Shea v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.

68 N.W. 608, 66 Minn. 102, 1896 Minn. LEXIS 381
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedOctober 22, 1896
DocketNos. 10,100-(15)
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 68 N.W. 608 (Shea v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shea v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 68 N.W. 608, 66 Minn. 102, 1896 Minn. LEXIS 381 (Mich. 1896).

Opinion

BUCK, J.

On June 23, 1894, the plaintiff contracted with the Chicago Great Western Railway Company to transport 307 boxes of lemons from Boston, Massachusetts, to plaintiff, at Minneapolis, Minnesota. This railroad company has a line of railway from Chicago to Minneapolis, but none from Boston to Chicago. The lemons were forwarded from Boston via the Boston & Maine Railroad in a refrigerator car to Montreal, where the lemons were by it delivered to its connecting carrier, the Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company, for transportation to Chicago, and by it placed in a common box car with tin roof, and in this vehicle transported to Chicago by the Grand Trunk road, where they arrived on June 29, 1894. The Great Western Railway Company refused to receive and forward the lemons, alleging as its reason the great strike existing at that time, although it had contracted to do so, and had issued its bill of lading accordingly.

Upon this refusal the car loaded with lemons was delivered to this defendant, which owns and operates a railroad from Chicago to West Liberty, Iowa, but it had no line of railroad beyond the latter place in the direction of Minneapolis, although it did there connect with the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway, which runs to Albert Lea, Minnesota, and there connects with the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway, which extends to Minneapolis.

There is some controversy between the respective counsel as to who delivered the lemons to the defendant. In the complaint it is alleged that plaintiff made this delivery. In the answer it is alleged that “this defendant did not receive the said lemons from the plaintiff, but received them from the Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company, to be transported over the defendant’s line in the direction of Minneapolis, subject to delay caused by labor troubles.” On the trial it was stipulated that on or about June 27, 1894, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant 307 boxes of lemons, of the value of $1,842, consigned to plaintiff at Minneapolis, and that defend-

[104]*104ant, as such common carrier, received the same to be by it safely carried to West Liberty, aforesaid, and there delivered to the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Company, the next connecting carrier. Notwithstanding this stipulation, the defendant subsequently introduced without objection oral evidence and a written receipt showing that the car load of lemons was received by it from the Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company, and in counsel’s brief it is alleged that when the Great Western Railway Company refused to accept and forward the car of lemons the Grand Trunk delivered it to the defendant, although it is there further alleged that plaintiff adopted the delivery as his own act.

We are of the opinion that the record quite conclusively shows that the plaintiff had nothing to do personally with the delivery of the car of lemons to the defendant, and that the transaction was one between the Grand Trunk Railway and the defendant. At no time or place did the plaintiff communicate with the defendant or the other carrier mentioned relative to the lemons after the making of the first contract, June 23, 1894, and did not know of any of the proceedings in regard to putting the lemons in an ordinary box car with tin roof, or their delivery in said car to the defendant by the Grand Trunk Railway Company at Chicago. The assumption by the defendant’s counsel that the original contract, reserving the right on the part of the Chicago Great Western Company to forward the lemons by any railroad line between the point of shipment and destination, authorized that company to deliver the lemons to defendant so as to absolve it from any negligence in caring for them while in their possession, transporting them to their destination, is farfetched and unsound.

The lemons were in good order when delivered to the defendant at Chicago, June 29, 1894, and it executed a receipt to that effect. There is no evidence to the contrary, and the claim of defendant’s counsel that this question of how much of the total loss was due to the damage which occurred after the fruit was taken from the refrigerator car at Montreal and before it reached Chicago should have been submitted to the jury is without merit, and not justified by the evidence, nor by the conduct of counsel at the trial.

At the commencement of the trial the defendant’s counsel said: “I am inclined to think that we have got the affirmative and burden [105]*105of proof. I do not think there is any question in dispute except the conclusion of law.” When the testimony was closed, the same counsel said: “If your honor please, the defendant moves the court to withdraw this case from the consideration of the jury, and to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, for the reason that it does not appear from the evidence that the defendant has been guilty of any wrongful or negligent act.” Further remarks of the same nature were made by the same counsel. The plaintiff’s •counsel also asked for the direction of a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the amount claimed in the complaint. The court granted the plaintiff’s request.

It is useless to discuss this point to any great extent. Counsel should, in this case, be compelled to submit to the course which they pursued on the trial, and upon which the court below acted. The case was tried by both counsel and the court upon the theory that there was no question of fact to be submitted to the jury, and that the only question in dispute wras the conclusion of law based upon admitted or undisputed facts. Such being the state of the record, both parties are concluded thereby.

When the defendant railway company received the lemons on June 29, 1894, in Chicago, it did not put the lemons into another car, but undertook to carry them in the same car in which they were to West Liberty, Iowa, where they arrived on the afternoon of June 30. The weather was extremely warm on June 30, and July 1, 2, and 3. It is admitted in defendant’s answer that the lemons were loaded in a car unfit for the transportation of fruit, and that when they arrived at West Liberty they were nearly all spoiled, and of little value, on account of heat. At West Liberty the defendant had no connecting carrier to forward the lemons towards their destination except the Burlington, Cedar Eapids & Northern Railway Company, and it refused to accept and carry them forward, although the defendant, the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Company, and the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company had a traffic agreement by virtue of which they made and published a joint through traffic rate from Chicago to Minneapolis, and the lemons in question were to be shipped on that through rate. On July 2, 1894, the defendant’s agent at West Liberty opened the car, and examined the lemons, and, finding the lemons nearly spoiled, [106]*106tried to sell them, but could get no offer in excess of $250. The defendant finally induced the Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern. Company to transport the car to Cedar Rapids, 80 miles northwest of West Liberty, where the lemons were sold for the best price obtainable, viz. $491 net.

Thus we have for our consideration a case where a common carrier receives from a preceding connecting carrier perishable fruit in good condition, but in a car unfit for its transportation and safe-keeping, and does nevertheless transport it over its railway, and has it in its-possession three or four days, in extremely hot weather, and, by reason of its not being properly cared for, it is greatly damaged.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Di Vita v. Payne
184 N.W. 184 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1921)
E. H. Emery & Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
186 Iowa 1156 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1919)
George B. Higgins & Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
161 N.W. 145 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1917)
Nashville v. Johnson
109 N.E. 912 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1914)
Dunlap v. Great Northern Railway Co.
148 N.W. 529 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1914)
Lucas v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
80 S.E. 1076 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1914)
Vaillancour v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad
119 N.W. 53 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1908)
Kibby v. Michigan Central Railroad
105 N.W. 769 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1905)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
68 N.W. 608, 66 Minn. 102, 1896 Minn. LEXIS 381, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shea-v-chicago-rock-island-pacific-railway-co-minn-1896.