Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMay 4, 2017
DocketCUMbcd-cv-15-25
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney (Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney, (Me. Super. Ct. 2017).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. BCD-CV-2015~25 ./

SHEEP SCOT ISLAND COMPANY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT v, ) FRANCES PINNEY'S MOTION ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FRANCES B. PINNEY, et al., ) ) Defendants )

Before the Court is Defendant Frances B. Pinney's ("Frances") Motion fol' Summary

Judgment against Defendant Diane A. Pinney ("Diane") concerning the ownership of 452

shares of stock of Sheepscot Island Company ("SICO"). Attorney Daniel L. Cummings

represents Frances. Diane appears pro se,

I. Background

Before the Couti is the question of ownership of 452 shares of stock in SICO.

According to Ftances, she owns 453 shares of stock in SICO evidenced by Share

Ce1tificate Nos. 307, 312, 496, 514, 549, 599, 611, and 708. Supp, S.M.F. ,r I. In August

2005, Frances intended to gift 452 of her shares to her stepdaughtel', Diane. Supp. S;M.F.

,r 4. On August 2, 2005, Frances executed a Stock Power indicating that she was transfering 452 shares of her original 453 shares to Diane and authorizing the SICO clerk,

Carl Stinson, to transfe1· the stock jn the SICO books. Supp. S,M.F. ~ 4, Ex C. At the

August 6, 2005 shareholders meeting of SICO, Frances attempted to deliver the original

Stock Power to Mr. Stinson. Supp. S.M.F. ~ 5. Mr. Stinson would not accept the Stock

Power. Supp. S.M.F. ~ 6. Frances does not remember what happened to the original

1 Stock Power, Supp. S.M.F. ~ 7. Frances contends that she never delivered the stock

certificates to Diane and therefore, Frances remains the owner of the stock. See Supp.

S,M.F. ~ 8. Diane claims that the stock was effectively transferred and that she is the

owner of the 452 shares. In the alternative, Diane argues that SICO was ''casual at best"

in its record keeping and therefore the Cou1t should find that under equity that Diane is

the owner of the stock.

At some point, Frances lost the original stock certificates. It is not clear from the

record whether the original stock certificates were lost before Frances signed the Stock

Power. On December 12, 2014, SICO issued Share Certificate No. 830 ("Replacement

Share') to Frances to replace the Original Share Certificates. Supp. S.M.F. ,r 3.

II. Standard of Review

Under M.R. Civ. P, 56, summary judgment is appropriate when review of the patties'

statements of mate1'ial facts and the record evidence to which the statements refer,

considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is

no genuine issue of material fact that is in dispute and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of Jaw. Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 ME 20, ~ 11, 989 A.2d 733.

A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a genuine issue

when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between two competing

versions of the facts. Stewart-Dore v. Webster Hosp. Ass 'n, 2011 ME 26, ,I 8, 13 A.3d

773.

The evidence offered to establish a dispute as to a material fact, submitted in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment, "need not be persuasive at that stage, but

the evidence must be sufficient to allow a fact-finder to make a factual determination

2 without speculating.,, Estate ofSmith v. Cumberland Cnty., 2013 ME 13, 119, 60 A.3d

759. Likewise, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate even when concepts such as motive

or intent are at issue, if the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations,

improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation," Dyer v. Dept. ofTransp., 2008 ME

106,114,951 A.2d 821,825 (citing Vives v. Fajardo, 472 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2007))

(internal quotations omitted) (internal punctuation omitted),

When acting on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not make inferences

based on the credibility or weight of the evidence. Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v, Wrabacon,

Inc., 2007 ME 34, ~ 16, 917 A.2d 123 (citing Emerson v. Sweet, 432 A.2d 784, 785 (Me,

1981)). A defendant who moves for summary judgment is entitled to a judgment only if

the plaintiff opposed to the motion, in response, fails to establish a prima facie case for

each element of the plainti fr s cause of action. Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMor/gage,

Inc., 2012 ME 103, 112, 48 A.3d 774.

III, Discussion

Frances moves the Comt to grant summary judgment arguing that the stock was never

delivered, and therefore, even though Frances intended at one time to transfer the stock to

Dfane, Frances remains the owner of the stock, There are two methods by which a person

acquires a security or an interest in a security according to Maine statute: "(a). The person

is a purchaser to whom a secul'ity is delivered pursuant to section 8-13 01; or (b). The

person acquires a security entitlement to the security pursuant to section 8~1501." 11

M.R.S. § 8-1104. Section 8-1501 pertains to the acquisition of securities accounts and is

inapplicable to this case. Therefore, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment

on the question of ownership of the 452 shares of SICO stock, Diane nrnst set out a prima

3 facie case for acquisition showing that she is a purchaser and that the stock was delivered

pursuant to section 8-1301.

The parties agree that Diane is a "purchaser" pursuant to the statutory meaning. The

parties dispute whether delivery occurred in accordance with section 8-1301. For delivery

of a certified security to be effectuatedi one of the following must occur:

(a). The plll'chaser acquires possession of the security certificate; (b), Another person 1 other than a securities intermediru.y> either acqllires possession of the security certificate on behalf of the purchaser or1 having previously acquired possession of the certificate, acknowledges that it holds for the purchaser; or (c), A securities intermediary acting on behalf of the put·chaser acquires possession of the security ce1tificate, only if the ceitificate is in registered form and is: (i) Registered in the name of the purchaser; (ri) Payable to the order of the purchaser; or (iii) Specially indorsed to the purchaser by an effective inclorsement and has not been indorsed to the securities intermediary or in blank.

11 M.R.S. §. 8wl301 (2016). All methods of effectuating delivery pursuant to Section 8­

1301 requfre a physical transfer of the stock certificates or an acknowledgment that the

physical stock certificates are being held on the transferee's behalf. See Id. Frances and

Diane agree that Diane never acquired possession of the stock certificates. Diane does not

allege that someone acknowledged holding the stock certificates for her. She does not

allege that a securities intermediary acquired the stock ce1iificates on her behalf. I~ the

absence of any evidence that Frances gave the physical stock certificates to Diane or to

someone else on Diane's behalf, the Couii finds that no reasonable fact-finder could find

that delivery occurred _pursuant to Section 8-1301.

There are questions of fact concerning what exactly occurred when Frances presented

the SICO clerk with the Stock Power, whether the SICO clerk should have accepted it,

and what happened with the Stock Power subsequently. However, the disputed facts are

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Related

Vives v. Fajardo
472 F.3d 19 (First Circuit, 2007)
Emerson v. Sweet
432 A.2d 784 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1981)
Dyer v. Department of Transportation
2008 ME 106 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2008)
Beal v. Allstate Insurance Co.
2010 ME 20 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2010)
Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Wrabacon, Inc.
2007 ME 34 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2007)
Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hospital Ass'n
2011 ME 26 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2011)
Estate of Patrick P. Smith v. Cumberland County
2013 ME 13 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2013)
Lougee Conservancy v. Citimortgage, Inc.
2012 ME 103 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2012)

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Sheepscot Island Company v. Pinney, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheepscot-island-company-v-pinney-mesuperct-2017.