Sheffield v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Sheffield v. State

447 So. 2d 899, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25400

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 28, 1983

DocketNos. 82-1868, 82-1876

StatusPublished

This text of 447 So. 2d 899 (Sheffield v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sheffield v. State, 447 So. 2d 899, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25400 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).

Pincite

Opinion

BERANEK, Judge.

The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for dealing in stolen property and conspiracy to deal in the same stolen property. We reverse and remand.

The defendant was charged in two separate informations for the above two crimes arising from a single criminal episode. For some unknown reason, the State chose to prosecute the defendant for each crime separately, and defendant chose not to object. In the case charging defendant with dealing in stolen property, a defense continuance was taken. However, the speedy trial deadline ran in the conspiracy case. The defendant’s motion for discharge was denied due to the continuance in the other case.

Reviewing the matter on a case-by-case basis, we find the rationale of State v. DeSimone, 386 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), inapposite. Here, the defendant was not brought to trial within the speedy trial deadline and should have been discharged on the conspiracy charge. The State chose its prosecutorial route and is bound by it. Although the two prosecutions might well have been, consolidated, they were filed in different divisions before different judges and with different prosecutors. Each case was prepared separately and discovery proceeded independently. At all times, the defendant made known his reliance on the speedy trial deadline in the conspiracy case and the State even agreed to speed up discovery in that case to meet the speedy trial deadline. Unlike State v. DeSimone, supra, the instant ease presents strong elements of estoppel against the State. Further, in DeSimone the two informa-tions were consolidated prior to the running of the speedy trial deadline.

[900]*900Our review of the record convinces us that the appellant was prejudiced and the court thus erred in denying discharge as to the conspiracy count. We also find error in the trial of the matter as to the admission of certain coconspirator statements against defendant. This evidence prejudiced defendant in the dealing in stolen property prosecution so we must also reverse that conviction.

REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISCHARGE ON THE CONSPIRACY CHARGE AND POR A NEW TRIAL ON THE DEALING IN STOLEN PROPERTY CHARGE.

DELL and HERSEY, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BERANEK, Judge.

The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for dealing in stolen property and conspiracy to deal in the same stolen property. We reverse and remand.

The defendant was charged in two separate informations for the above two crimes arising from a single criminal episode. For some unknown reason, the State chose to prosecute the defendant for each crime separately, and defendant chose not to object. In the case charging defendant with dealing in stolen property, a defense continuance was taken. However, the speedy trial deadline ran in the conspiracy case. The defendant’s motion for discharge was denied due to the continuance in the other case.

Reviewing the matter on a case-by-case basis, we find the rationale of State v. DeSimone, 386 So.2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), inapposite. Here, the defendant was not brought to trial within the speedy trial deadline and should have been discharged on the conspiracy charge. The State chose its prosecutorial route and is bound by it. Although the two prosecutions might well have been, consolidated, they were filed in different divisions before different judges and with different prosecutors. Each case was prepared separately and discovery proceeded independently. At all times, the defendant made known his reliance on the speedy trial deadline in the conspiracy case and the State even agreed to speed up discovery in that case to meet the speedy trial deadline. Unlike State v. DeSimone, supra, the instant ease presents strong elements of estoppel against the State. Further, in DeSimone the two informa-tions were consolidated prior to the running of the speedy trial deadline.

[900]*900Our review of the record convinces us that the appellant was prejudiced and the court thus erred in denying discharge as to the conspiracy count. We also find error in the trial of the matter as to the admission of certain coconspirator statements against defendant. This evidence prejudiced defendant in the dealing in stolen property prosecution so we must also reverse that conviction.

REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISCHARGE ON THE CONSPIRACY CHARGE AND POR A NEW TRIAL ON THE DEALING IN STOLEN PROPERTY CHARGE.

DELL and HERSEY, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

447 So. 2d 899, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25400, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheffield-v-state-fladistctapp-1983.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack