Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney
This text of Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney (Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. BCD-CV-2015~25 ./
SHEEP SCOT ISLAND COMPANY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT v, ) FRANCES PINNEY'S MOTION ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FRANCES B. PINNEY, et al., ) ) Defendants )
Before the Court is Defendant Frances B. Pinney's ("Frances") Motion fol' Summary
Judgment against Defendant Diane A. Pinney ("Diane") concerning the ownership of 452
shares of stock of Sheepscot Island Company ("SICO"). Attorney Daniel L. Cummings
represents Frances. Diane appears pro se,
I. Background
Before the Couti is the question of ownership of 452 shares of stock in SICO.
According to Ftances, she owns 453 shares of stock in SICO evidenced by Share
Ce1tificate Nos. 307, 312, 496, 514, 549, 599, 611, and 708. Supp, S.M.F. ,r I. In August
2005, Frances intended to gift 452 of her shares to her stepdaughtel', Diane. Supp. S;M.F.
,r 4. On August 2, 2005, Frances executed a Stock Power indicating that she was transfering 452 shares of her original 453 shares to Diane and authorizing the SICO clerk,
Carl Stinson, to transfe1· the stock jn the SICO books. Supp. S,M.F. ~ 4, Ex C. At the
August 6, 2005 shareholders meeting of SICO, Frances attempted to deliver the original
Stock Power to Mr. Stinson. Supp. S.M.F. ~ 5. Mr. Stinson would not accept the Stock
Power. Supp. S.M.F. ~ 6. Frances does not remember what happened to the original
1 Stock Power, Supp. S.M.F. ~ 7. Frances contends that she never delivered the stock
certificates to Diane and therefore, Frances remains the owner of the stock. See Supp.
S,M.F. ~ 8. Diane claims that the stock was effectively transferred and that she is the
owner of the 452 shares. In the alternative, Diane argues that SICO was ''casual at best"
in its record keeping and therefore the Cou1t should find that under equity that Diane is
the owner of the stock.
At some point, Frances lost the original stock certificates. It is not clear from the
record whether the original stock certificates were lost before Frances signed the Stock
Power. On December 12, 2014, SICO issued Share Certificate No. 830 ("Replacement
Share') to Frances to replace the Original Share Certificates. Supp. S.M.F. ,r 3.
II. Standard of Review
Under M.R. Civ. P, 56, summary judgment is appropriate when review of the patties'
statements of mate1'ial facts and the record evidence to which the statements refer,
considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is
no genuine issue of material fact that is in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of Jaw. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 ME 20, ~ 11, 989 A.2d 733.
A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a genuine issue
when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between two competing
versions of the facts. Stewart-Dore v. Webster Hosp. Ass 'n, 2011 ME 26, ,I 8, 13 A.3d
773.
The evidence offered to establish a dispute as to a material fact, submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, "need not be persuasive at that stage, but
the evidence must be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination
2 without speculating.,, Estate ofSmith v. Cumberland Cnty., 2013 ME 13, 119, 60 A.3d
759. Likewise, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate even when concepts such as motive
or intent are at issue, if the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation," Dyer v. Dept. ofTransp., 2008 ME
106,114,951 A.2d 821,825 (citing Vives v. Fajardo, 472 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2007))
(internal quotations omitted) (internal punctuation omitted),
When acting on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not make inferences
based on the credibility or weight of the evidence. Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v, Wrabacon,
Inc., 2007 ME 34, ~ 16, 917 A.2d 123 (citing Emerson v. Sweet, 432 A.2d 784, 785 (Me,
1981)). A defendant who moves for summary judgment is entitled to a judgment only if
the plaintiff opposed to the motion, in response, fails to establish a prima facie case for
each element of the plainti fr s cause of action. Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMor/gage,
Inc., 2012 ME 103, 112, 48 A.3d 774.
III, Discussion
Frances moves the Comt to grant summary judgment arguing that the stock was never
delivered, and therefore, even though Frances intended at one time to transfer the stock to
Dfane, Frances remains the owner of the stock, There are two methods by which a person
acquires a security or an interest in a security according to Maine statute: "(a). The person
is a purchaser to whom a secul'ity is delivered pursuant to section 8-13 01; or (b). The
person acquires a security entitlement to the security pursuant to section 8~1501." 11
M.R.S. § 8-1104. Section 8-1501 pertains to the acquisition of securities accounts and is
inapplicable to this case. Therefore, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment
on the question of ownership of the 452 shares of SICO stock, Diane nrnst set out a prima
3 facie case for acquisition showing that she is a purchaser and that the stock was delivered
pursuant to section 8-1301.
The parties agree that Diane is a "purchaser" pursuant to the statutory meaning. The
parties dispute whether delivery occurred in accordance with section 8-1301. For delivery
of a certified security to be effectuatedi one of the following must occur:
(a). The plll'chaser acquires possession of the security certificate; (b), Another person 1 other than a securities intermediru.y> either acqllires possession of the security certificate on behalf of the purchaser or1 having previously acquired possession of the certificate, acknowledges that it holds for the purchaser; or (c), A securities intermediary acting on behalf of the put·chaser acquires possession of the security ce1tificate, only if the ceitificate is in registered form and is: (i) Registered in the name of the purchaser; (ri) Payable to the order of the purchaser; or (iii) Specially indorsed to the purchaser by an effective inclorsement and has not been indorsed to the securities intermediary or in blank.
11 M.R.S. §. 8wl301 (2016). All methods of effectuating delivery pursuant to Section 8
1301 requfre a physical transfer of the stock certificates or an acknowledgment that the
physical stock certificates are being held on the transferee's behalf. See Id. Frances and
Diane agree that Diane never acquired possession of the stock certificates. Diane does not
allege that someone acknowledged holding the stock certificates for her. She does not
allege that a securities intermediary acquired the stock ce1iificates on her behalf. I~ the
absence of any evidence that Frances gave the physical stock certificates to Diane or to
someone else on Diane's behalf, the Couii finds that no reasonable fact-finder could find
that delivery occurred _pursuant to Section 8-1301.
There are questions of fact concerning what exactly occurred when Frances presented
the SICO clerk with the Stock Power, whether the SICO clerk should have accepted it,
and what happened with the Stock Power subsequently. However, the disputed facts are
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