federal court will not grant a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief until the 14 prisoner has exhausted his available state remedies for all claims raised. Rose v. 15 Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A petitioner must give the state 16 courts a fair opportunity to act on each of his claims before he presents those claims in 17 a federal habeas petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999); see also 18 Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). A claim remains unexhausted until the 19 petitioner has given the highest available state court the opportunity to consider the 20 claim through direct appeal or state collateral review proceedings. See Casey v. Moore, 21 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004); Garrison v. McCarthey, 653 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 22 1981). 23 1 A habeas petitioner must “present the state courts with the same claim he urges 2 upon the federal court.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). The federal 3 constitutional implications of a claim, not just issues of state law, must have been raised 4 in the state court to achieve exhaustion. Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480, 1481 (D.

5 Nev. 1988) (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 276)). To achieve exhaustion, the state court 6 must be “alerted to the fact that the prisoner [is] asserting claims under the United 7 States Constitution” and given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of the 8 prisoner’s federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); see Hiivala v. 9 Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). It is well settled that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) 10 “provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 11 to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Jiminez v. 12 Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 13 (1982)). “[G]eneral appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, 14 equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish exhaustion.”

15 Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. However, citation to state case law that applies federal 16 constitutional principles will suffice. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 17 2003) (en banc). 18 A claim is not exhausted unless the petitioner has presented to the state court the 19 same operative facts and legal theory upon which his federal habeas claim is based. 20 Bland v. California Dept. Of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994). The 21 exhaustion requirement is not met when the petitioner presents to the federal court facts 22 or evidence which place the claim in a significantly different posture than it was in the 23 state courts, or where different facts are presented at the federal level to support the 1 same theory. See Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 1988); Pappageorge v. 2 Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982); Johnstone v. Wolff, 582 F. Supp. 455, 3 458 (D. Nev. 1984). 4 c. Procedural Default 5 In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who fails 6 to comply with state-law procedural requirements in presenting his claims in state court 7 is barred by the adequate and independent state ground doctrine from obtaining a writ 8 of habeas corpus in federal court. 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991) (“Just as in those cases 9 in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has 10 failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has 11 deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first 12 instance.”). Where such a procedural default constitutes an adequate and independent 13 state ground for denial of habeas corpus, the default may be excused only if “a 14 constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 15 innocent,” or if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice resulting 16 from it. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 17 To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, the petitioner must “show that 18 some objective factor external to the defense impeded” his efforts to comply with the 19 state procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. For cause to exist, the external 20 impediment must have prevented the petitioner from raising the claim. See McCleskey 21 v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991). With respect to the prejudice prong, the petitioner 22 bears “the burden of showing not merely that the errors [complained of] constituted a 23 possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 1 infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of constitutional dimension.” White v. Lewis, 2 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 3 (1982)). 4 In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court ruled that ineffective assistance of

5 postconviction counsel may serve as cause with respect to a claim of ineffective 6 assistance of trial counsel. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). The Martinez Court stated: “Where, 7 under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an 8 initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas 9 court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial 10 review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 11 ineffective.” 566 U.S. at 17; see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 (2013) 12 (regarding the showing necessary to overcome a procedural default under Martinez). 13 d. The Court rejects Respondents’ argument that several claims are untimely 14 15 Ground 2(D) 16 Sheffield asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert 17 on eyewitness identification. (ECF No. 33 at 25-27.) He contends that Collins’ girlfriend, 18 Julie Kniesl couldn’t identify Sheffield from a photo lineup and only identified him at his 19 preliminary hearing. He pointed to the report by Dr. Cara Laney, an expert on 20 eyewitness identification that his federal counsel retained. She criticized the photo 21 lineup and described Kniesl’s in-court identification as worthless because Sheffield had 22 already been arrested. 23 1 Respondents argue that this ground does not relate back in part, because in his 2 original and First-Amended Petitions, Sheffield claims that his trial counsel failed to 3 retain an eyewitness identification expert. (ECF No. 7 at 3-5; ECF No. 13 at 56-59.) 4 While he did not cite the Dr. Laney report, the current ground relies on the same core of

5 operative facts as the timely claims. Ground 2(D) relates back and is timely. 6 Ground 2(F) 7 Sheffield argues that his counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct 8 during closing arguments. (ECF No. 33 at 28-30.) He contends that the prosecutor 9 improperly vouched for the credibility of witness Rufus Smith and the reliability of 10 Kniesl’s identification. This ground essentially mirrors the claim brought in Sheffield’s 11 First-Amended Petition. (ECF No. 13 at 71-74.) Ground 2(F) relates back and is timely. 12 Ground 2(G) 13 Sheffield asserts that his counsel failed to object to the testimony of Dr. Jennifer 14 Corneal. (ECF No. 33 at 30-31.) Dr. Corneal testified about the autopsy on the victim

15 and the toxicology report, which had been completed by Dr. Elaine Olson who had 16 retired by the time of trial. In his First-Amended Petition, Sheffield presented the claim 17 that he was denied his right to confrontation because Dr. Corneal testified instead of Dr. 18 Olson. (ECF No. 13 at 129-130.) Both claims rely on the same core of operative facts. 19 Ground 2(G) relates back to a timely-filed claim, and is, therefore, timely. 20 Ground 2(H) 21 Sheffield insists that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors prejudiced him. 22 (ECF No. 33 at 32.) He raised a claim of cumulative error of trial counsel in his First- 23 1 Amended Petition. (ECF No. 13 at 107-108.) So, Ground 2(H) relates back and is 2 timely. 3 e. Several Grounds are unexhausted and/or procedurally defaulted 4 5 Respondents argue that most subparts of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 6 (Ground 2) are unexhausted. 7 Ground 2(C) 8 Sheffield alleges that his counsel failed to mention alibi witness JaVonique Sheffield 9 during closing arguments. (ECF No. 33 at 23-24.) Sheffield did not present this claim to 10 the state appellate court. (See Exhs. 128, 132.) Ground 2(C) is unexhausted. 11 Ground 2(D) 12 Sheffield contends that his counsel failed to obtain an expert on eyewitness 13 identification. (ECF No. 33 at 25-27.) Respondents argue that this federal claim is 14 unexhausted because it refers to an expert report prepared for the federal petition that

15 was not presented to the state courts. (ECF No. 44 at 11.) But Sheffield did argue to 16 the state courts that his counsel failed to obtain an expert. The Court declines to 17 dismiss the claim as unexhausted. 18 Ground 2(F) 19 Sheffield argues that counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct during 20 closing arguments. (ECF No. 33 at 28-30.) He presented this claim on appeal of the 21 denial of his state postconviction petition. (Exh. 128 at 50-55; Exh. 132 at 6-7.) Thus, 22 Ground 2(F) is exhausted. 23 1 Ground 2(H) 2 The Court declines to dismiss this claim of cumulative error of counsel at this time 3 because a cumulative error claim may be exhausted to the extent that the underlying 4 individual claims of error are exhausted.

5 Grounds 2(A), 2(B), and 2(G) 6 Sheffield concedes that these claims were not presented to state courts. (ECF 7 No. 33 at 20-23, 30-34.) He contends that they are technically exhausted and also 8 procedurally defaulted because the state courts would not consider the claims due to 9 the state procedural bars. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2002) (state court 10 remedies are “exhausted” when they are “no longer available, regardless of the reason 11 for their unavailability”). 12 Sheffield insists he can overcome the default of these claims under Martinez. To 13 establish cause under Martinez, a petitioner needs to show “that he had no counsel 14 during his state collateral review proceeding or that his counsel during that proceeding

15 was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington.” Rodney v. Filson, 916 16 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. Sheffield also needs 17 to establish prejudice. He can satisfy the prejudice standard by showing his defaulted 18 claims are “substantial,” for example, that they have “some merit.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 19 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013). 20 In Grounds 2(A), (B), and (G), Sheffield claims that his counsel failed to: test a 21 pill bottle containing bullets for fingerprints; address certain jury questions; and object to 22 Dr. Corneal’s testimony. Sheffield argues that postconviction counsel was ineffective 23 for failing to raise these claims and that the claims are substantial. (ECF No. 50.) 1 Respondents disagree that these claims are substantial. The Court concludes that 2 because the question of procedural default is intertwined with the underlying merits of 3 the claims, full merits briefing may assist the Court with its determinations, and best 4 serves judicial efficiency. A decision on whether grounds 2(A), 2(B) and 2(G) are

5 procedurally defaulted from federal review is deferred. 6 Ground 2(C) 7 Sheffield argued that this claim that his counsel failed to mention his alibi witness 8 during closing arguments is exhausted. However, the Court disagrees; the claim is 9 technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. So Sheffield may also choose to 10 argue in the merits briefing that the procedural default of Ground 2(C) should be 11 excused under Martinez. 12 Ground 3 13 This is the standalone claim that Sheffield’s confrontation rights were violated by 14 Dr. Corneal’s testimony. He argues that Ground 3 is technically exhausted and

15 procedurally defaulted and that the procedural default of this claim should also be 16 excused under Martinez and Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). In Edwards, 17 the Court held that that a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim 18 “can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the 19 habeas petitioner can satisfy the ‘cause and prejudice’ standard with respect to the 20 ineffective assistance claim itself.” Id. But cause here to excuse the default of Ground 3 21 is based on whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 22 confrontation claim on appeal. Under Edwards, the ineffective assistance of appellate 23 counsel must itself be exhausted in order to excuse the procedural default of Ground 3. 1 That claim was not presented to the state courts, and Martinez does not extend to 2 excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 3 Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521 (2017). The Court, therefore, dismisses Ground 3 as 4 procedurally barred from federal review.

5 III. Motion to Seal 6 7 Respondents have also filed a Motion for Leave to File an Exhibit Under Seal. 8 (ECF No. 48.) While there is a presumption favoring public access to judicial filings and 9 documents, a party seeking to seal a judicial record may overcome the presumption by 10 demonstrating “compelling reasons” that outweigh the public policies favoring 11 disclosure. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); 12 Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006) 13 (citations omitted). In general, “compelling reasons” exist where the records may be 14 used for improper purposes. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 15 598). 16 Here, Respondents ask to file Sheffield’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) 17 under seal because it is confidential under state law and contains sensitive, private 18 information. The Court has reviewed the PSI and concludes that Respondents have 19 demonstrated compelling reasons to file it under seal. Accordingly, the Court grants the 20 motion, and Exhibit 59, the PSI, will remain under seal. 21 22 23 | IV. Conclusion 2 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

4 44) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

5 e Grounds 2(D), 2(F), 2(G) and 2(H) are timely; 6 e Ground 3 is DISMISSED as procedurally barred from federal review; e A decision as to whether Grounds 2(A), 2(B), 2(C), and 2(G) are ' procedurally barred from federal review is deferred. 8 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Exhibit 10|| Under Seal (ECF No. 48) is GRANTED. The exhibit will remain under seal. 1] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents have 60 days from the date of this order to file an answer to the remaining grounds in the petition. The answer must contain all substantive and procedural arguments for all surviving grounds of the petition comply with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Proceedings in the United States 15]| District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sheffield will then have 45 days from the date of 17|| service of Respondents’ answer to file a reply. 18 19 DATED: 10 December 2024. “fp,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE